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Abstract: It hasÌýbeen widely discussedÌýthat systematic communicative disablements – such as disbelief, misinterpretation and unintelligibility – can be unjust.ÌýOurÌýcommunicativeÌýpractises extend beyond merely sharing information; we also share and contest which questions are worth answering, which answers suffice, what parts of our shared body of information matter.ÌýThis is a central aspect of our social epistemic practices. One way we do this is viaÌýperspectival communicationÌýin which what one communicates includes an interpretive stance or ‘way of looking’ at the world, via frames like metaphor and narrative.ÌýIn this paper, I consider how perspectival communicationÌýmay be wrongfully frustrated, constituting an unjust communicative disablement. IÌýanalyse howÌýperspectival communication can be distorted due to dominant ‘mis-interpretive’ resources. IÌýspecifically examine the way in which marginalised people’s testimony relating to their own experience of marginalisation, mayÌýbe misinterpretedÌýin such a way as to justifyÌýandÌýperpetuate that marginalisation thereby ‘backfiring’.ÌýMoreover, IÌýhighlight that attempts to counter hermeneutical injustice are especially vulnerable to this form of communicative disablement.