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Title: Purely perspectival ignorance and purely perspectival differences

Abstract: One might hold thatÌýde seÌý²¹²Ô»åÌý²õ±ð±ô´Ú-±ô´Ç³¦²¹³Ù¾±²Ô²µÌýbeliefs associated to ‘I’ and ‘now’ are philosophically significant but disagree with Lewis and Perry that this requires taking them to beÌý°ù±ð±ô²¹³Ù¾±±¹±ðÌýorÌý±è°ù¾±±¹²¹³Ù±ð. However, a quick look at the recent literature – including surveys by Titelbaum & Egan (2022) and Torre & Weber (2021) – might give one a different impression, for most who think that there’s something special about these beliefs overall agree with that it can be illustrated by the Lewis-Perry “either relative or private” dilemma. Indeed, I’ll argue that, deep down, this applies even to authors like Stalnaker 2008 and Prosser 2005, 2015 who otherwise are critical of Lewis and Perry. As far as I can see, the ubiquity of the Lewis-Perry dilemma can only be justified, if at all, by two kinds of arguments: arguments fromÌýpurely perspectival ignorance (PPI)ÌýandÌý´Ú°ù´Ç³¾Ìýpurely perspectival differences (PPD). Let’s evaluate these arguments taking recent contributions into account. Like Kwon (2017), I’m sceptical about arguments from PPI. The issue is I find it impossible to conceive of aÌýrational subjectÌý(like you and me) who is objectively omniscient but harbours a purely perspectival doubt, as Lewis’ (1979) gods and, more recently, Shaw’s (2019) forgetful god are supposed to be. In any case, I still think that Shaw’s discussionÌýshows something important:Ìýde nuncÌýignorance can arise in a peculiar way, we need only stop tracking time for a second. But I don’t think this needs to lead us to anything like the Lewis-Perry dilemma, for there’s promise in an alternative approach,Ìýthe Frege-Evans viewÌý(the name comes from Prosser 2005 but the view is inspired by Evans 1982). In the end of the day, whether the Frege-Evans view is ultimately tenable depends on the soundness of the argument from PPD, which I see as the strongest and most resilient reason to hold on to the orthodoxy. Few people ever dare challenge this compelling argument, but the last months have seen two exceptions: Lin (2022) and Hunter (2023). Let’s then look at their arguments against the entrenched assumption thatÌýpurely perspectival differencesÌýgive rise toÌýbelief differences. I’m sympathetic to Lin and Hunter’s ambitions but I think theirÌýarguments require improvement. I’ll do my best for this. One key idea is that, from the perspective of rational explanation and belief individuation, we can distinguishÌýwhichÌýaction subjects perform fromÌýhowÌýthey perform it. If so, then hopefully your eyebrows won’t be raised too high when I say that a subject’sÌýcurling up into a ballÌýand another’sÌýrunning to get helpÌýare theÌýsame actionÌýperformed in distinct ways.Ìý

Lin, Lixiao (forthcoming). ‘Attitudes and action: against de se exceptionalism’.ÌýInquiry.

Prosser, Simon (2005). ‘Cognitive dynamics and indexicals’.ÌýMind and LanguageÌý20 (4):369–391.

Prosser, Simon (2015). ‘Why Are Indexicals Essential?’.ÌýProceedings of the Aristotelian SocietyÌý115 (3pt3):211-233.

Stalnaker, Robert (2008).ÌýOur Knowledge of the Internal World. OUP.

Shaw, James R. (2019). ‘De Se Exceptionalism and Frege Puzzles’.ÌýErgoÌý6:1057-1086.

Titelbaum, Michael & Egan, Andy (2022). ‘Self-Locating Beliefs’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.