Sandy Goldberg is a Chester D.Tripp Professor of Philosophy at Northwestern University, and a professorial fellow at the University of 58³Ô¹Ï.\u00a0He works in the areas of Epistemology, Philosophy of Language, and Philosophy of Mind. His recent research focuses on the social dimensions of knowledge and the informational responsibilities of citizens.<\/p>\n
SCHEDULE:<\/strong><\/p>\n In the morning, Sandy will give a presentation for students and postgraduates in philosophy on PhD programs and the philosophy job market in the United States. Afterward, a few postgraduates will present their current research in epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind.<\/p>\n 9:30\u201310:30<\/strong>\u00a0Sandy Goldberg \u2018Information Session on Academic Philosophy in the United States\u2019<\/strong><\/p>\n Break<\/strong><\/p>\n 11:00\u201312:00<\/strong>\u00a0Katharina Bernhard \u2018Inductive Risk Decision-Making Maximizes Expected Accuracy\u2019<\/strong><\/p>\n Inductive Risk requires scientists (qua scientists) to weigh the risks of error when believing or disbelieving a scientific claim. This activity requires of scientists to consider practical or social utilities and decide whether the probability of a claim\u2019s truth is high enough to warrant belief (or low enough for disbelief) in light of those utilities. I will show that weighing the risks of error in Inductive Risk decisions can be understood as a genuine epistemic activity that \u2013 under appropriate formal constraints \u2013 can maximize (expected) accuracy. To that end, I will introduce the \u201cJamesian-Lockean threshold model\u201d (echoing \u201cgeneralized Lockeanism\u201d, Dorst 2019). This model embeds Lockeanism (\u201cbelieve p iff you have sufficient credence in it\u201d), and Jamesian epistemic goals (\u201cbelief truly!\u201d and \u201cavoid error!\u201d) in a framework of expected epistemic utility. It allows to determine a proposition- and context-dependent credal threshold for epistemically rational belief and disbelief.\u00a0The Jamesian-Lockean threshold model entails a specific type of permissivism for rational belief. What singles out Inductive Risk decisions as a special kind of Jamesian-Lockean belief formation is how this permissivism is (or ought to be) dealt with in scientific inquiry.<\/p>\n 12:00\u201313:00<\/strong>\u00a0Nathan Bray \u2018Religious Disagreement and Divine Psychology\u2019<\/strong><\/p>\n The argument that religious peer disagreement should lead to moderation of one’s theistic views has been subject to objections that rely on appeals to divine psychology, such as Moon’s (2021) argument. However, such objections are suspect because humans, as finite beings, are not well-equipped to determine what God or the Holy Spirit would do. Relying on these appeals weakens the argument and risks resurrecting the logical problem of evil that skeptical theism has seemingly resolved. Theists, including Alvin Plantinga, should be accountable for making similar moves in their arguments. I conclude that most responses to this argument are examples of appeals to divine psychology, thereby diminishing their strength.<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/b>Break<\/strong><\/p>\n 14:00\u201315:00\u00a0Viviane Fairbank \u2018How Journalists Know: A Case Study in Epistemic Justification\u2019<\/strong><\/p>\n A subset of applied epistemology, the epistemology of journalism investigates how journalists know what they know, and in what that knowledge consists. In this talk, I apply an epistemological analysis to the methods used by journalists to report on and verify the facts they publish; I am interested in the journalistic practices that make a fact into a\u00a0journalistic fact<\/i>. Based on the literature in contemporary journalism studies, I argue that journalists are epistemic agents of a distinctive kind because of the importance they place on testimonial knowledge and on\u00a0justification as verification<\/i>. This makes them a particularly interesting case study for philosophers interested in developing a non-ideal epistemology of testimony\u2014where\u00a0non-ideal epistemology<\/i>\u00a0is epistemology that is grounded in our everyday, \u201creal-world\u201d knowledge practices, including the acknowledgment of structural injustices and oppression. As proof of concept, I present three case studies from contemporary journalism, each of which serves to elucidate the norms of journalistic verification. The main takeaways are that (good) journalists subscribe to a well-defined practice of \u201cresponsible communication\u201d; they distinguish between different kinds of facts based on what kind of verification should be expected for them; and they rely on a notion of authority that is fact- and source-sensitive.<\/p>\n 15:00\u201316:00\u00a0Francisca Silva \u2018(In a Sense) Yes and (In a Different Sense) No\u2019<\/strong><\/p>\n There are conversational contexts where we are confronted with yes-or-no questions for which neither option seems entirely right but where we are inclined to answer instead with \u201cYes and no\u201d where this does not commit us with true contradictions for we are, as we say, talking \u201cin different senses\u201d. In this talk I aim to present a model for what goes on in such conversational contexts in terms of speakers taking the inquirers to have posed a defective question which is ambiguous between two non-defective questions that the speaker could appropriately answer with \u201cYes\u201d and \u201cNo\u201d, respectively. From this model we can derive a method to determine what concepts can be employed to ask what adequate questions.<\/p>\n 16:00\u201317:00\u00a0Daniel Garibay Garcia \u2018Authority and Group Assertion\u2019<\/strong>\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n Recently there is a lot of interest in collective phenomena; group assertion among those. In everyday conversations, it is very common that we attribute assertions not to individuals but to institutions, governments, companies, research groups,\u00a0 etc. For example, when the U.K. government says \u201cShortages are not related to Brexit\u201d through a spokesperson, or a research team publishes an article stating \u201cMicroplastics have been found in human bloodstream\u201d. In this work, I offer an account of group assertion. Utterances of sentences and expressions are paradigmatically performed by individuals, then there is an interesting question about if assertions can be attributed to groups (and not just to individuals) and when. I aim to provide an account that distinguishes between group and individual assertions (meaning assertions that belong to individuals). I expect my account to inform us about the nature of group assertion as a speech act and its relation to individual assertion. In my account, group assertion requires a special kind of authority: the authority to assert on behalf of a group. An assertion is a group assertion if the individual(s) performing the utterance have the authority to assert for it. To argue that my account is better than previous accounts, I present a case of group assertion that I hold other accounts can\u2019t explain. This is the case of what I call \u201cindividualistic collaborative assertions\u201d. I also discuss relevant details about the concept of authority that other accounts that speak of authority in relation to group assertion have overlooked.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n The event is hosted by the Arch\u00e9 Philosophical Research Centre Epistemology: Current 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