  {"id":10702,"date":"2023-09-14T14:08:51","date_gmt":"2023-09-14T13:08:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/arche\/event\/language-and-mind-seminar-13\/"},"modified":"2023-09-14T14:11:58","modified_gmt":"2023-09-14T13:11:58","slug":"language-and-mind-seminar-13","status":"publish","type":"tribe_events","link":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/arche\/event\/language-and-mind-seminar-13\/","title":{"rendered":"Language and Mind Seminar: Matheus Valente (LOGOS and Val\u00e8ncia)"},"content":{"rendered":"<div><b>Title<\/b>: Purely perspectival ignorance and purely perspectival differences<\/div>\n<div><\/div>\n<div><b>Abstract<\/b>: One might hold that\u00a0<i>de se\u00a0<\/i>and\u00a0<i>self-locating\u00a0<\/i>beliefs associated to &#8216;I&#8217; and &#8216;now&#8217; are philosophically significant but disagree with Lewis and Perry that this requires taking them to be\u00a0<i>relative\u00a0<\/i>or<i>\u00a0private<\/i>. However, a quick look at the recent literature &#8211; including surveys by Titelbaum &amp; Egan (2022) and Torre &amp; Weber (2021) &#8211; might give one a different impression, for most who think that there&#8217;s something special about these beliefs overall agree with that it can be illustrated by the Lewis-Perry &#8220;either relative or private&#8221; dilemma. Indeed, I&#8217;ll argue that, deep down, this applies even to authors like Stalnaker 2008 and Prosser 2005, 2015 who otherwise are critical of Lewis and Perry. As far as I can see, the ubiquity of the Lewis-Perry dilemma can only be justified, if at all, by two kinds of arguments: arguments from\u00a0<i>purely perspectival ignorance (PPI)\u00a0<\/i>and<i>\u00a0from<\/i>\u00a0<i>purely perspectival differences (PPD)<\/i>. Let&#8217;s evaluate these arguments taking recent contributions into account. Like Kwon (2017), I&#8217;m sceptical about arguments from PPI. The issue is I find it impossible to conceive of a\u00a0<i>rational subject<\/i>\u00a0(like you and me) who is objectively omniscient but harbours a purely perspectival doubt, as Lewis&#8217; (1979) gods and, more recently, Shaw&#8217;s (2019) forgetful god are supposed to be. In any case, I still think that Shaw&#8217;s discussion\u00a0shows something important:\u00a0<i>de nunc<\/i>\u00a0ignorance can arise in a peculiar way, we need only stop tracking time for a second. But I don&#8217;t think this needs to lead us to anything like the Lewis-Perry dilemma, for there&#8217;s promise in an alternative approach,\u00a0<i>the Frege-Evans view\u00a0<\/i>(the name comes from Prosser 2005 but the view is inspired by Evans 1982). In the end of the day, whether the Frege-Evans view is ultimately tenable depends on the soundness of the argument from PPD, which I see as the strongest and most resilient reason to hold on to the orthodoxy. Few people ever dare challenge this compelling argument, but the last months have seen two exceptions: Lin (2022) and Hunter (2023). Let&#8217;s then look at their arguments against the entrenched assumption that\u00a0<i>purely perspectival differences<\/i>\u00a0give rise to<i>\u00a0belief differences<\/i>. I&#8217;m sympathetic to Lin and Hunter&#8217;s ambitions but I think their\u00a0arguments require improvement. I&#8217;ll do my best for this. One key idea is that, from the perspective of rational explanation and belief individuation, we can distinguish\u00a0<i>which\u00a0<\/i>action subjects perform from\u00a0<i>how\u00a0<\/i>they perform it. If so, then hopefully your eyebrows won&#8217;t be raised too high when I say that a subject&#8217;s<i>\u00a0curling up into a ball<\/i>\u00a0and another&#8217;s\u00a0<i>running to get help\u00a0<\/i>are the<i>\u00a0<\/i>same action\u00a0performed in distinct ways.<i>\u00a0<\/i><\/div>\n<div><\/div>\n<div>\n<div>Evans, G. (1982).\u00a0<i>The Varieties of Reference<\/i>. OUP.<\/div>\n<div>Hunter, David (2023).\u00a0<i>On Believing<\/i>. OUP.<\/div>\n<div>Kwon, Hongwoo (2017). &#8216;Mary and the Two Gods: Trying Out an Ability Hypothesis&#8217;.\u00a0<i>Philosophical Review<\/i>\u00a0126 (2):191-217.<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div>Lin, Lixiao (<i>forthcoming<\/i>). &#8216;Attitudes and action: against de se exceptionalism&#8217;.\u00a0<i>Inquiry<\/i>.<\/div>\n<div>Prosser, Simon (2005). &#8216;Cognitive dynamics and indexicals&#8217;.\u00a0<i>Mind and Language<\/i>\u00a020 (4):369\u2013391.<\/div>\n<div>Prosser, Simon (2015). &#8216;Why Are Indexicals Essential?&#8217;.\u00a0<i>Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society<\/i>\u00a0115 (3pt3):211-233.<\/div>\n<div>Stalnaker, Robert (2008).\u00a0<i>Our Knowledge of the Internal World<\/i>. OUP.<\/div>\n<div>Shaw, James R. (2019). &#8216;De Se Exceptionalism and Frege Puzzles&#8217;.\u00a0<i>Ergo<\/i>\u00a06:1057-1086.<\/div>\n<div>Titelbaum, Michael &amp; Egan, Andy (2022). &#8216;Self-Locating Beliefs&#8217;, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.<\/div>\n<p>Torre, Stephan &amp; Weber, Clas (2021). &#8216;What is Special about De Se Attitudes?&#8217;\u00a0<i>In<\/i>\u00a0Stephen Biggs &amp; Heimir Geirsson (eds.),\u00a0<i>The Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference<\/i>. Routledge. pp. 464-481.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Title: Purely perspectival ignorance and purely perspectival differences Abstract: One might hold that\u00a0de se\u00a0and\u00a0self-locating\u00a0beliefs associated to &#8216;I&#8217; and &#8216;now&#8217; are philosophically significant but disagree with&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":44,"featured_media":0,"template":"","meta":{"_tribe_events_status":"","_tribe_events_status_reason":"","_tribe_events_is_hybrid":"","_tribe_events_is_virtual":"","_tribe_events_virtual_video_source":"","_tribe_events_virtual_embed_video":"","_tribe_events_virtual_linked_button_text":"","_tribe_events_virtual_linked_button":"","_tribe_events_virtual_show_embed_at":"","_tribe_events_virtual_show_embed_to":[],"_tribe_events_virtual_show_on_event":"","_tribe_events_virtual_show_on_views":"","_tribe_events_virtual_url":"","footnotes":"","_members_access_role":[],"_members_access_error":"","_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"tags":[],"tribe_events_cat":[],"class_list":["post-10702","tribe_events","type-tribe_events","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/arche\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tribe_events\/10702","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/arche\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tribe_events"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/arche\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/tribe_events"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/arche\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/44"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/arche\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tribe_events\/10702\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":10704,"href":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/arche\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tribe_events\/10702\/revisions\/10704"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/arche\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=10702"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/arche\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=10702"},{"taxonomy":"tribe_events_cat","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/arche\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tribe_events_cat?post=10702"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}