58吃瓜

Abstract. 鈥� In this talk I argue that our engagement in debates about art can be fruitfully understood along the same lines as debates in conceptual engineering. Proposals in conceptual engineering are not to be evaluated on the basis of their ability to track empirical essences but on the basis of a concept鈥檚 epistemic, pragmatic, or political merits. In the same way, we should view membership in the category 鈥榳ork of art鈥� as well as subcategories such as 鈥榝olk art鈥� and 鈥榮culpture鈥� not as a fact to be discovered but a decision to be made. I flesh out this core idea by describing a normativist account of aesthetic terms, according to which our terms do not function to 鈥減ick out鈥� properties in the world but enable speakers to convey, endorse, and negotiate semantic and behavioral norms. I conclude by showing how this parallel understanding of art and conceptual engineering sheds light on more general issues for conceptual engineers, such as the role of power in the legitimization of new concepts and philosophical questions.