58吃瓜

Title: Good Moves: A Risk-Theoretic Account of Telic Know-How

Abstract: I defend a new account of telic know-how, what I call the Good Moves (GM) account. To know how to complete a telic task T is to possess a stable, trainable disposition to select and sequence good moves across T’s state space, where a move is good just in case it robustly reduces the risk of task-failure across a neighbourhood of nearby contexts. The GM account reconstructs the intellectualism / anti-intellectualism dispute as a dispute over two distinct functional roles within a single disposition: an underwriting role (occupied by propositional and quasi-propositional representations) and a manifestation role (occupied by motor and perceptual systems). Their relative weight shifts systematically with three structural parameters of the task environment (namely, the volatility, alignment, and precision of a task) which together yield a taxonomy of practical domains from routine/friendly to hostile. The view builds an anti-luck condition into the unit of action itself in such a way as to dispose of Gettier-style worries at the source; it accommodates gradability and context-sensitivity without multiplying kinds of know-how and, further, grounds two empirically familiar grades of practical credit, one Watsonian (attributability) and one Aristotelian (accountability).