58吃瓜

April 30^th, 聽Arche Philosophical Research Centre, 58吃瓜 University. Venue School II.

Organiser: Jessica Brown

There is a widespread consensus that the online spread of disinformation, misinformation, and hatred have had dramatic and pernicious effects on politics worldwide.聽 It has arguably contributed in particular to the rise of authoritarian movements and governments, and to the false beliefs and hatreds that sustain them.聽 This workshop aims to bring together experts in political philosophy of language and political epistemology to understand the mechanisms at work in our online information and communication ecosystems.

Talk Timetable:

09.30-10.45. Zakkou. Defeat as Defense. A Novel Account of Figleaves

11-1215. Peet. Some Problems in the Ethics of Interpretation

1215-1315 Lunch (Served in UCO 36, Spanish seminar room)

1315-1430. Marsili. The costs and benefits of hiding: anonymous testimony in online spaces.

1440-1555. Popa-Wyatt. Platform speech should be libertas not gratis

1555-1615 tea break (Served in UCO 36, Spanish seminar room)

1615-1730 Cepollaro. Studying Toxic Speech and Counterspeech On Social Media – Let’s Brainstorm!

1800 Speaker Dinner

Open to philosophy faculty and graduate students outside 58吃瓜/Stirling by request. Please contact the organiser Jessica Brown in 58吃瓜.

Abstracts

Ceppollaro. “Studying Toxic Speech and Counterspeech On Social Media – Let’s Brainstorm!”

Abstract: In this workshop, I will present a pilot study (2021) conducted in collaboration with computer scientists, in which we collected, annotated, and analyzed a corpus of Twitter pairs of toxic speech and counterspeech, focusing on different axes of discrimination such as sexism, racism, and homophobia. I will outline the annotation guidelines we used and invite participants to discuss how these might be improved for future studies. This will be interactive: together, we will reflect on how to refine our annotation practices and, more broadly, how to shape our research questions in light of the philosophical issues addressed in the workshop.

Marsili. The costs and benefits of hiding: anonymous testimony in online spaces
Anonymous testimony is often taken to be epistemically weaker than ordinary testimony, givent that it (i) obscures the speaker鈥檚 track record and (ii) lowers reputational costs for dishonesty. Pseudonymity appears to fall in between. To test whether this 鈥淚PA hierarchy鈥� (identified > pseudonymous > anonymous) is reflected in folk intuitions about source credibility, we conducted a preregistered experiment (N = 1,241). Participants preferred more identifiable sources across contexts, supporting the hypothesised hyerarchy. The findings provide empirical data points for theorising about testimony, trust, and persuasion in online environrments, and have implications for current debates over the regulation of anonymity in digital spaces.

Peet. 聽Some Problems in the Ethics of Interpretation

Abstract: We have an expectation that others at least attempt to interpret us correctly, and we naturally feel indignation and resentment when we feel that they are making no attempt to do so. This is illustrated particularly clearly by considering the form of performative misinterpretation many of us are familiar with from cross political discourse on online platforms such as twitter.聽 Consideration of such cases lends itself to the thought that we somehow wrong others when we make no attempt to interpret them correctly. But why would this be? The answer we give will depend on how we conceive of interpretation. I start by considering some answers we might give from within the 鈥榠nterrogative鈥� view of interpretation 鈥� the view of interpretation that naturally falls out of the 鈥楲ockean鈥� model of communication. These answers derive from work on epistemic injustice, doxastic wrongdoing, and respect. These answers all seem to get something right 鈥� but none of them are wholly satisfactory. I then consider the question from within an alternative 鈥榮ense-making鈥� view of interpretation and suggest that by failing to engage in responsible interpretation we both disrespect and alienate the speaker.

Popa-Wyatt. Platform speech should be libertas not gratis

The question I want to focus on is: who is the legally responsible actor for online hate speech? Is a hateful utterance the responsibility of the individual user who made it? Or does the platform have the responsibilities of a publisher? What system of regulation should govern social media?

The primary responsibility is that of the users. However, wrongful harms of individuals wouldn鈥檛 be as impactful offline as they are online, given the amplifying effect of social media algorithms. This makes social media companies morally complicit to the harmful content of their users. Therefore, they should have a moral duty to minimize their complicity. Currently, social media companies discharge their duty to avoid complicity through self-regulation. Platforms set up content rules concerning incitement as part of content moderation. However, human content moderation is costly and automated moderation is far from being reliable.

Users also tend to use code words or turns of phrase, creating a safe lexicon that will avoid getting their posts removed, or down-ranked by content moderation systems. Platforms have also implemented approved risk assessments to reduce illegal content and to reduce lawful but harmful content. However, self-audit remains company specific. They are also required to conduct 鈥渦pload filtering鈥�, whereby all user content is scanned for its (company-assessed) legality before it hits the internet. This enables platforms to engage in a form of 鈥減rior restraint鈥� of illicit speech.

Today social media companies have legal duties to remove harmful content from their platforms. Enforcement by companies and regulators is patchy 鈥� leading to concerns that filtering all online speech is too burdensome to be practical. Various countries have laws holding the individual responsible. However, enforcement at scale is challenging, particularly if a criminal offence has to be prosecuted.

Zakkou Defeat as Defense. A Novel Account of Figleaves
Suppose someone makes a racist or sexist remark but prefaces it with “I’m not a racist/sexist, but鈥�” or later dismisses it as “locker room talk.” These rhetorical maneuvers are now commonly known as figleaves: rhetorical devices that obscure otherwise apparent norm violations. Figleaves can be dangerous. It is therefore important to find effective strategies to counter them. In this paper, we propose a new account of figleaves that lays the groundwork for such strategies. On our account, figleaves defeat evidence for norm violations, while this defeating effect would be canceled if the audience were to properly process the evidence already available to them.