58吃瓜

This week, we鈥檒l be discussing epistemic consequentialism. I鈥檒l start by giving some background on the topic more generally and presenting some problems that have been raised for it in the literature, and then spend most of the time on Andersen and Kappel鈥檚 article 鈥淓pistemic consequentialism as a metatheory of inquiry鈥�. Here is the abstract for their article:

The overall aim of this article is to reorient the contemporary debate about epistemic consequentialism. Thus far the debate has to a large extent focused on whether standard theories of epistemic justification are consequentialist in nature and therefore vulnerable to certain trade-off cases where accepting a false or unjustified belief leads to good epistemic outcomes. We claim that these trade-offs raise an important鈥攜et somewhat neglected鈥攊ssue about the epistemic demands on inquiry. We first distinguish between two different kinds of epistemic evaluation, viz., backing evaluation and outcome evaluation, and then go on to outline and discuss a consequentialist metatheory about the right combinations of decision procedures to adopt in inquiry. Note that the piece is exploratory in the following sense: we try to explore epistemic evaluation in consequentialist terms, which involves stating a form of epistemic consequentialism, but also pointing to what non-consequentialist alternatives might be. Rather than trying to argue decisively for a particular conclusion, we aim to outline various intricate issues in an underexplored area of theorizing. In the course of doing this, we鈥檒l transpose some well-known themes from discussions of consequentialism in ethics to the current debate about consequentialism in epistemology, e.g., agent-neutrality, options, and side-constraints.