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Abstract:ÌýWhat are the functions of the predicate ‘is true’ or the noun ‘truth’? Descriptivists assume that the predicate serves to describe a property, which propositions possess if they correspond to the right sort of facts in the world. Pragmatists and deflationists have suggested instead that the truth predicate plays useful roles in encouraging debate and friction or enabling us to form generalizations.ÌýThis paper argues draws on work in systemic functional linguistics to develop a step-by-step account of the functions served through different grammatical developments: having practices of acceptance and rejection of propositions, introducing a truth predicate, and finally introducing a noun for ‘truth’. The resulting view gives us a way of justifying some prior pragmatic and deflationary suggestions, while also showing that their views about the function of truth talk are compatible and may form different parts of a more complete picture.Ìý