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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201102T150000
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DTSTAMP:20201102T194241Z
CREATED:20200925T203417Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201102T194241Z
UID:10001245-1604329200-1604332800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Cover to Cover Reading Group (Kamm’s *Almost Over*)
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/cover-to-cover-reading-group-kamms-almost-over-7/
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201102T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201102T170000
DTSTAMP:20201102T233930Z
CREATED:20200804T184546Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201102T233930Z
UID:10001038-1604329200-1604336400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar Christopher Masterman
DESCRIPTION:Title: How Serious is Serious Actualism?\n\n\nAbstract: Serious Actualism is a view which many find compelling: it is impossible for an object to exemplify a property and not exist. In this talk\, I aim to do two things. First\, I argue that there are compelling reasons for thinking that there is a property of nonexistence and that it is possibly exemplified. Thus\, Serious Actualism\, as standardly construed\, is false. Second\, I defend a neglected approach to Serious Actualism. I distinguish between a strong and a weak formulation of the view by drawing on the distinction between truth in\, and truth at\, a possible world. I argue that we should endorse only the weak formulation of Serious Actualism. This allows us to accommodate for much of what rings true about Serious Actualism without running into problems posed by properties like the property nonexistence.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-tba-8/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
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