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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201110T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201110T140000
DTSTAMP:20201110T160133Z
CREATED:20200813T191004Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201110T160133Z
UID:10001046-1605009600-1605016800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar | Julia Zakkou (Bielefeld)
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: This paper investigates the norm of presupposition\, as one pervasive type of indirect speech act. It argues against the view that sees presuppositions as an indirect counterpart of the direct speech act of assertion and proposes instead that they are much more similar to the direct speech act of assumption. More concretely\, it suggests that the norm that governs presuppositions is not an epistemic or doxastic attitude such as knowledge\, justified belief\, or mere belief; it’s a practical attitude\, most plausibly the attitude of rational acceptance. This view has important ramifications well beyond debates in philosophy of language and linguistics. It affects not only our view of which speech act sequences are fine and which are off; it bears on whether presuppositions can function as testimony\, whether they can be lies\, and whether they are ontologically committal\, thus addressing central topics in epistemology\, ethics\, and metaphysics.
URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-23/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔąĎ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201110T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201110T170000
DTSTAMP:20201110T160133Z
CREATED:20200813T191004Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201110T160133Z
UID:10001047-1605020400-1605027600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Conceptual Engineering Seminar | Juliette Kennedy (Helsinki): “On the feasibility of conceptual engineering in logic and (meta)mathematics: A few case studies”
DESCRIPTION:Abstract. — Precisifications of certain informal concepts could be thought of as instances of conceptual engineering: the concept of a Turing machine (human effective computability)\, the notion of a Kripke structure (possibility)\, the Kolmogorov axioms (probability)\, Tarski’s definition of truth in formal languages\, to name just a few. Should we regard the technical notions these formalisms define as engineered concepts? In this talk I will present a critical view of the feasibility of conceptual engineering in logic and foundations of mathematics\, drawing on a few key examples: the concept of “model\,” which emerged slowly and under significant internal pressures; the concept of computability\, and from my own work the concept of formalism independence/formalism freeness. The view taken here is that foundational formalisms such as these are not tracking conceptual change so much as invariant conceptual content. Time permitting\, we venture into the sociology of mathematics as it bears on the control problem. Mathematicians are often resistant to new concepts (especially those coming from foundations). The bar may be set too high for conceptual engineering projects in mathematics if such projects do not deliver on conventional factors such as simplification (the complex number proof of the Fundamental Theorem of Algebra)\, establishing deep connections between mathematical subdisciplines (Hrushovski’s application of model-theoretic concepts to the Mordell-Lang Conjecture)\, the ability to prove new theorems (projective determinacy vis a vis regularity properties of the reals). \n\nZoom meeting ID: 857 3025 53 80\nZoom password: ACEW20 (Invite link)
URL:/philevents/event/conceptual-engineering-seminar-tba-9/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔąĎ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Conceptual Engineering Seminar
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