BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//Philosophy events - ECPv6.16.4.1//NONSGML v1.0//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-ORIGINAL-URL:/philevents X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Philosophy events REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H X-Robots-Tag:noindex X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Europe/London BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20200329T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20201025T010000 END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20210328T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20211031T010000 END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20220327T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20221030T010000 END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210531T093000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210531T110000 DTSTAMP:20210531T124959Z CREATED:20210504T101302Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210531T124959Z UID:10001277-1622453400-1622458800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: Dumbleton\, Summa Logicae DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/medieval-logic-seminar-dumbleton-summa-logicae-4/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔąĎ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210531T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210531T170000 DTSTAMP:20210531T125000Z CREATED:20200819T113142Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210531T125000Z UID:10001155-1622473200-1622480400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar Kathrin Koslicki (UniversitĂ© de Neuchâtel) DESCRIPTION:TITLE: Artifacts and the Limits of Human Creative Intentions \nABSTRACT: According to Amie Thomasson’s author-intention-based account of artifacts\, an artifact of kind K is essentially a product of a largely successful intention to create something of kind K (see\, e.g.\, Thomasson (2003)\, “Realism and Human Kinds”\, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research\, Vol. 67\, No. 3\, pp. 592-602). A maker has the relevant intention if and only if she has a substantive concept of the nature of Ks which largely matches that of prior makers of Ks (if any) and she intends to realize that concept by imposing K-relevant features. In cases of prototype production\, however\, where there are no prior exemplars of the artifactual kind in question\, Thomasson argues that what it is to be a K and what the K-relevant features are is determined\, as a matter of invention or stipulation\, purely by the content of the maker’s intentions and the goals she sets out to achieve through her creative act. As a result\, an agent who is constructing a prototype is related in a special way to the artifact and the artifactual kind she creates which protects her from certain kinds of error concerning the outcome of her creative act (see\, e.g.\, Thomasson\, Amie (2007)\, “Artifacts and Human Concepts”\, in Creations of the Mind: Theories of Artifacts and Their Representation\, edited by Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence\, Oxford University Press\, New York\, NY\, pp. 60-61). In this paper\, I discuss the adequacy of Thomasson’s treatment of prototype production. I argue that the process of prototype production in fact allows for various sources of errors and failures on the part of agents attempting to carry out their creative intentions that are not recognized by Thomasson’s author-intention-based account. The possibility of this kind of divergence between the intentions of authors and the outcome of their creative efforts thus calls for an alternative conception of prototype-production and of the nature of artifacts more generally. URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-tba-23/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔąĎ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR