BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//Philosophy events - ECPv6.16.4.1//NONSGML v1.0//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-WR-CALNAME:Philosophy events X-ORIGINAL-URL:/philevents X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Philosophy events REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H X-Robots-Tag:noindex X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Europe/London BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20200329T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20201025T010000 END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20210328T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20211031T010000 END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20220327T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20221030T010000 END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210603T100000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210603T120000 DTSTAMP:20210603T125912Z CREATED:20200819T113142Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210603T125912Z UID:10001157-1622714400-1622721600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar tba DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/super-special-seminar-tba-27/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58Թ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210603T130000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210603T143000 DTSTAMP:20210603T125912Z CREATED:20200819T113143Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210603T125912Z UID:10001158-1622725200-1622730600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Daniel Whiting (Southampton) “Higher-Order Evidence\, First-Order Beliefs” DESCRIPTION:Abstract: When a person has evidence about their capacity to assess the evidence for or against a proposition\, for example\, when they have evidence that their assessment is subject to bias\, they have higher-order evidence. A popular view in epistemology is that higher-order evidence can make a difference to whether it is rational for a person to believe a proposition. In particular\, many think that there are cases in which it would be rational to believe a proposition in the absence of higher-order evidence but not rational to believe that same proposition in the presence of higher-order evidence. In this paper\, I will ask\, how? How might higher-order evidence have this effect? I will outline three answers to this question and show that they fail. In closing\, I will query the motivation for thinking that higher-order evidence makes a rational difference. URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-tba-22/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58Թ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR