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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210607T150000
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DTSTAMP:20210607T131900Z
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UID:10001160-1623078000-1623085200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar Thomas Randriamahazaka (University of St. Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Truthmaker semantics for containment and nonsense\n\nAbstract: Conceptivism is the doctrine according to which a proposition cannot entail another proposition if the latter contains a concept which is not already contained in the former: entailment does not introduce any additional conceptual content. This doctrine motivates so-called containment logics\, namely logics where a formula B cannot be deduced from a formula A if B contains a propositional variable which is not already contained in A. Interestingly\, most containment logics can be described as the result of filtering another logic by this syntactic condition. For instance\, A follows from B in Parry’s logic PAI if and only if A classically follows from B and all the propositional variables of B occur in A. Routley uses this fact to discredit containment logics as syntactic artefacts lacking any semantic depth. In this talk\, I investigate the semantic properties of containment logics to rebut Routley’s critique. I look at two recent strategies to semantically characterise containment logics without syntactic filters: Berto (2019)’s two-component semantics\, where entailment contains a condition of topical inclusion\, and logics of nonsense (e.g.\, Ferguson (2015))\, which include a truth-value representing meaninglessness. Both are somewhat unsatisfactory and call for a more general approach. I argue that the framework of truthmaker semantics (e.g.\, Fine (2017)) can be used to that end. I develop sound and complete truthmaker semantics for logics of nonsense and adapt them to model containment logics. The truthmaker understanding of containment logics provides a purely semantic foundation for them\, thus refuting Routley’s claim that they are syntactic artefacts.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-tba-24/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
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