BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//Philosophy events - ECPv6.16.3//NONSGML v1.0//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
X-WR-CALNAME:Philosophy events
X-ORIGINAL-URL:/philevents
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Philosophy events
REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H
X-Robots-Tag:noindex
X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Europe/London
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0000
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:BST
DTSTART:20230326T010000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0000
TZNAME:GMT
DTSTART:20231029T010000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0000
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:BST
DTSTART:20240331T010000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0000
TZNAME:GMT
DTSTART:20241027T010000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0000
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:BST
DTSTART:20250330T010000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0000
TZNAME:GMT
DTSTART:20251026T010000
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20240509
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20240511
DTSTAMP:20260614T131018
CREATED:20240320T222531Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240509T091524Z
UID:10001969-1715212800-1715385599@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Scottish Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy XII
DESCRIPTION:9 MAY\n\n\n11.00-11.15\nWelcome\n\n\n11.15-12.00\nHelena Taylor (Exeter)\, Natural philosophy in the Early Modern French Salon: at the Crossroads of Science and Literature\nChair: Mogens Lærke (CNRS\, Oxford/Lyon)\n\n\n12.00-12.45\nEmily Kent (Edinburgh)\, Practice Makes Pedagogy: Maignan’s Cursus philosophicus (1653) and the Institutionalization of Experimental Philosophy\n\n\n12.45-14.00\nLunch\n\n\n14.00-15.00\nKey Note. Antonio Salgardo Borge (Nottingham)\, Spinoza’s (only) doctrine of parallelism\nChair: Alexander Douglas (St. Andrews)\n\n\n15.00-15.15\nBreak\n\n\n15.15-16.00\nLouis Rouquayrol (CNRS\, Lyon)\, Descartes and Mersenne versus Comenius on Common Notions\nChair: Veronica Calado (Paraná)\n\n\n16.00-16.45\nAlex Douglas (58³Ô¹Ï)\, Spinozism in Aceh: divine superdeterminacy in Spinoza and Malaysian Sufism\n\n\n16.45-17.00\nBreak\n\n\n17.00-17.45\nGeertje Bol (Ghent)\, Mary Astell on Ambition\, Rank\, and Talent\nChair: Mara van der Lugt (St. Andrews)\n\n\n10 MAY\n\n\n9.00-9.15\nWelcome\n\n\n9.15-10.00\nTim Stuart-Buttle (York)\, Gratitude in the History of Modern Political Thought: The Case of Hobbes\nChair : Antonio Salgado Borge (Nottingham)\n\n\n10.00-10.45\nMarie Wuth (Hamburg)\, A Tale of Two States Spinoza on the Civil and the Natural\n\n\n10.45-11.00\nBreak\n\n\n11.00-12.00\nKey Note: Michael Gill (Edinburgh)\, Responses to the denial of virtue in Butler and his contemporaries\nChair: James Harris (St. Andrews)\n\n\n12.00-13.00\nLunch\n\n\n13.15-14.00\nMaaike Korpershoek (Groningen) and Aaron Wells (Paderborn)\, From the Theory of Fire to Dynamical Balancing: Boerhaave\, Du Châtelet\, and Kant.\nChair: Tamás Demeter (Corvinus\, Budapest)\n\n\n14.00-14.45\nDaniel Klugman (Princeton)\, Cracked Foundations: Pascal’s Critique of Descartes’ Theory\n\n\n14.45-15.00\nBreak\n\n\n15.00-15.45\nDario Perinetti (UQAM)\, Desire and Satisfaction: Understanding Hume’s Sceptical Problems and Solutions\nChair: Flavio Augusto de Oliveira Santos (Paraná)\n\n\n\n  \nOrganisation: James Harris (St. Andrews); Alexander Douglas (St. Andrews); Mara van der Lugt (St. Andrews)\, Mogens Lærke (CNRS) \nFunding: University of St. Andrews / Scots Philosophical Association (SPA) / Maison Française d’Oxford / NOTCOM (ERC AdG  101052433)
URL:/philevents/event/scottish-seminar-in-early-modern-philosophy-xii/
LOCATION:Senate Room\, St Mary’s College\, South St\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, Fife\, KY16 9JU\, United Kingdom
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:/philevents/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/rocks.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T120000
DTSTAMP:20260614T131018
CREATED:20240409T015541Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240509T052516Z
UID:10002016-1715248800-1715256000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Plenary Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/plenary-seminar-6/
CATEGORIES:Plenary session
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T143000
DTSTAMP:20260614T131018
CREATED:20240409T015541Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240509T052516Z
UID:10002017-1715259600-1715265000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Jade Fletcher (58³Ô¹Ï)
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Jade Fletcher (58³Ô¹Ï) \nPractices\, Normativity\, and Ideological Construction: Conceptualizing Epistemic (In)Justice \nThe aim of this exploratory paper is to put into dialogue two different threads in contemporary social philosophy. Charles Mills made a helpful interjection into the epistemic injustice literature when he suggested that the concept of ideology is valuable for analytic epistemologists. Sally Haslanger has developed a metaphysics which captures how ethically pernicious ideologies can construct unjust social realities. In this paper I want to explore how this metaphysics of the social world might complicate our understanding of the nature of epistemic injustice\, and consequently our conception of the demands of epistemic justice. This is to accept Mills’ invitation to take more seriously the explanatory potency of ideology when theorising epistemic injustice\, but\, following Haslanger\, I understand ideologies to be metaphysically productive. I argue that this metaphysical reframing brings to light a potentially misguided theoretical orientation that pervades the epistemic injustice literature.
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-jade-fletcher-st-andrews/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T153000
DTSTAMP:20260614T131018
CREATED:20240409T140757Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240414T142419Z
UID:10002019-1715265000-1715268600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 and Teams \nContact: ceppadirector@st-andrews.ac.uk
URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-142/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T153000
DTSTAMP:20260614T131018
CREATED:20240415T142327Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240505T163934Z
UID:10002026-1715265000-1715268600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:  \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and Teams \nContact: ceppadirector@st-andrews.ac.uk
URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-145/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T153000
DTSTAMP:20260614T131018
CREATED:20240506T163859Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240508T163832Z
UID:10002061-1715265000-1715268600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:This week Victor Tardos will be leading an in-person discussion of Sameer Bajaj and Patrick Tomlin’s article ‘Consenting Under Coercion: The Partial Validity Account.’ (Link here: https://academic.oup.com/pq/advance-article/doi/10.1093/pq/pqad092/7287044) \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and Teams \nContact: ceppadirector@st-andrews.ac.uk
URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-150/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T170000
DTSTAMP:20260614T131018
CREATED:20240409T015606Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240509T052516Z
UID:10002018-1715266800-1715274000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Unity Pre-Reading: Gärdenfors Ch. 4
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/unity-pre-reading-gardenfors-ch-4/
LOCATION:Arché Seminar Room\, 17-19 College Street\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY169AL
CATEGORIES:Unity Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T173000
DTSTAMP:20260614T131018
CREATED:20240416T142456Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240509T164232Z
UID:10002033-1715270400-1715275800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CANCELLED CEPPA Talk (in person) –  Victor Tadros (University of Warwick)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Consent\, Intent\, and Communication \nWhat is consent? I will assume that it is a normative power – a power to alter rights and duties directly. If this is right\, how is consent exercised? I will argue that consent is exercised through the execution of intentions to alter practical reasoning. Successful communication is not needed for valid consent. Even an attempt to communicate is not needed (though it is the central way of consenting). What is needed is an intention that the consentee understands that their practical reasoning is altered – their understanding that they are permitted to do what the consenter consents to. More precisely\, I defend: \nPermissive Intentions: X consents to Y aing where they execute their intention permit Y to a by intending that Y understands that X has permitted Y to a. \nThis View contrasts with familiar alternative views in four ways. \nFirst\, consent is concerned with altering the consentee’s practical reasoning\, and not just with altering the normative status of the consentee’s conduct. So\, a person cannot give consent where they believe that altering the consentee’s practical reasoning is impossible\, even where they wish the normative status of the target’s conduct to be altered. This contrasts with pure mentalist views that consent can be given just by having a mental state or performing a mental action without attempting to alter the consentee’s practical reasoning. Second\, consent can be given without external behaviour that is sufficient to give the consentee grounds to conclude that the consenter has permissive intentions. Consenters can try but fail to give others evidence of their intentions. This contrasts with one kind of externalist view that external evidence or signs of permissive intentions are necessary for consent. Third\, consent is given only if the consenter intends to permit the consentee’s conduct. This contrasts with another kind of externalist view that external evidence or signs of permissive intentions are sufficient for consent. Fourth\, consenters necessarily intend to permit consentees’ conduct. It is insufficient for consent that a person intends the recipient of their communication to believe that they intend to permit them to act. A person can pretend to consent by communicating that they intend to permit an act without actually intending to permit it. And sometimes this might result in the consenter forfeiting a right against the consentee acting. But consent is absent. This contrasts with the view that intending to communicate that one has permissive intentions is sufficient for consent whether or not the consenter has these intentions. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-neil-sinhababu-national-university-of-singapore/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR