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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241121T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241121T120000
DTSTAMP:20260614T033340
CREATED:20241022T185929Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241101T195504Z
UID:10002226-1732183200-1732190400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Plenary Seminar:
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/plenary-seminar-25/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Plenary session
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241121T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241121T143000
DTSTAMP:20260614T033340
CREATED:20241022T185930Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241116T212312Z
UID:10002227-1732194000-1732199400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar:
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-36/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241121T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241121T143000
DTSTAMP:20260614T033340
CREATED:20241117T212311Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241121T213814Z
UID:10002259-1732194000-1732199400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar:
DESCRIPTION:Ethan Lai will lead a discussion on ‘What are epistemic standards’ by Laura Frances Callahan and Michael G. Titelbaum. This is the abstract for the paper: \nAbstract: Over the past two decades\, a new concept has gained prominence in epistemology: “epistemic standards”. We catalog the functional roles of epistemic standards\, including their role in explaining reasonable (philosophical) disagreement\, if there is any. Given these roles\, the nature of epistemic standards should be of interest to permissivists\, uniqueness theorists\, subjectivists\, and objectivists alike\, despite their somewhat different understandings of standards’ normative role. Our central question is: What are the real mental phenomena in virtue of which an agent counts as having a particular set of epistemic standards? We consider whether agents have standards in virtue of their beliefs\, their epistemic dispositions\, their intentions/plans\, their epistemic goals/desires\, or their epistemic (“confirmational”) commitments. We ultimately find the last possibility most promising.
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-40/
LOCATION:Online Meeting via Teams
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241121T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241121T153000
DTSTAMP:20260614T033340
CREATED:20241022T122308Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241114T125310Z
UID:10002224-1732199400-1732203000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION: Location: Edgecliffe G03
URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-165/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241121T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241121T153000
DTSTAMP:20260614T033340
CREATED:20241115T125311Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241121T132310Z
UID:10002256-1732199400-1732203000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:This week we will discuss James Sias\, ‘Ethical Intuitionism and the Emotions: Toward an Empirically Adequate Moral Sense Theory’\, available here. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-171/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241121T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241121T173000
DTSTAMP:20260614T033340
CREATED:20241022T122322Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241121T132310Z
UID:10002225-1732204800-1732210200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – James Hutton (Delft)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Emotion-Based Environmental Ethics: The Radical Implications of Taking Wonder Seriously \nAbstract:\nIn environmental ethics\, we find many competing theories of environmental value\, but little discussion of the epistemological grounds for believing one theory rather than another. Building on the framework of moral empiricism (which I’ve developed elsewhere)\, I propose an “Emotion-Based” methodology for environmental ethics. The Emotion-Based methodology requires treating our emotional experiences as defeasible intuitions about value\, wrongness\, etc. – accepting their contents\, unless we have substantive reason not to. I offer some rationales for adopting the Emotion-Based methodology\, exploiting analogies with other domains of knowledge. In the final part of the talk\, I zoom in on the emotion of wonder. Wonder\, I argue\, presents its object as valuable for its own sake. If we take seriously the full range of our experiences of wonder\, we face pressure to adopt a pluralist view of environmental value\, on which some nonsentient beings (e.g. trees) and collective entities (i.e. ecosystems) are valuable for their own sake. Thus\, while moral empiricism is an abstract view about the conditions for moral knowledge\, it turns out to have fairly radical first-order implications for environmental ethics.\nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-online-james-hutton-delft/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
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