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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20251210T150000
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DTSTAMP:20260611T203939
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UID:10002613-1765378800-1765386000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar: Patrick Todd\, “The Open Future: ‘will’\, negation\, credence\, and an extended error-theory”
DESCRIPTION:In Todd 2021 (The Open Future: Why Future Contingents are All False) I defended a kind of pragmatic “error-theory” regarding ordinary judgments about the interaction of ‘will’ and negation.  On the view I defended\, ‘will’ involves an essentially modal component\, in the form of a universal quantifier over the “available” histories.  But this view faces an objection: we do not tend to hear a distinction between ‘not: will’ and ‘will not’.  Response: that is because we typically assume (falsely\, I suggest) that there is always only ever one available history\, in which case the scope of the negation makes no difference.  In this talk\, I aim to review and clarify the essential components of this pragmatic account — and I attempt to sketch an improved story about how a similar strategy might help my “all false” open future view respond to a persistent objection involving credence.  Here I try to build on some anti-“Molinist” remarks of Anscombe and van Inwagen regarding counterfactuals.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-patrick-todd-tba/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
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