BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//Philosophy events - ECPv6.16.5.1//NONSGML v1.0//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-ORIGINAL-URL:/philevents X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Philosophy events REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H X-Robots-Tag:noindex X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Europe/London BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20190331T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20191027T010000 END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20200329T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20201025T010000 END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20210328T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20211031T010000 END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201001T100000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201001T120000 DTSTAMP:20201001T210022Z CREATED:20200708T155356Z LAST-MODIFIED:20201001T210022Z UID:10000996-1601546400-1601553600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar tba DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/super-special-seminar-tba-7/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201001T130000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201001T143000 DTSTAMP:20201001T210023Z CREATED:20200709T155442Z LAST-MODIFIED:20201001T210023Z UID:10001006-1601557200-1601562600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Lara Jost DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-tba-3/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201002T101500 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201002T114500 DTSTAMP:20201002T205833Z CREATED:20200708T155410Z LAST-MODIFIED:20201002T205833Z UID:10000997-1601633700-1601639100@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar (no meeting) DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/medieval-logic-seminar-tba-3/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201006T120000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201006T140000 DTSTAMP:20201006T211230Z CREATED:20200709T155443Z LAST-MODIFIED:20201006T211230Z UID:10001007-1601985600-1601992800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-18/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201006T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201006T170000 DTSTAMP:20201006T211231Z CREATED:20200709T160550Z LAST-MODIFIED:20201006T211231Z UID:10001008-1601996400-1602003600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Conceptual Engineering Seminar | Paul Égré (Paris) & Cathal O’Madagain (Ben Guérir): “Concept utility†DESCRIPTION:Abstract. — Practices of concept-revision among scientists suggest that concepts can be improved. In 2006\, the International Astronomical Union revised the concept PLANET so that it excluded Pluto\, and insisting that the result was an improvement. But what could it mean for one concept or conceptual scheme to be better than another? Here we draw on the theory of epistemic utility to address this question. We show how the plausibility and informativeness of beliefs\, two features that contribute to their utility\, have direct correlates in our concepts. These are how inclusive a concept is\, or how many objects in an environment it applies to\, and how homogeneous it is\, or how similar the objects that fall under the concept are. We provide ways of measuring these values\, and argue that in combination they can provide us with a single principle of concept utility. We use this measure to account for concept constitution\, and to rationalize cases of concept-revision. \n\nZoom meeting ID: 857 3025 53 80\nZoom password: ACEW20 (Invite link) URL:/philevents/event/conceptual-engineering-seminar-tba-4/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Conceptual Engineering Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201008T100000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201008T120000 DTSTAMP:20201008T221645Z CREATED:20200710T160942Z LAST-MODIFIED:20201008T221645Z UID:10001014-1602151200-1602158400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar tba DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/super-special-seminar-tba-8/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201008T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201008T180000 DTSTAMP:20201008T221646Z CREATED:20200710T160942Z LAST-MODIFIED:20201008T221646Z UID:10001015-1602172800-1602180000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar (joint with CEPPA!). Talk: Martin Smith (Edinburgh) DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-tba-4/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201009T101500 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201009T114500 DTSTAMP:20201009T222622Z CREATED:20200711T164525Z LAST-MODIFIED:20201009T222622Z UID:10001016-1602238500-1602243900@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: John Dumbleton on Insolubles DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/medieval-logic-seminar-tba-4/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201013T120000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201013T140000 DTSTAMP:20201013T230606Z CREATED:20200716T174429Z LAST-MODIFIED:20201013T230606Z UID:10001018-1602590400-1602597600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar | Emilia Wilson DESCRIPTION:Abstract: In this presentation I explore the harm of positive assault portrayals\, which refer to depictions of sexual assault in which the victim is shown to initially refuse some sexual contact but subsequently change their mind or enjoy the assault. I propose that\, contrary to some popular feminist analyses\, the significance of positive assault portrayals is the meaning of ‘consent’ and ‘rape’ they promote. On this view\, belief in rape myths for example\, does not merely reflect misconceptions about the nature of rape\, but the adoption of a regressive conception of what ‘rape’ means.  Positive assault portrayals force us to presuppose this regressive conception of ‘rape’ in order to make sense of them. I aim to argue that these positive assault portrayals\, specifically when produced in popular media\, could successfully shift the meaning of ‘rape’\, with potential consequences for the perpetration of sexual violence itself.  URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-19/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201013T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201013T170000 DTSTAMP:20201013T230607Z CREATED:20200716T174429Z LAST-MODIFIED:20201013T230607Z UID:10001019-1602601200-1602608400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Conceptual Engineering Seminar | Helen De Cruz (St Louis): “Ameliorative genealogy and hunter-gatherer philosophies†DESCRIPTION:Abstract. — According to Mary Midgley (1919–2018)\, philosophy is like plumbing: “Each system supplies vital needs for those who live above it. Each is hard to repair when it does go wrong\, because neither of them was ever consciously planned as a wholeâ€. In her view\, philosophy responds to basic needs that are fundamental to human social life. Our political and social institutions have philosophical concepts at their basis\, and a well-ordered society requires philosophical concepts that are up to the task of helping us devise right ways of living together. Melioristic projects in philosophy attempt to fix or reroute this plumbing\, but because our philosophical concepts are invisible and because we are so familiar with them\, conceptual engineering is difficult. Philosophical genealogies aim to overcome this limit to our imagination by looking at how our current concepts originated. This paper will discuss philosophical concepts developed in hunter-gatherer communities as a source of inspiration for melioristic philosophy and conceptual engineering. We ought not treat contemporary hunter-gatherers as proxies of stages of human evolution. Rather\, examining the philosophical ideas of hunter-gatherers is useful because it gives us a better idea of the range of human ethical\, political\, metaphysical ideas. Members of large-scale societies do not get a clear view of this range\, because living in large groups presents its own constraints and challenges\, which in turn limits the philosophical options. I will argue that features of hunter-gatherer philosophies\, such as egalitarianism and care for one’s natural environment are not inevitable byproducts of hunter-gatherer life\, but rather\, sophisticated philosophical ideas\, and hunter-gatherer societies\, past and present\, are philosophical peers to our present-day large-scale societies. I close by considering the role of academic philosophers in the light of this. \n\nZoom meeting ID: 857 3025 53 80\nZoom password: ACEW20 (Invite link) URL:/philevents/event/conceptual-engineering-seminar-tba-5/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Conceptual Engineering Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201015T100000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201015T120000 DTSTAMP:20201015T214158Z CREATED:20200717T165327Z LAST-MODIFIED:20201015T214158Z UID:10001021-1602756000-1602763200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar tba DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/super-special-seminar-tba-9/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201015T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201015T180000 DTSTAMP:20201015T214159Z CREATED:20200717T165327Z LAST-MODIFIED:20201015T214159Z UID:10001022-1602777600-1602784800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar (joint with CEPPA!). Talk: Kieran Setiya (MIT) DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-tba-5/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201016T101500 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201016T114500 DTSTAMP:20201016T214215Z CREATED:20200718T173935Z LAST-MODIFIED:20201016T214215Z UID:10001023-1602843300-1602848700@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: John Dumbleton on Insolubles DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/medieval-logic-seminar-tba-5/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201020T120000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201020T140000 DTSTAMP:20201020T215749Z CREATED:20200723T191042Z LAST-MODIFIED:20201020T215749Z UID:10001025-1603195200-1603202400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar | No Seminar (ILW) DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-20/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201020T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201020T170000 DTSTAMP:20201020T215750Z CREATED:20200723T191042Z LAST-MODIFIED:20201020T215750Z UID:10001026-1603206000-1603213200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Conceptual Engineering Seminar | Teresa Marques (Barcelona): “Representing or shaping reality? What class can teach about woman†DESCRIPTION:Abstract. — Historically\, some feminists and Marxists aimed to introduce theoretically useful concepts to accurately describe\, explain\, and predict existing oppression and inequality. In fact\, Haslanger (2000\, 2006) had argued that we should analyse social kind concepts for discriminated groups (e.g.\, for race or gender) so as to lay down the conditions of oppression of the relevant groups. Haslanger’s analysis was recently criticized by Simion (2018a)\, who argued that a concept should be ameliorated only if so doing preserves epistemic accuracy. Simion further argued that Haslanger’s concept woman is not epistemically accurate (Simion 2018b). In turn\, Podosky 2018 and McKenna 2018 suggested that conceptual revision should be allowed because concepts can “shape realityâ€\, not just represent it. I argue that this recent debate makes a mistaken assumption. I draw a parallel with the Marxist analysis of class and the aforementioned analysis of woman. The theoretical concept class was not introduced to shape reality – to create new social positions that the concept would come to represent. Rather those positions are occupied (if the Marxist analysis is correct) by the oppressed and the oppressors. Doing away with unfair inequality would bring about less epistemically accurate class concepts. An apt criticism of class analysis would rather have to show that it failed in its aim of explaining and predicting actual conditions of inequality. I claim that this discussion shows us what ameliorative projects that have political aims should look like. \n\nZoom meeting ID: 857 3025 53 80\nZoom password: ACEW20 (Invite link) URL:/philevents/event/conceptual-engineering-seminar-tba-6/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Conceptual Engineering Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20201021 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20201025 DTSTAMP:20201021T220547Z CREATED:20200205T224127Z LAST-MODIFIED:20201021T220547Z UID:10000844-1603238400-1603583999@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Workshop on Theories of Paradox in the Middle Ages DESCRIPTION:N.B. The Workshop will now take place wholly online.\n\nGiorgione\, Three Philosophers\nParadoxes seized the attention of logicians in the middle ages\, and were used both as tests for the viability of theories of logic\, language\, epistemology\, and possibly every philosophical issue\, and also in the specific genre of insolubles as needing a theoretical solution\, usually involving issues about signification\, truth\, knowledge and modality. Numerous theories were developed\, not only in the Latin West\, but also in the Islamic world and in the Byzantine tradition. Some of these theories are well known\, others barely investigated\, if at all. This workshop is an opportunity to discuss and contrast a range of these theories and consider their advantages and drawbacks\, and their relation to more recent theories of paradox and antinomy. It will also be an occasion to hear and discuss what has been achieved locally in the Leverhulme-funded project ‘Theories of Paradox in Fourteenth-Century Logic: Edition and Translation of Key Texts‘. \nFormat\nThe workshop will be held using Zoom software. It will run from 13.45 – 18.45 BST (British Summer Time = GMT+1) on 21 and 22 October 2020\, and from 13.45 – 16.15 BST on 23 October. \nRegistration\nRegistration is free but required for attendance. To register\, please email Dr Barbara Bartocci (bb66@st-andrews.ac.uk) with your Full Name\, email address\, affiliation and whether you are a student. \nProgramme\n  \n\n\n\n\nWednesday 21 October\nThursday 22 October\nFriday 23 October\n\n\n13.45\n(Virtual) Doors Open\n(Virtual) Doors Open\n(Virtual) Doors Open\n\n\n13.50\nOpening Remarks\n\n\n\n\n14.00-15.00\nStephen Read (Arché Research Centre): ‘Theories of insolubles from Thomas Bradwardine to Paul of Venice’\nAlessandro Conti (Università L’Aquila): ‘Wyclif and Paul of Venice on the Liar’s Paradox: a Comparison’\nBarbara Bartocci (Arché Research Centre): ‘John Dumbleton on signification and semantic paradoxes’\n\n\n15.15-16.15\nHarald Berger (Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz): ‘An unknown version of Albert of Saxony’s De insolubilibus (= Logica\, tr.VI\, pt.1)’\nMiroslav Hanke (Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic): ‘Tractatus insolubilium and fifteenth-century Cologne scholasticism’\nStephen Read: ‘Walter Segrave on insolubles: a restrictivist response to Bradwardine’\n\n\n16.30-17.30\nManuel Dahlquist (Universidad Nacional Del Litoral): ‘Nulla propositio est negativa (and the paradox of validity)’\nGraziana Ciola (Radboud University Nijmegen): ‘Marsilius of Inghen on insolubles’\n\n\n\n17.45-18.45\nDavid Sanson (Illinois State University) and Ahmed Alwishah (Pitzer College): ‘Al-DawÄnÄ« on truth\, grounding\, and the Liar’\nMohammad Saleh Zarepour (University of Birmingham): ‘Abharī’s Solution to the Liar paradox: a logical analysis’\n\n\n\n\nAbstracts\n \n\n\n\nStephen Read: ‘Theories of insolubles from Thomas Bradwardine to Paul of Venice’\n\n\n\nWe can divide medieval discussions of the insolubles—logical paradoxes such as the Liar—into two main periods\, before and after Bradwardine. Thomas Bradwardine wrote his treatise on Insolubles in Oxford in the early 1320s and it marks a sea change in the solutions which were mainly favoured. Up until then two types of solution were the focus of attention\, restrictio and cassatio. Bradwardine attacked several versions of restrictivism mercilessly in chs.3-4 of his Insolubles. While this was the pre-eminent proposal for solving the insolubles before his attack\, it had few proponents thereafter. It was Bradwardine’s own proposal which initiated a whole new era in discussions of the insolubles. His aim was to develop a solution to the insolubles which placed no restriction on self-reference or the theory of truth.\nHowever\, although most if not all subsequent writers on insolubles owe a debt to Bradwardine\, few followed him completely. Two alternative proposals presented in Oxford in the 1330s\, both responding to Bradwardine’s idea but in different ways\, dominated subsequent discussion of the insolubles. They were due to William Heytesbury and Roger Swyneshed. Heytesbury’s solution agrees with Bradwardine’s that there is a hidden signification\, but feels under no obligation to specify what it is. A later author\, Robert Eland\, presented Bradwardine’s and Heytesbury’s solutions and invited the reader to choose between them. What seems to have happened\, however\, is that the popular solution was to combine them. It is the solution commonly found in the teaching manuals at Oxford now known as the Logica Oxoniensis. Swyneshed’s solution was at root very different. His aim was to provide a solution without the postulation of hidden meanings\, but taking the expressions at face value. He proposed that truth should require that a proposition not entail its own falsehood. At the end of the century\, Paul of Venice subscribes to the modified Heytesbury solution in his Logica Parva\, but in his Logica Magna he defends a version of Swyneshed’s solution.\nThere were remarkably similar developments at Paris\, remarkable not least for the fact that their differences suggest that it is hard to detect any direct influence. Buridan’s solution to the insolubles is nowadays perhaps the most famous of all medieval solutions\, again claiming that propositions have an additional signification or implication. Gregory of Rimini claimed that (spoken and written) insolubles correspond to a conjunction of two mental propositions\, the first of which captures the primary or customary signification of the insoluble\, and the second of which says that the first conjunct is false. Gregory’s solution was taken up and adapted by Peter of Ailly. Where Gregory claimed that insolubles were false\, corresponding to false mental conjunctions\, Peter argued that the phenomena are better explained by realising that insolubles are equivocal\, both true and false\, corresponding to two different mental propositions. \n\n\n\nHarald Berger: ‘An unknown version of Albert of Saxony’s De insolubilibus (= Logica\, tr.VI\, pt.1)’\n\n\n\nAlbert of Saxony’s well-known usual version of the partial treatise on Insolubles starts with four descriptions\, six suppositions\, and seven conclusions. On this basis\, he subsequently discusses and solves a lot of exempla\, the first of which is\, as he himself puts it\, “illud insolubile commune ‘Ego dico falsum’â€.\nThere is\, however\, a single witness of Albert’s Logica which hands down a completely different version of the Insolubilia (and the Obligationes as well)\, namely Milano\, Veneranda Biblioteca Ambrosiana\, Cod. B 36 sup.\, fol. 118va-131rb. This version first presents five previous opinions regarding insolubles\, an introduction which is quite common (as\, e.g.\, with Bradwardine\, Heytesbury\, Brinkley\, Wyclif\, Marsilius of Inghen\, Paul of Venice\, Strode)\, but is completely lacking in Albert’s usual version. Subsequently\, different sorts of insolubles are treated in four chapters. Finally\, there is an additional chapter on apparent insolubles (“quae apparent insolubilia et non suntâ€\, which wording has a parallel in the definition of paralogisms as argumentations “quae apparent esse consequentiae et non suntâ€\, tr. V\, ch. 1). This last chapter discusses four examples\, the previous chapters include 29 examples.\nIn my talk\, I shall discuss the pros and cons of the authenticity of this unique treatise and give an overview of its contents. Up to now\, I am more inclined to regard this treatise as a genuine work of Albert’s than to the contrary. \n\n\n\nManuel Dahlquist: ‘Nulla propositio est negativa (and the paradox of validity)’\n\n\n\nJean Buridan gives us two examples of inferences that do not meet the requirements of the intuitive notion of consequence\, even though they should be considered intuitively valid. The first of the two examples appears in the Tractatus de Consequentiis; (1) No proposition is negative; therefore\, no ass is running (TC 2015\, 67) and the second in the Sophismata: (2) Every proposition is affirmative; therefore\, no proposition is negative (SD 2001\, 952). Both (1) and (2) have problems to be accepted as good inferences for Buridan. Both of them have a common sentence: “No proposition is negativeâ€. Nulla Propositio est negativa (hereinafter NPN) was studied by Jean Buridan always linked to the notion of logical consequence and has some logical characteristics that make it special: (a) NPN is self-referential; (b). NPN has a syntactic character; (c). NPN does not behave like a classical paradoxical sentence regarding negation; (d). NPN is a case of a proposition that is always false.\nBoth inferences have been studied in the literature on medieval logic; (1) where NPN appears as a premise\, in works such as Dutilh Novaes (2005)\, Klima (2004)\, Read (2012); (2) where NPN appears as a conclusion\, in works such as (Yrjönsuuri\, 2008) (Hughes\, 1982) (Scott\, 1966) and Prior (1969)\, who develops Buridan’s solution to insolubles. My work is about the latter.\nWhen Buridan analyzes the insoluble Omnis propositio est affirmativa; ergo\, nulla propositio est negativa\, like all medieval logicians\, he argues for and against it\, but makes an unusual move: he proposes his own solution within the critiques of the validity of the inference (Hughes 1982): after doing so\, he definitively departs from these reasons\, to found the validity of the insoluble on a modal distinction. The difference between my approach and Buridan´s (and Prior´s) is that I am going to give all the weight they deserve to the first three arguments in favor of the validity of the insoluble that Buridan presents to us at the beginning of the chapter.\nAs we said before\, Sophismata’s first insoluble aims to problematize the notion of logical consequence. I am going to argue that there are three notions of logical consequence under consideration in the First Insoluble: Two are well described by Hughes (1982) as Theory A and Theory B (Theory B is the one used by Prior in his paper); the third – which I will call Theory C – is proposed by Buridan himself in his first three arguments in favor of the validity of the insoluble and reflect the validity conditions proposed by the medievals logicians of the School of Paris for the Formal consequence. I am going to present these three notions of consequence; then\, I will show: a) that in Sophismata Buridan accepts only two of the three notions of consequences that are being considered; b) that accepting these two notions together leads to paradox.\nReferences:\nBuridan\, J. 2001. Summulae de Dialectica\, New Haven & London: Yale University Press.\nBuridan\, J. 2015. Treatise on consequences\, S. Read (tr.)\, New York: Fordham University Press.\nDutilh Novaes\, C. 2005. ‘Buridan’s Consequentia: Consequence and Inference Within a Token-Based Semantics’\, History and Philosophy of Logic\, 26\, 4: 277-297.\nHughes\, G. E.. 1982\, Chapter Eight of Buridan´s Sophismata Translated\, with an Introduction and a philosophical Commentary\, Cambridge University Press.\nKlima\, G. 2004. ‘Consequences of a closed\, token-based semantics: the case of John Buridan’\, History and Philosophy of Logic\, 25(2)\, 95-110.\nPrior\, A. 1969 “The Possibly-True and the Possible†in Mind\, New Series\, Vol. 78\, No. 312 (Oct.\, 1969)\, pp. 481-492.\nRead\, S. 2012. “The medieval theory of consequenceâ€\, Synthese\, Vol. 187: 899-912.\nScott\, T. 1966. Sophisms on Meaning and Truth\, (tr. Sophismata\, by Jean Buridan)\, New York: Meredith Publishing Company.\nYrjönsuuri\, M. 2008. “Treatments of the Paradoxes of Self-reference†in Handbook of the History of Logic Volume 2 Mediaeval and Renaissance Logic\, Ed. D.Gabbay and J. Woods\, ELSIEVER. \n\n\n\nDavid Sanson and Ahmed Alwishah: ‘Al-DawÄnÄ« on truth\, grounding\, and the Liar’\n\n\n\nIn his treatise\, The Final Word on Solving the [Liar Paradox]\, JalÄl al-DÄ«n al-DawÄnÄ« (d. 908/1502) offers a novel solution to the Liar. At the core of his solution is that idea that\, for a sentence to be truth apt\, it must be an imitation (ḥikÄya) of a fact. When I say\, “This sentence is composedâ€\, my sentence imitates itself\, and also corresponds to itself\, and so is non-paradoxically true. But when I say\, “This sentence is falseâ€\, my sentence attempts to imitate its own imitating\, which it cannot do\, so it fails to imitate anything\, and so fails to be truth apt. He uses this to explain why only some self-referential sentences are pathological\, and he uses it to solve range of Liar and Liar-like Paradoxes\, including the Truthteller (“This sentence is trueâ€)\, the Simple Liar (“This sentence is falseâ€)\, Contingent Liars (“Everything I say this hour is falseâ€)\, and Liar Cycles (“Everything I say on Tuesday is trueâ€\, “Everything I say on Wednesday is trueâ€\, “Everything I said on Monday is falseâ€).\nWe reconstruct al-DawÄnī’s position and compare it to contemporary grounding solutions to the Liar\, as found in Herzberger (1970) and Kripke (1975). This comparison helps clarify al-DawÄnī’s reasons for thinking that attempted self-imitation fails\, and helps clarify what is distinctive about his use of imitation as a semantic relation. We then look at al-DawÄnī’s argument that truth aptness requires imitation\, and the role he thinks imitation plays in explaining the distinction between declarative (khabar) and constructative (≈performative) (inshÄʾ) sentences. Tracing a bit of the history of that debate suggests that al-DawÄnÄ« is synthesizing two debates: a debate about the Liar\, self-reference\, and the correspondence theory of truth that has its roots in al-ṬūsÄ«\, and a debate about declaratives and constructatives that has its roots in the grammatical tradition\, going back (at least) to al-AstarÄbÄdÄ« (d. 686/8\, 1287/9). \n\n\n\nAlessandro Conti: ‘Wyclif and Paul of Venice on the Liar’s Paradox: a Comparison’\n\n\n\nIn this paper I will consider two different solutions to the paradox of the liar\, the one proposed by Wyclif in chapter eight of the third treatise of his Continuatio logicae (on conditional propositions and insoubles) and the one developed by Paul of Venice in the fifteenth treatise of the second part of his Logica Magna (which deals with insolubles). The two different solutions seem to me more interesting than others\, since they are emblematic of two different ways of approaching the problem of paradoxes: semantic the former (via the philosophy of languge) and formal the latter (via the logic). Wyclif places his solution within a larger\, semantic context\, namely his theory of meaning and truth of the propositions\, while Paul\, on the basis of Roger Swyneshed’s own theory\, tries to come up with a technical solution – a sort of dialetheism ante litteram\, since he seems to admit that there are cases in which from true it can follow the false and vice versa and that\, for this reason\, the classical liar sentences are both true and false. Paradoxically\, this was the same general thesis that Wyclif himself had mantained (p. 205): “Dico quod omnia vocata communiter insolubilia sunt tam vera quam falsa. Claudit enim contradiccionem quod aliqua sit proposicio insolubilis.†Yet\, the explanation and justification that Wyclif works out for supporting this thesis are totally different from those of Swyneshed and Paul\, as well as the general context of the solution. As a consequence\, Wyclif’s thesis and Paul of Venice’s thesis on the liar’s paradox are opposite. In fact\, Wyclif distinguishes three different levels of truth and consequently three corresponding levels of falsehood\, and no (so called) insoluble is both true and false according to truth and falsehood of the same level. \n\n\n\nMiroslav Hanke: ‘Tractatus insolubilium and fifteenth-century Cologne scholasticism’\n\n\n\nScholastic analysis of self-referential paradoxes seems to have peaked in the fourteenth century\, as far as establishing basic paradigms is concerned\, and the subsequent tradition\, including the so-called “Second Scholasticism†either focused on further technical development\, or limited the debate on insolubles\, sometimes to a bare minimum. The period between 1400s and 1550s predominately instantiates the first tendency\, making the texts from this period interesting both historically and systematically. The paper will analyse texts produced at Thomist and Albertinist “bursae†in fifteenth century Cologne and printed together with commentaries on Peter of Spain’s Summulae. These consist of an anonymous treatise on insolubles (the core of this textual tradition) supplemented by commentaries. The paper aims to reconstruct the strategy of solving insolubles endorsed in these texts\, to describe their connections to the earlier scholastic tradition and discuss the degree of innovation. \n\n\n\nGraziana Ciola: ‘Marsilius of Inghen on Insolubilia’\n\n\n\nThis presentation is centred on Marsilius of Inghen’s still unedited treatise on insolubilia and on the theory presented there.\nFirst\, I introduce Marsilius’ Tractatus de insolubilibus\, outlining its structure and its manuscript tradition. In doing so\, I suggest a tentative date of composition for the text and situate it in the context of the production of Marsilius’ other treatises on parva logicalia. Secondly\, I offer an overview of the most relevant features of Marsilius’ approach to insolubilia. And\, finally\, I situate it within the framework of the 14th century on the subject as well as in the context of Marsilius’ own most peculiar philosophical positions advanced throughout his other treatises on parva logicalia. \n\n\n\nMohammad Saleh Zarepour: ‘Abharī’s Solution to the Liar paradox: a logical analysis’\n\n\n\nThe medieval Islamic solutions to the liar paradox can be categorized into three different families. According to the solutions of the first family\, the liar sentences are not well-formed truth-apt sentences. The solutions of the second family are based on a violation of the classical principles of logic (e.g. the principle of non-contradiction). Finally\, the solutions of the third family render the liar sentences as simply false without any contradiction. In the Islamic tradition\, almost all the well-known solutions of the third family are inspired by the solution proposed by Aṯīr al-DÄ«n al-AbharÄ« (d. 1265). Providing a logical analysis of his discussion of the liar paradox\, I show that his solution is based on a conception of truth according to which every sentence signifies\, usually among other things\, its own truth. This makes Abharī’s solution of the same spirit as certain solutions that were later developed in the Latin tradition\, in particular by John Buridan (d. 1358) and Albert of Saxony (d. 1390). \n\n\n\nBarbara Bartocci: ‘John Dumbleton on signification and semantic paradoxes’\n\n\n\nJohn Dumbleton was active in Oxford from the end of the 1330s\, where he was a member of the group of the Merton Calculators and perhaps composed the nine volumes of his Summa Logicae et Philosophiae Naturalis\, which was left unfinished probably due to Dumbleton’s decease in the Black Death. In the Summa Logicae\, which is the first volume of his extensive work\, Dumbleton presents an original agent-centred theory of signification\, according to which terms signify only when they actualize a thing’s intention (intentio) through an act of comprehension and “propositions and all proper signification subsist only in the soulâ€. The semantic theory sustains and underpins Dumbleton’s solution to the logical paradoxes which combines the nullifiers’ (cassantes) and restrictivists’ (restringentes) approaches. \nIn the first part of my talk\, I will introduce Dumbleton’s semantics of terms\, particularly demonstratives\, and propositions. And in the second part\, I will present Dumbleton’s view on the nature of paradoxical sentences and his solution to paradoxes of the Liar family (‘This proposition is false’; ‘Every truth is one of these’\, supposing it exists together with two true propositions to which it refers) and to Curry’s Paradox (‘This inference is valid\, therefore a man is an ass’). \n\n\n\nStephen Read: ‘Walter Segrave on insolubles: a restrictivist response to Bradwardine’\n\n\n\nWalter de Segrave (or de Sexgrave) was at Merton College\, Oxford from 1321 until at least 1338\, and had obtained his Magister Artium by 1336. From 1340-42 Segrave was Chancellor to Richard de Bury\, Bishop of Durham\, who famously gathered around him some of the very best minds in the kingdom\, including Burley\, Bradwardine and Kilvington. Segrave subsequently became Dean of Chichester\, but was dead by 1349. Segrave’s ‘Insolubles’ is his only known work\, which appears to have been composed at Oxford in the late 1320s or early 1330s\, consistent with the fact that it is clearly a response to Bradwardine’s own ‘Insolubles’\, composed when Bradwardine was regent master at Balliol College\, that is\, from 1321-23\, before he moved to Merton in 1323. The dominant theory at the time Bradwardine was writing was restrictivism\, the claim that the part cannot supposit for the whole of which it is part (and consequently\, for its contradictory or anything convertible with it)\, at least in the presence of a privative term\, in particular\, privative alethic and epistemic terms such as ‘false’ and ‘unknown’. Accordingly\, Bradwardine spends two and a half chapters attacking restrictivist theories\, in particular\, that of Walter Burley. Segrave’s treatise is an extensive and detailed response to Bradwardine\, defending restrictivism by presenting a well-thought out reason for the restriction of supposition required to avoid contradiction. Where Burley\, and Bradwardine\, both attributed the fallacy in insolubles to what Aristotle described as the fallacy of the conditional and the unconditional (simpliciter et secundum quid)\, Segrave attributed it to the fallacy of accident\, turning on a variation in the supposition of the middle term and the extremes in what might otherwise appear to be a sound syllogism. \n Childcare \nThrough the generosity of the British Society for the History of Philosophy\, and in order to guarantee a demographically diverse participation we are able to offer financial assistance with childcare during the Workshop. Please email Dr Barbara Bartocci (bb66@st-andrews.ac.uk) with details of the childcare needed. \nWe are grateful to the University of 58³Ô¹Ï\, via the Arché Research Centre\, to the British Society for the History of Philosophy\, and to the Scots Philosophical Association for financial support. URL:/philevents/event/workshop-on-theories-of-paradox-in-the-middle-ages/ LOCATION:A virtual workshop by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Arche,Workshops ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:/philevents/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Royal-12FXIX-EZse5v.tmp_.jpg ORGANIZER;CN="Stephen Read":MAILTO:arche@st-andrews.ac.uk END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201022T100000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201022T120000 DTSTAMP:20201022T224527Z CREATED:20200725T180714Z LAST-MODIFIED:20201022T224527Z UID:10001028-1603360800-1603368000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar tba DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/super-special-seminar-tba-10/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201022T130000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201022T143000 DTSTAMP:20201022T224527Z CREATED:20200725T180945Z LAST-MODIFIED:20201022T224527Z UID:10001029-1603371600-1603377000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: no seminar (learning week) DESCRIPTION:We will meet online\, but NOT via Arche Zoom. Updates will follow. URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-different-venue-tba/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201023T101500 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201023T114500 DTSTAMP:20201023T221822Z CREATED:20200725T180946Z LAST-MODIFIED:20201023T221822Z UID:10001030-1603448100-1603453500@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: no meeting (Workshop) DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/medieval-logic-seminar-tba-6/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201027T120000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201027T140000 DTSTAMP:20201027T221728Z CREATED:20200731T181120Z LAST-MODIFIED:20201027T221728Z UID:10001033-1603800000-1603807200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-21/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201027T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201027T170000 DTSTAMP:20201027T221728Z CREATED:20200731T181121Z LAST-MODIFIED:20201027T221728Z UID:10001034-1603810800-1603818000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Conceptual Engineering Seminar | David Plunkett (Dartmouth) & Tristram McPherson (Ohio State): “Conceptual ethics\, metaepistemology\, and the foundations of epistemic normativity†DESCRIPTION:*** SESSION RESTRICTED TO ARCHÉ MEMBERS *** \nAbstract. — This paper advertises the importance of distinguishing three different foundational projects concerning the epistemic\, which we call normative epistemic inquiry\, metaepistemic inquiry\, and the conceptual ethics of epistemology. We argue that these projects can be distinguished by their contrasting constitutive success conditions. We argue further that because of these contrasts\, explicit attention to the distinction between them is a valuable resource for philosophical work on the epistemic. For example\, we argue that carefully distinguishing these projects allows us to: (a) better understand and evaluate existing views; (b) identify and appreciate new or underexplored theoretical options; (c) avoid merely verbal disputes that can hinder intellectual progress\, and (d) help us to understand the relationship between epistemology and the deepest normative questions concerning what we ought to believe\, and how we ought to live. URL:/philevents/event/conceptual-engineering-seminar-tba-7/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Conceptual Engineering Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201029T100000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201029T120000 DTSTAMP:20201029T223248Z CREATED:20200731T181524Z LAST-MODIFIED:20201029T223248Z UID:10001035-1603965600-1603972800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar tba DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/super-special-seminar-tba-11/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201029T130000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201029T143000 DTSTAMP:20201029T223249Z CREATED:20200731T181524Z LAST-MODIFIED:20201029T223249Z UID:10001036-1603976400-1603981800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Talk: Jessica Brown DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-tba-6/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201030T101500 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201030T114500 DTSTAMP:20201030T223245Z CREATED:20200801T183918Z LAST-MODIFIED:20201030T223245Z UID:10001037-1604052900-1604058300@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: John Dumbleton on Insolubles DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/medieval-logic-seminar-tba-7/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR