BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//Philosophy events - ECPv6.16.5//NONSGML v1.0//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-WR-CALNAME:Philosophy events X-ORIGINAL-URL:/philevents X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Philosophy events REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H X-Robots-Tag:noindex X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Europe/London BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20200329T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20201025T010000 END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20210328T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20211031T010000 END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20220327T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20221030T010000 END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210504T120000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210504T140000 DTSTAMP:20210504T101228Z CREATED:20210504T101228Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210504T101228Z UID:10001265-1620129600-1620136800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-29/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210506T100000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210506T120000 DTSTAMP:20210506T102042Z CREATED:20200819T113131Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210506T102042Z UID:10001137-1620295200-1620302400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar tba DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/super-special-seminar-tba-23/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210506T130000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210506T143000 DTSTAMP:20210506T102042Z CREATED:20200819T113131Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210506T102042Z UID:10001138-1620306000-1620311400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Lara Jost “Knowledge: Emotions\, Perception and Rational Agents†DESCRIPTION:Abstract: In contemporary analytic epistemology\, emotions are usually not considered to be a good justification for an agent’s belief\, in the same way perception\, memory\, reasoning or testimony are\, due to emotions facing issues when it comes to being reliable and sensitive to defeaters. In this talk\, I argue that this problem can be overcome if one reframes what is expected of emotions under rational guidance. Building on Jones (2003)\, I will propose that we need to consider emotions as participating to knowledge acquisition under a conception of epistemic agents as reason trackers rather than reason responders. This will enable me to build a model where the reliability and sensitivity of emotions can be explained through delayed calibration rather than immediate control. In order to strengthen this proposal\, I will highlight how perception is following the same pattern\, while benefiting from a better epistemic reputation than emotions. Finally\, I will discuss how the calibration of emotions is a dual process\, where calibration is influenced by both internal and social monitoring\, which explains why our emotions can offer good justification for belief. URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-tba-18/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210511T120000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210511T140000 DTSTAMP:20210511T105324Z CREATED:20210504T101231Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210511T105324Z UID:10001268-1620734400-1620741600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-30/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20210513 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20210516 DTSTAMP:20210513T112005Z CREATED:20210504T101245Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210513T112005Z UID:10001270-1620864000-1621123199@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Breaking Down the Barriers: Applied Conceptual Engineering (ACE) DESCRIPTION:  \nDESCRIPTION\nConceptual engineering focuses on how best to assess and improve our conceptual apparatuses. In less than half a decade\, it has become a central topic of contemporary analytic philosophy. Current work in conceptual engineering goes in two main directions. Case study research\, on the one hand\, which focuses on specific concepts and then advocates for specific improvement. Metaphilosophical research\, on the other hand\, which focuses on conceptual engineering qua philosophical method and deals\, for instance\, with issues related to its theoretical foundations. The ACE Conference takes the next step: It bridges the gap between these two trends of research in conceptual engineering and concentrates on how conceptual engineering actually works. Thereby\, it aims to contribute to turning conceptual engineering into a form of applied philosophy that has a direct bearing on areas of practical concern. \n  \nSPEAKERS\nINVITED SPEAKERS\n\nHerman Cappelen (Hong Kong University)\nDownload ACE20 Poster\n\nNancy Cartwright (Durham University)\nCatarina Dutilh Novaes (VU Amsterdam/University of 58³Ô¹Ï)\nManuel Gustavo Isaac (Swiss NSF/University of 58³Ô¹Ï)\nÉdouard Machery (University of Pittsburgh)\nMichela Massimi (University of Edinburgh)\nKevin Scharp (University of 58³Ô¹Ï)\nNicholas Shea (University of London)\n\n  \nONLINE ACCESS\n\nZoom Meeting ID: 875 2607 3825\nZoom Password: ACE21 (Invite link)\nACE YouTube Channel: www.youtube.com/channel/UC2KmatAi964jqA6gTSm7wbQ\n\n  \nFORMAT\nThe ACE conference will run over two days\, divided into four sessions. Each session will include two one-hour talks\, an open space\, and a final round table. \n\nSession 1: Thursday 13th May | 09.00 – 12.00 (BST/GMT+1) [Chair: TBA]\nSession 2: Thursday 13th May | 14.00 – 17.00 (BST/GMT+1) [Chair: TBA]\nSession 3: Friday 14th May | 09.00 – 12.00 (BST/GMT+1) [Chair: TBA]\nSession 3: Friday 14th May | 14.00 – 17.00 (BST/GMT+1) [Chair: TBA]\n\n  \nPROVISIONAL SCHEDULE\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nUK Time\n13 MAY\n14 MAY\n\n\n  \nAM\n09.00 – 09.15\nOpening\nOpen space\n\n\n09.15 – 10.15\nNancy Cartwright\nMichela Massimi\n\n\n10.15 – 10.30\nBreak\nBreak\n\n\n10.30 – 11.30\nHerman Cappelen\nManuel Gustavo Isaac\n\n\n11.30 – 12.00\nRound table 1\nRound table 3\n\n\n\n\n\n  \nPM\n14.00 – 15.00\nÉdouard Machery\nNicholas Shea\n\n\n15.00 –15.15\nBreak\nBreak\n\n\n15.15 – 16.15\nKevin Scharp\nCatarina Dutilh Novaes\n\n\n16.15 – 16.45\nRound table 2\nRound table 4\n\n\n16.45 – 17.00\nOpen space\nClosing\n\n\n\n  \nABSTRACTS\n#01 | Nancy Cartwright (Durham University): “Engineering Objectivity – For Responsible Science Use†— This talk is about engineering the concept of scientific objectivity to fit it to serve the demand for responsible use of science’s practices\, products and endeavours. It is based on work from the forthcoming Tangle of Science\, with Jeremy Hardie\, Eleonora Montuschi\, Mat Soleiman and Ann Thresher. Rather than engineering the concept to make it more precise\, we urge leaving it as a loose ‘Ballung’ notion\, similar to ‘duty of care’\, where context sets what is demanded in any given case. In particular we argue for the importance of a concept that we label ‘objectivity to be found’: the duty to be objective involves the duty to find what is required in the case. This duty intertwines epistemic and moral considerations because it demands finding the right tools for the right purposes. \n#02 | Herman Cappelen (Hong Kong University): “Conceptual Engineering as Lexical and Conceptual Abandonment: “Democracy†as a Case Study†— Some of our terminology shouldn’t be improved\, but instead abandoned. Abandonment Theory is the study of the conditions under which lexical and conceptual abandonment is appropriate. The first part of this talk is an introduction to abandonment theory and its relationship to amelioration\, replacement and elimination. The second part applies abandonment theory to a core concept in political philosophy: ‘democracy’. I argue that ‘democracy’ is an ideal candidate for abandonment. \n#03 | Édouard Machery (University of Pittsburgh): “Should We Really Engineer Confused\, Unclear\, or Otherwise Deficient Concepts? The Case of Scientific Concepts†— Following Carnap\, conceptual engineers have long thought that confused\, unclear\, or vague concepts\, particularly scientific concepts\, are deficient\, and should be explicated (Carnap)\, prescriptively analyzed (Machery)\, or engineered (Cappelen). This talk will review several challenges to this view\, arguing in particular that confusion\, lack of clarity\, and vagueness are not necessarily deficiencies in science. \n#04 | Kevin Scharp (University of 58³Ô¹Ï): “Conceptual Engineering and the Omnicide Problem†\n#05 | Michela Massimi (University of Edinburgh): “Conceptually Re-Engineering ‘Phenomena’†— In this paper I will re-engineer one of the oldest concepts in philosophy of science: the concept of ‘phenomena’. For long time this concept has been a battleground for empiricist\, metaphysical realist and constructivist views about science. I will lay out the reasons why the concept of ‘phenomena’ requires to be re-engineered so as to address some outstanding problems facing the empiricist tradition and the metaphysical realist one too. The solution is not a de novo conceptual engineering but instead a ‘re-engineering’ that goes back to a Kantian insight and tries to make good of it for 21st century debates about realism and perspectivism in philosophy of science. \n#06 | Manuel Gustavo Isaac (Swiss NSF/University of 58³Ô¹Ï): “Applied Conceptual Engineering†— Applied conceptual engineering primarily concerns the application of conceptual engineering to real-world cases. It ranges from across academic disciplines to society at large. This talk aims to take the first step toward making conceptual engineering an effective tool to achieve real-world changes with measurable impact via the development of a multistakeholder participatory model for knowledge co-creation. \n#07 | Nicholas Shea (University of London): “How People Appraise Their Conceptsâ€. — One way of addressing various social injustices is by changing the way we conceive of the relevant social categories. However\, to stop people using a familiar concept may take more than exhortation. We will need to find ways to act on the psychological factors that make people select some concepts\, and leave others aside\, when they engage in communication and reasoning. At the moment we have little idea what those factors are. They may be implicit as well as explicit. The findings reported here are a first step in the direction of gaining that insight. Our studies found that people have a unified sense of how well they understand a concept (a Sense of Understanding). They also appraise concepts along a number of other dimensions. These forms of appraisal are shown to affect which concepts are relied on for category-based induction. They also predict the hierarchical structure (superordinate-basic-subordinate) of taxonomic concepts. That gives us an indication of how aspects of the structure of a concept may affect whether or not it is selected for various uses\, including for communication with others. It thus points the way towards potential places to intervene if we want people to stop using certain commonplace but problematic concepts. \n#08 | Catarina Dutilh Novaes (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam): “The Role of History and Genealogy for Conceptual Engineering.†— What is the relevance of historical\, and in particular genealogical\, investigations for projects of conceptual engineering? This question has received some attention in the literature (in particular in (Plunkett 2016))\, but it deserves further attention. In this presentation\, I address this question by focusing on Carnapian explication\, in particular the preliminary step of clarification of the explicandum\, which remains an under-developed component of Carnap’s own presentation of explication. I argue that a genealogical perspective\, in particular inspired by Foucault\, is eminently suitable for the clarification of an explicandum: it provides the conditions for a successful conceptual intervention because it may provide a diagnosis of what is defective in the explicandum. I illustrate this approach by means of two examples: the concept of marriage and the concept of logical form. \n  \nFUNDING\nTHOUGHT Trust Conference Grant \n  \nORGANISER\nDr. Manuel Gustavo Isaac // SNSF-PM2018 Fellow @ ARCHÉ Philosophical Research Centre \nDr. Kevin Scharp // Reader in Philosophy\, Director of ARCHÉ @ University of 58³Ô¹Ï URL:/philevents/event/breaking-down-the-barriers-applied-conceptual-engineering-ace/ LOCATION:A virtual Conference – by Zoom CATEGORIES:Conference ORGANIZER;CN="Manuel Gustavo Isaac":MAILTO:mgi1@st-andrews.ac.uk END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210513T100000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210513T120000 DTSTAMP:20200819T113136Z CREATED:20200819T113136Z LAST-MODIFIED:20200819T113136Z UID:10001142-1620900000-1620907200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar tba DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/super-special-seminar-tba-24/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210513T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210513T173000 DTSTAMP:20210513T112006Z CREATED:20200819T113136Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210513T112006Z UID:10001143-1620921600-1620927000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar (joint with CEPPA and FPST): Emmalon Davis (UMich) “Challenging the Pursuit of Novelty†DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Novelty—understood as the value of saying something new—appears to be a good-making feature of a philosophical contribution. Beyond this\, however\, novelty functions as a marker of philosophical success: contributions that say something new are considered successful\, while contributions that do not say something new are considered unsuccessful. When novelty serves as a marker and metric of success\, the pursuit of novelty becomes an aspirational ideal. This paper challenges the presumption and expectation that a successful philosophical contribution will be a novel one.\n\nTo do so\, I distinguish two constituent components—novelty as ingenuity/originality and novelty as discovery/priority—which\, taken together\, comprise the aspirational ideal of novelty. I outline a series of traps or pitfalls associated with the practical pursuit of each component part and show that efforts to avoid traps associated with one render philosophers vulnerable to traps associated with the other. I argue that an aspirational ideal of novelty should be rejected\, as the pursuit of each component part is in tension with the other. Throughout my analysis\, I demonstrate that the greatest risks accompanying the pursuit of novelty are unevenly distributed and that an aspirational ideal of novelty disadvantages certain practitioners disproportionately. I conclude that an aspirational ideal of novelty is less desirable and less feasible than it appears. URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-tba-19/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210518T120000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210518T140000 DTSTAMP:20210518T120720Z CREATED:20210504T101246Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210518T120720Z UID:10001272-1621339200-1621346400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-31/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210520T100000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210520T120000 DTSTAMP:20210520T121903Z CREATED:20200819T113138Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210520T121903Z UID:10001147-1621504800-1621512000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar tba DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/super-special-seminar-tba-25/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210520T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210520T173000 DTSTAMP:20210520T121903Z CREATED:20200819T113138Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210520T121903Z UID:10001148-1621526400-1621531800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar (joint with CEPPA and FPST): Rima Basu (CMC) “Normative Expectations†DESCRIPTION:Abstract: In supplementing the familiar ways that our interpersonal relationships are morally fraught\, recent work in epistemology on doxastic wronging has highlighted how these relationships can be epistemically fraught as well. However\, in focusing predominantly on beliefs— mental states that arguably constitute a small fraction of our mental lives—these theories have their own theoretical blindspots. In this paper\, I expand the scope of analysis to expectations. Typically\, we notice the failures of expectations when we’re the targets of them: when we let our loved ones down. Key indicators of the presence of normative expectations are feelings of disappointment and betrayal. Contexts in which these feelings manifest most vividly involve parents and their hopes and dreams for our lives. Focusing on these contexts\, I argue that normative expectations play three distinctive roles: a pre- dictive role\, a prescriptive role\, and a proleptic role. Each role\, I conjecture\, comes with its own avenue for moral\, epistemic\, and conceptual failure. Ultimately\, in precisifying the heterogeneous class of attitudes that constitute normative expectations\, I reveal just how expansive the ‘doxastic’ in doxastic wronging ought be. URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-tba-20/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210525T120000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210525T140000 DTSTAMP:20210525T123428Z CREATED:20210504T101259Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210525T123428Z UID:10001275-1621944000-1621951200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-32/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210527T100000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210527T120000 DTSTAMP:20210527T125028Z CREATED:20200819T113140Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210527T125028Z UID:10001152-1622109600-1622116800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar tba DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/super-special-seminar-tba-26/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210527T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210527T173000 DTSTAMP:20210527T125029Z CREATED:20200819T113140Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210527T125029Z UID:10001153-1622131200-1622136600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar (joint with CEPPA and FPST): Renee Bolinger (Princeton) “Are We Entitled to Be Believed?†DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Discussions in a variety of contexts (including at least epistemic injustice\, moral encroachment\, epistemic obligations of friendship) sometimes assume that speakers have a right or moral entitlement to be believed when they assert or testify that p: that they are wronged if their audience fails to believe them. It is controversial whether rights of this kind are intelligible\, or precisely what their basis is. This talk aims to get clearer on what a “right to be believed†is a right to by working backward: sifting through the various ways of characterizing the justifications we might give for such an entitlement\, and the wrongs suffered when it is violated. I suggest that the best candidate is a claim to appropriate epistemic policies\, which I unpack and sketch at the end of the talk. URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-tba-21/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR