BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//Philosophy events - ECPv6.16.5//NONSGML v1.0//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
X-WR-CALNAME:Philosophy events
X-ORIGINAL-URL:/philevents
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Philosophy events
REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H
X-Robots-Tag:noindex
X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Europe/London
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0000
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:BST
DTSTART:20200329T010000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0000
TZNAME:GMT
DTSTART:20201025T010000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0000
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:BST
DTSTART:20210328T010000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0000
TZNAME:GMT
DTSTART:20211031T010000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0000
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:BST
DTSTART:20220327T010000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0000
TZNAME:GMT
DTSTART:20221030T010000
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210601T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210601T140000
DTSTAMP:20210601T124914Z
CREATED:20210504T101302Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210601T124914Z
UID:10001278-1622548800-1622556000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-33/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210603T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210603T120000
DTSTAMP:20210603T125912Z
CREATED:20200819T113142Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210603T125912Z
UID:10001157-1622714400-1622721600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar tba
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/super-special-seminar-tba-27/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210603T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210603T143000
DTSTAMP:20210603T125912Z
CREATED:20200819T113143Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210603T125912Z
UID:10001158-1622725200-1622730600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Daniel Whiting (Southampton) “Higher-Order Evidence\, First-Order Beliefs”
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: When a person has evidence about their capacity to assess the evidence for or against a proposition\, for example\, when they have evidence that their assessment is subject to bias\, they have higher-order evidence. A popular view in epistemology is that higher-order evidence can make a difference to whether it is rational for a person to believe a proposition. In particular\, many think that there are cases in which it would be rational to believe a proposition in the absence of higher-order evidence but not rational to believe that same proposition in the presence of higher-order evidence. In this paper\, I will ask\, how? How might higher-order evidence have this effect? I will outline three answers to this question and show that they fail. In closing\, I will query the motivation for thinking that higher-order evidence makes a rational difference.
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-tba-22/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210608T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210608T140000
DTSTAMP:20210608T131906Z
CREATED:20210504T101317Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210608T131906Z
UID:10001281-1623153600-1623160800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-34/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20210610
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20210612
DTSTAMP:20210610T131900Z
CREATED:20210504T101319Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210610T131900Z
UID:10001283-1623283200-1623455999@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Workshop on Identity and Individuation of Particulars and Universals
DESCRIPTION:The University of 58łÔčÏ’ ArchĂ© Philosophical Research Centre for Logic\, Language\, Metaphysics\, and Epistemology will host a one-day online workshop on Identity and Individuation\, which will take place on June 10th 2021\, 12:30PM-7PM (British Summer Time). \nThe aim of this workshop is to bring together and promote research in the metaphysics of identity and individuation\, and to draw connections with ongoing work in metaphysics\, including but not limited to: the logical form and function of criteria of identity\, identity and indiscernibility\, identity and essence\, identity and modality\, the individuation of particulars and properties\, intrinsic and extrinsic properties\, and qualitative and non-qualitative properties\, as well as assessments of the relative merits of the different criteria of identity for both particulars and properties on offer today. \n  \nProgramme\n(N.B. Details to access the workshop can be found at the bottom of this webpage) \n12:30-12:55 Registration and Coffee \n12:55-13:00 Introduction \n13:00-14:00 Tim Button (University College London) \n14:00-14:15 Break \n14:15-15:15 Sophie Allen (Keele University) \n15:15-15:30 Break \n15:30-16:30 Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (University of Oxford) \n16:30-16:45 Break \n16:45-17:45 Vera Hoffman-Kolss (University of Bern) \n17:45-18:00 Break \n18:00-19:00 Sam Cowling (Denison University) \n  \nTim Button (University College London) \nTitle: Getting precise on indiscernibility \nAbstract: “Are there indiscernible but distinct objects?” That question is imprecise\, in at least two regards: \nFirst: there are many notions of indiscernibility. For example: we say (roughly) that two objects are two-symmetricaliff you can swap the objects without affecting the overall structure. (More precisely: a and b are two-symmetrical iff there is an automorphism mapping a to b and b to a.) We say that two objects are Leibniz-indiscernible iff they stand in exactly the same relations to all entities. These are distinct notions. When asking questions about indiscernibility\, we need to know which notion we have in mind. \nSecond: every notion of indiscernibility makes reference to a background language\, with regard to which discernment occurs. When asking questions about indiscernibility\, we need to choose a particular language. Which language we choose might depend on our purposes. For example\, if we are interested in our ability to refer (determinately) to one entity rather than another\, we should presumably choose a language we can acquire and manifest. By contrast\, if we are interested in whether there are “metaphysically” indiscernible entities\, we will have to assume there is a metaphysically privileged language. \nTo see why this matters\, I will run through the question “Are there indiscernible but distinct mathematical objects?” It transpires there is a “cheap” to a version of the identity of indiscernibles (with the most demanding notion of indiscernibility); and it is not obviously too cheap. \n  \nSophie Allen (Keele University) \nTitle: Sortalism\, Token Identity\, and the Conception of a Particular \nAbstract: The conflict between sortalism and token identity between the mental and the physical is not unexpected: the former requires that the individuation of events or objects be based somehow on their type\, their essence or the properties which they have\, while the latter maintains that particulars can be identified across disparate domains regardless of type. In this paper\, I consider the prospects for resolving this dispute\, or for rejecting sortalism and characterising particulars in a way which is compatible with token identity. \n  \nGonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (University of Oxford) \nTitle: An Argument for the Identity of Indiscernibles \nAbstract: I shall argue that there is no trivial version of the Identity of Indiscernibles. I shall also identify the weakest version of the Identity of Indiscernibles (a fortiori the weakest non-trivial version of it) and give an argument for it based on considerations of grounding. \n  \nVera Hoffman-Kolss (University of Bern) \nTitle: Interventionism and the Individuation of Properties \nAbstract: Under what conditions is a property P identical with a property Q? Interventionist theories of causation and causal models provide a prima facie plausible answer to this question: P and Q are identical iff they (or the variables representing them) assume exactly the same position in all possible causal models. This criterion is problematic\, however\, if properties are individuated hyperintensionally\, that is\, if there are properties P and Q that are distinct\, but instantiated by the same individuals in all possible worlds. In this paper\, I argue that causal modeling frameworks can overcome this difficulty if the dependence relations occurring in them are characterized in terms of counterpossible conditionals. \n  \nSam Cowling (Denison University) \nTitle: Haecceitism by the Numbers \nAbstract: Haecceitism holds that things could be just as they are in all qualitative respects—e.g.\, with respect to properties like shape and mass—but differ non-qualitatively—e.g.\, with respect to which individuals exist or which qualitative roles they occupy. Although debate over the truth of haecceitism is commonplace\, investigation into the nature or variety of haecceitistic differences we ought to accept is far more limited. This essay explores the challenges that haecceitists face when specifying which haecceitistic differences are genuine. After considering competing proposals that deliver gruesome or natural species of haecceitism\, we turn to some empirical studies of haecceitistic intuitions. We conclude by considering what differ species of haecceitism might mean for the effectiveness of conceivability arguments for haecceitism. \nDetails to access the workshop:  \nWhere: Zoom \nMeeting ID: 895 194 2082 \nMeeting Password: PHD2020 (Invite link) \nIf you have any questions\, please contact one of the organizers: Matteo Nizzardo (email- mn85@st-andrews.ac.uk) or Jace Snodgrass (email- js413@st-andrews.ac.uk).
URL:/philevents/event/1st-workshop-on-identity-and-individuation/
LOCATION:A virtual workshop by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Workshops
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:/philevents/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Poster_Identity-V9e5b4.tmp_.png
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210610T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210610T120000
DTSTAMP:20210610T131900Z
CREATED:20200819T113145Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210610T131900Z
UID:10001162-1623319200-1623326400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar tba
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/super-special-seminar-tba-28/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210610T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210610T143000
DTSTAMP:20210610T131901Z
CREATED:20200819T113145Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210610T131901Z
UID:10001163-1623330000-1623335400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Catarina Dutilh Novaes “Argumentation and a three-tiered model of epistemic exchange”
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Argumentation is often contrasted with testimony in that in cases of testimony\, an epistemic agent (presumably) primarily evaluates the trustworthiness of the source of information (the informant)\, whereas in argumentation there is (presumably) primarily engagement with the content communicated. I have argued however (Dutilh Novaes 2020) that trust and trustworthiness in fact play an important role in argumentation too. From this analysis emerged a three-tiered model of epistemic exchange\, inspired by the framework of social exchange theory (an influential framework in sociology and social psychology). According to this model\, there are three stages for an instance of epistemic exchange to take place: 1- a relation of attention is established between the parties; 2- a relation of sufficient trust is established between the parties; 3- the parties can finally engage in fruitful epistemic exchange. This model generalizes beyond argumentation\, and sheds new light on a number of phenomena that have attracted the interest of social epistemologists such as epistemic bubbles and epistemic injustice\, among others. In this talk\, I present the model in detail and discuss some of its applications.
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-tba-23/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210615T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210615T140000
DTSTAMP:20210615T134922Z
CREATED:20210504T101338Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210615T134922Z
UID:10001285-1623758400-1623765600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-35/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20210617
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20210619
DTSTAMP:20210617T135307Z
CREATED:20210504T101339Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210617T135307Z
UID:10001287-1623888000-1624060799@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Workshop on Hyperintensional Metaphysics
DESCRIPTION:The University of 58łÔčÏ ArchĂ© Philosophical Research Centre for Logic\, Language\, Metaphysics and Epistemology will be hosting a Workshop on Hyperintensional Metaphysics\, which will take place on the 17th of June 2021. \nThe aim of this Workshop is to bring together and promote research in the area of Hyperintensional Metaphysics\, and to draw connections with ongoing work in Metaphysics\, including (but not limited to): causation\, essence\, grounding\, explanation\, the individuation of propositions and properties\, intrinsic and extrinsic properties\, conditionality\, impossible worlds\, and truthmaking. Further\, other areas up for discussion also include: questions regarding the metaphysical status of hyperintensional phenomena\, objections against hyperintensional analyses\, or kinds of analyses\, as well as assessments of the relative merits of the different accounts of hyperintensional metaphysics on offer today. \nConference Venue: Online on Zoom (N.B. There is a 100 participant capacity.) \nProgramme (All times are British Summer Time) \n12:30-12:55 Registration and Coffee \n12:55-13:00 Introduction \n13:00-14:00 Timothy Williamson (University of Oxford) \n14:00-14:15 Break \n14:15-15:15 Maya Eddon (University of Massachusetts\, Amherst) \n15:15-15:30 Break \n15:30-16:30 Sara Bernstein (University of Notre Dame) \n16:30-16:45 Break \n16:45-17:45 Daniel Nolan (University of Notre Dame) \n17:45-18:00 Break \n18:00-19:00 Kit Fine (New York University) \n  \nTimothy Williamson (University of Oxford) \nTitle: Is Hyperintensionalism Good Science? \nAbstract: Theories in metaphysics can be compared abductively\, in a way similar to the abductive comparison of theories in natural science. By that standard\, how do hyperintensionalist theories when compared to their natural rivals\, intensionalist theories? (Here intensionalism about states of affairs\, properties\, relations\, etc. holds that they are identical if necessarily equivalent\, while hyperintensionalism is the denial of intensionalism.) \nSimplicity is one salient abductive virtue. In most cases\, hyperintensionalist theories are manifestly more complicated than their intensionalist rivals\, so the issue is whether the former can compensate on other dimensions for this initial disadvantage. Hyperintensionalism is sometimes held to have an advantage over intensionalism in being a less constraining framework than intensionalism\, but from an abductive perspective that is a mistake: extra degrees of freedom weaken a theory (i.e. make it less informative) and so in themselves are an abductive vice. Furthermore\, the intensionalist approach has been far more systematically and fully developed than hyperintensionalist accounts\, has proved its worth in applications outside philosophy (e.g. in computer science\, theoretical economics\, and linguistics)\, and is closely related to frameworks in very general use in science (e.g. probability spaces). Another disadvantage of hyperintensionalism is that its unrestricted versions are inconsistent (Russell-Myhill paradoxes)\, while its restricted versions involve further losses of simplicity and elegance; there is no analogous threat to intensionalism. \nIf hyperintensionalist theories are to survive abductive comparison with their intensionalist rivals\, they will have to do so by fitting the data better (for which the extra complications and loss of informativeness would be the price to be paid). However\, the data to which they appeal are shaky. The relevant judgments seem to project features of discourse onto the extra-linguistic world\, e.g. relevance\, aboutness\, contextual shifts\, perspicuousness of explanations\, and can be explained away by intensionalists without ad hoc auxiliary assumptions. By abductive standards\, intensionalism is way ahead of hyperintensionalism. \n  \nMaya Eddon (University of Massachusetts\, Amherst) \nTitle: On Not Having Mass \nAbstract: What does it mean for an object to lack some quantitative feature\, like mass?  Does such an object instantiate the property having no mass\, or does it instantiate the property having 0 units mass\, or is there even any distinction between the two?  I will show that no matter what we say we must deal with some counterintuitive results.  I lay out several views and their consequences\, and argue in favor of one of these views. \n  \nSara Bernstein (University of Notre Dame) \nTitle: Countersocial Counterfactuals \nAbstract: We often reason about what our lives would have been like if we had belonged to different social groups\, as in “If I had been born into a Victorian English family\, I wouldn’t have gotten married\,” or “If I hadn’t been a woman\, I would have had an easier time in that meeting.” This talk aims to make sense of such countersocial counterfactuals\, conditionals whose antecedents run contrary to social facts. I distinguish between several sorts of countersocials\, and suggest that some countersocials are non-vacuous counterpossibles. After arguing for the explanatory power of such countersocials\, I suggest that countersocial counterfactuals play an important role in social explanations. I discuss the benefits of adopting a hyperintensional framework (i.e.\, a framework for distinguishing between necessarily equivalent claims) for the evaluation of countersocials. I conclude by suggesting that a plausible similarity metric for countersocial counterfactuals must take into account the nature of unitary and intersectional social groups. \n  \nDaniel Nolan (University of Notre Dame) \nTitle: The Hyperintensional Mind \nAbstract: The case for hyperintensionally individuated mental contents is now hard to resist. That is\, it is clear that agents do not automatically believe all the necessary equivalents of the things they believe; and they do not always desire necessary equivalents to the same degree. Debate continues about the ontology of the contents of belief and desire. Issues include whether to characterise contents as propositions or properties; whether to think of the propositions or properties as structured or unstructured; and if contents are not individuated by necessary equivalence\, how fine-grained should we take them to be. \nWe would like an account of what it is about an agent that determines she has one set of mental contents rather than another. One influential picture of how content is determined\, associated with the kinds of functionalism defended by David Lewis\, Frank Jackson\, Robert Stalnaker and others\, outlines an account of the contents of an agent’s attitudes in terms of how the agent\, others like her\, and her internal states are disposed to behave across a range of possible circumstances. This kind of story can be developed to handle a rich range of impossible contents as well\, provided we equip ourselves with hyperintensional metaphysical resources. In particular\, if we endorse non-trivial counterpossible conditionals and non-trivial dispositions to respond in impossible circumstances\, we can characterise the “modal” profiles of agents\, states\, and populations in the way needed to deliver a foundational story about agents with fine grained attitudes. The resulting understanding of mental content is a useful guide to the metaphysics of those contents themselves. It suggests a picture of contents as sets of worlds rather than as structured contents\, and offers some guidance on the question of the fine-grainedness of belief and desire. \n  \nKit Fine (New York University) \nTitle: Why go Hyperintensional? \nAbstract: I will give some purely logical reasons why it might be helpful to adopt a hyperintensional approach to logics – such as those for the counterfactual and deontic operators – that are commonly taken to be intensionial. \n  \nOrganizers: \nJace Snodgrass \nMatteo Nizzardo
URL:/philevents/event/workshop-on-hyperintentional-metaphysics/
LOCATION:A virtual workshop by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Workshops
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:/philevents/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/WHM-yOJlDZ.tmp_.png
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210617T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210617T120000
DTSTAMP:20210617T135307Z
CREATED:20200819T113147Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210617T135307Z
UID:10001167-1623924000-1623931200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar tba
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/super-special-seminar-tba-29/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210617T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210617T143000
DTSTAMP:20210617T135308Z
CREATED:20200819T113147Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210617T135308Z
UID:10001168-1623934800-1623940200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Corine Besson (Sussex) “Carroll’s Regress\, Guidance and Explicit Representation”
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: What is the nature of one’s justification to use a logical principle such as Modus Ponens in reasoning? It is widely agreed amongst epistemologists of logic that such justification cannot be internalist. One key reason offered for this view is that internalist accounts of justification are susceptible to Carroll-style regresses. In this talk\, I examine this claim and argue that internalist accounts of justification are not open to such regresses. I further argue that the sorts of externalist accounts of the justification of logical principles typically put forward as alternatives are inadequate.
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-tba-24/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20210618
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20210621
DTSTAMP:20210618T135330Z
CREATED:20210508T103806Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210618T135330Z
UID:10001302-1623974400-1624233599@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:How Could Truth be Plural?
DESCRIPTION:It has been nearly thirty years since Crispin Wright’s Truth and Objectivity was published\, and in these thirty years alethic pluralism has established itself as a strong contender in the current debate on truth. Yet\, while various intricate versions of alethic pluralism have been developed over the years\, many philosophers are still hesitant to buy into the very idea that truth is plural.\nOur conference\, “How Could Truth Possibly Be Plural?”\, offers the alethic pluralist the opportunity to face their critics and defend their views. \nSchedule (all times are in UTC+1)\nDay 1 (18th of June):\n14:45 – 15:00 Crispin Wright (NYU/Stirling)  Introduction\n15:00 – 16:15 Mark Jago (Nottingham)  On Ways of Being True\n16:30 – 17:45 Cheryl Misak (Toronto)  Ramsey’s Unified Pragmatist Concept of Truth\n18:00 – 19:15 MarĂ­a JosĂ© FrĂĄpolli (Granada)  Semantic Pluralism and the Complex Meaning of Truth\n19.30 – 20:45 Chase Wrenn (Alabama) — Blindspots and Brightspots in Alethic Pluralism \nDay 2 (19th of June):\n15:00 – 16:15 William Gamester (Leeds) A Place and Purpose for Pluralism\n16:30 – 17:45 Douglas Edwards (Utica) & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (Yonsei) Moderate Pluralism: Doubly Grounded?\n18:00 – 19:30 Douglas Edwards\, Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen\, Crispin Wright  Panel Discussion \nRegistration\nIf you would like to attend the conference\, please register by emailing Tom Kaspers (tk70@st-andrews.ac.uk) or NiccolĂČ Aimone Pisano (nap6@st-andrews.ac.uk). The conference is free and open to all. \nAbstracts\nJago — On Ways of Being True \nThere are many ways for truths to be true. How should we understand that idea? One is that there are different kinds of truth: the ways are different properties of truth. Another understanding is that a truth can be made true in different ways\, by different kinds of entities. The former understanding supports alethic pluralism. But the latter can be understood as a kind of monism: truth is the existential property of having some truthmaker or other. On this view\, the differences reside in how a truth is made true\, but not in its being true. I’ll discuss how these two understandings differ\, and what the potential advantages of each might be. \nMisak — Ramsey’s Unified Pragmatist Concept of Truth \nF.P. Ramsey is sometimes taken to be a proponent of the redundancy theory of truth. Sometimes he is taken to be on the same page as the Vienna Circle or Wittgenstein’s Tractatus\, where the truth predicate only applies to something like simple elementary perceptual propositions. I will argue that both these interpretations are wrong. Ramsey offered a promising account of truth on pragmatist lines\, where truth is the aim of belief\, and each domain of belief or inquiry must answer\, for its own subject matter\, the question What is true? His project was to offer a unified account of how various kinds of beliefs might aim at truth\, including logic\, ethics\, and perhaps even aesthetics. \nFrĂĄpolli — Semantic Pluralism and the Complex Meaning of Truth \nTruth ascriptions are sophisticated linguistic tools of endorsement and generalisation over propositions. Their complex meaning can only be unravelled in a pluralistic semantic framework that makes room for a distinction between an aspect of meaning that is stable\, i.e. linguistic meaning\, and an aspect that is contextually modulated\, i.e. the content that they help to assert. The focus on the use of truth ascriptions accommodates the intuition that different terms (different sentences) can act as truth predicates (truth ascriptions). This does not imply\, nevertheless\, that there are different truth conceptsthat apply to different kinds of contents. Ramsey is my main inspiration. Frege\, Kaplan\, Strawson\, C. F. J. Williams and Brandom have also had an essential impact on my proposal\, which combines philosophical aspects\, taken from pragmatics\, and technical aspects\, taken from the linguistic analysis of proforms. \nWrenn — Blindspots and Brightspots in Alethic Pluralism \nAlethic pluralists often stake their position on the claim that truth-attributions involve marking claims with a special normative status. We can understand that status as fitness to believe or fitness to assert. I argue that truth-attributions can’t necessarily involve attributing any such status. The problem comes from true-belief (or true-assertion) blindspots (Sorensen; Bykvist & Hattiangadi) and brightspots. The former are claims such as ‘It’s raining and no one believes it’\, which can be true but not truly believed. The latter are claims such as ‘2 is prime and no one believes it’\, which can be false but not falsely believed. The basic shape of the problem is this: If something is fit to believe\, then\, were you to believe it\, your belief would be alethically fitting (or correct or good or whatever). No state of believing a blindspot is alethically fitting\, even though blindspots can be true. So\, being true does not entail fitness to believe. For similar reasons\, falsehood doesn’t entail unfitness to believe. Consequently\, it can’t be part of the content of TRUE that what is true is fit to believe. After laying out the problem\, I explore some of the likeliest pluralist responses to it. \nGamester — A Place and Purpose for Pluralism \nThis talk takes up a suggestion made independently by Wright (“Comrades Against Quietism”\, 1998) and Lynch (“Expressivism and Plural Truth”\, 2013): that truth pluralism and metaethical expressivism are natural allies. I explore one way in which expressivists stand to benefit by endorsing a substantive\, but non-representational\, theory of truth for ethical judgements: with regards to the notorious Frege-Geach Problem. I argue that such a theory can play a critical role in earning the right to a truth-conditional semantics for ethical discourse\, by explaining that in virtue of which ethical sentences have truth-conditions (namely\, in virtue of expressing judgements that can be true or false). The expressivist can hereby silo her distinctive commitments to the metasemantics of ethical discourse and the nature of ethical judgement\, while endorsing an utterly orthodox\, truth-conditional semantic theory. While this does not\, by itself\, suffice to solve the Frege-Geach Problem – we still need a compositional story about what mental states are expressed by logically complex sentences – it constitutes a major step forwards. Moreover\, I suggest how we can complete the solution by appealing to a kind of logical expressivism – an independently motivated and well-developed theory that is already employed by some truth pluralists (Ferrari\, Moruzzi\, and Pedersen\, “Austere Truth Pluralism”\, 2021). \nEdwards & Pedersen — Moderate Pluralism: Doubly Grounded? \nModerate truth pluralists (such as Lynch 2009\, Edwards 2018) hold that truth itself is distinct from properties such as correspondence and superassertibility that nevertheless play a significant role in explaining the truth of sentences in different domains. A significant challenge for moderate pluralists is to explain the relationship between truth itself and these domain-specific properties. In this talk we explore the idea (due to Pedersen 2020\, MS) that grounding can be used to account for this relation. We do this in two ways. We first show how the truth of particular sentences can be explained through grounding\, before going on to explore whether grounding can also be used to account for the general relation between truth and the domain-specific properties. \n  \n 
URL:/philevents/event/how-could-truth-be-plural/
LOCATION:A virtual Conference – by Zoom
CATEGORIES:Conference
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:/philevents/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Poster-Alethic-Pluralism-Conference_001-e1620399580532-1wKYWz.tmp_.png
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210622T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210622T140000
DTSTAMP:20210622T140846Z
CREATED:20210504T101354Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210622T140846Z
UID:10001289-1624363200-1624370400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-36/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20210624
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20210627
DTSTAMP:20210624T131842Z
CREATED:20210504T101355Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210624T131842Z
UID:10001291-1624492800-1624751999@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Integrated Information Theory: Current State and Perspectives
DESCRIPTION:One of the most intriguing theories of consciousness developed during the past twenty years is the Integrated Information Theory (IIT). Its core idea is that consciousness is identical with integrated information\, that is\, with the amount of information a system can generate as a whole\, over and above the information produced by its component parts taken independently from each other.\nIIT represents an articulate\, interdisciplinary attempt at characterising what consciousness is and how it works in a scientifically robust way\, by making use of mathematical tools to precisely describe phenomenal consciousness both quantitatively and qualitatively\, which is what makes it such a momentous theory of consciousness. However\, empirically testing this theory is quite troublesome\, as this would require a presently infeasible amount of computations. Furthermore\, after the first phase in which the theory has gradually reached its current shape\, a number of works have been published which point at a range of aspects of the theory in need of elaboration or reconsideration.\nThis conference is thus meant to provide a space in which some of the experts who have been contributed to IIT in various ways over the past few years will present and confront their views on the current state of IIT\, on the ways it could be developed in future\, and\, more generally\, on its prospects as a theory of consciousness. This would be beneficial for the development of IIT itself\, as it would represent an important occasion to take stock and discuss the most promising directions that this important theory of consciousness may (need to) take in the future. Therefore\, one of the main purposes of this conference is\, crucially\, to facilitate the first step towards a more mature stage of the theory\, one at which\, perhaps\, it will become the leading contemporary theory of consciousness. \nProgramme (all times are in UTC+1) \nDay 1 (Thursday 24th June)\n14:45 – 15:00 Introduction\n15:00 – 16:15 Larissa Albantakis (Wisconsin\, Madison) – Integrated Information Theory – An Introduction\n16:30 – 17:45 Haoying Liu (Massachusetts\, Amherst) – On the Postulates of the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness\n18:00 – 19:15 Melanie Boly (Wisconsin\, Madison) – Integrated Information Theory – Empirical Predictions \nDay 2 (Friday 25th June)\n13:30 – 14:45 Timothy Bayne (Monash) – IIT and the Unity of Consciousness\n15:00 – 16:15 Adam Barrett (Sussex) – The Strength of Weak Integrated Information Theory\n16:30 – 17:45 Pedro Mediano (Cambridge) – Beyond Integrated Information: Information Decomposition and its Implications for Consciousness Science\n17:45 – 18:00 Concluding Remarks \nRegistration\nIf you would like to attend the conference\, please register by emailing NiccolĂČ Aimone Pisano (nap6@st-andrews.ac.uk) or Tom Kaspers (tk70@st-andrews.ac.uk).The conference is free and open to all. \nAbstracts\nLarissa Albantakis (Wisconsin\, Madison): “Integrated Information Theory – An Introduction”\nIntegrated information theory (IIT)\, developed by Giulio Tononi and colleagues\, aims to provide a theory of consciousness with explanatory\, predictive\, and inferential power starting from phenomenology itself. IIT contrasts with current approaches that start from the NCC with the hope of identifying generalized principles about the nature of consciousness. Instead\, IIT first identifies the essential properties of every experience from consciousness itself. From these “axioms” of phenomenology\, IIT then infers a set of requirements (“postulates”) for a physical system to be a substrate of consciousness. IIT predicts that the quality or content of an experience is structurally identical to the cause-effect structure of its physical substrate\, and that the quantity or level of consciousness corresponds to the amount of intrinsic cause-effect power the substrate has onto itself. IIT’s theoretical formalism makes it possible to evaluate\, in principle\, whether a physical system complies with the IIT postulates and thus forms a physical substrate of consciousness. It\, moreover\, quantifies the level of consciousness of such a system\, and provides a full account of its phenomenological structure in causal terms. \n\nHaoying Liu (Massachusetts\, Amherst): “On the Postulates of the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness”\nThe Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness (IIT) begins with five “axioms” about the phenomenological features of consciousness. It then proceeds with five corresponding “postulates\,” which are supposed to specify a system’s physical features that realize these phenomenological features. Assuming that the axioms of IIT are not false\, I examine how the postulates of IIT may be derived from the axioms. Two major issues will emerge in this examination. The first concerns whether the concept of causation (in particular\, cause-effect power) in the formulation of the postulates is ambiguous. The second concerns whether the postulates sufficiently capture certain robust aspects of consciousness mentioned by the axioms\, such as “intrinsic perspective” and “phenomenal distinctions.” The examination will cast doubt on IIT’s potential to offer a substantive theory that sufficiently captures consciousness in terms of causation. \n\nMelanie Boly (Wisconsin\, Madison): “Integrated Information Theory – Empirical Predictions”\nTBA \n\nTimothy Bayne (Monash): “IIT and the Unity of Consciousness”\nAn appeal to the unity of consciousness is at the heart of the axiomatic case for IIT\, but what exactly is the unity of consciousness and to what extent does it support IT? This talk considers various conceptions of the unity of consciousness\, and compares and contrasts the appeal that is made to the unity of consciousness in IIT with the appeal that is made to it in other theories of consciousness. \n\nAdam Barrett (Sussex): “The Strength of Weak Integrated Information Theory”\nIIT has divided the consciousness science community. While some scientists believe it provides a feasible approach to address the `hard problem’\, others dismiss it on the grounds of scarce empirical support and in-principle untestability for its primary claims. In this talk I describe how this might be ameliorated by the division of IIT into two branches\, `strong’ and `weak’. Strong IIT will continue to assert that consciousness is integrated information\, and search for a fundamental mathematical formula for this based on first principles. Meanwhile\, weak IIT will focus on developing and testing pragmatic hypotheses on correlations between aspects of consciousness and broader measures of information dynamics\, and through this strategy obtain a deeper understanding of consciousness supported by progressive empirical validations. I will go over mathematical and physical arguments for why the existing formulation of strong IIT fails\, and mention some possible ways forward. I will summarise experimental evidence for weak IIT\, while also discussing theoretical limitations of approaches based on one-dimensional measures of integrated information. Finally\, I will argue for a multi-dimensional approach to measuring integrated information in weak IIT\, and briefly touch upon the `integrated information decomposition’ taxonomy of information dynamics. \n\nPedro Mediano (Cambridge): “Beyond Integrated Information: Information Decomposition and its Implications for Consciousness Science”\nA crucial part of the research programme in weak integrated information theory is the computational and empirical validation of practical measures of integrated information. To this end\, in this talk we will first examine the behaviour of several proposed measures of integrated information\, showing that they behave inconsistently even in simple linear systems. With the aim of understanding and alleviating some of the problems with these measures\, we will introduce the framework of `integrated information decomposition\,’ or ΊID\, which allows us to decompose the `modes’ of information dynamics taking place within a system. Some of these modes will be identified with measures of integrated information\, or other dynamical phenomena like causal emergence. We will then examine some of the philosophical implications of ΊID\, and argue that the modes of information dynamics revealed by ΊID provide a promising avenue to explore the multi-dimensional structure of consciousness. We will conclude by outlining a few neuroscientific applications of ΊID\, highlighting how a `weak’ approach to IIT can provide further insight into brain function and point towards compatibilities between IIT and other theories of consciousness.
URL:/philevents/event/integrated-information-theory-current-state-and-perspectives/
LOCATION:A virtual Conference – by Zoom
CATEGORIES:Conference
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:/philevents/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Poster2-1-e1618929690127-gVrm0e.tmp_.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210624T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210624T120000
DTSTAMP:20210624T131842Z
CREATED:20200819T113149Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210624T131842Z
UID:10001172-1624528800-1624536000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar tba
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/super-special-seminar-tba-30/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210624T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210624T143000
DTSTAMP:20210624T131843Z
CREATED:20200819T113149Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210624T131843Z
UID:10001173-1624539600-1624545000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Frederik Andersen “Engel’s Dilemma and the Horrors of Logical Disagreement”
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Hinge propositions\, or simply “hinges”\, are primitive certainties that we (must) presuppose in our normal inquiries. Recently there has been a lot of interest in hinge epistemology\, which is a kind of epistemology that sets the notion of hinge at the center stage. This paper puts forward a dilemma leveled against hinge epistemologists. The dilemma is based on work by Pascal Engel (2016) and it states that\, given the assumption that hinge propositions are normative at all\, they are either grammatical or epistemic norms. If the former is the case\, then hinges would appear to be irrelevant to epistemology as it is ordinarily conceived\, while if the latter holds\, hinges would have to compete with other types of epistemic norms\, resulting in an incomprehensible epistemology altogether. After presenting Engel’s dilemma\, it is utilized to tease out certain bleak insights about logical disagreement.
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-tba-25/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210629T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210629T140000
DTSTAMP:20210629T152316Z
CREATED:20210504T101357Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210629T152316Z
UID:10001293-1624968000-1624975200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-37/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR