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TZID:Europe/London
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240603T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240603T110000
DTSTAMP:20260615T072312
CREATED:20231109T140824Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231109T140824Z
UID:10001796-1717405200-1717412400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar:
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/medieval-logic-seminar-50/
CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240604T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240604T140000
DTSTAMP:20260615T072312
CREATED:20240505T050903Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240531T062312Z
UID:10002058-1717502400-1717509600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-64/
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240604T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240604T140000
DTSTAMP:20260615T072312
CREATED:20240601T063311Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240604T065317Z
UID:10002095-1717502400-1717509600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind seminar: Simon Prosser (University of 58łÔčÏ)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Mental Hypertime \nAbstract: Hypertime\, if it exists\, is a second dimension of time. The hypothesis of mental hypertime says that the mind has a second representation of time. This enables the mind to represent the world as though there were a second time dimension\, even though both representations may in fact be of the same real time series. I shall discuss some reasons for accepting the hypothesis of mental hypertime\, and its possible role in explaining our sense of ourselves\, and perhaps other things\, ‘moving’ through time. I’ll start from a discussion of the psychology of time travel. Then I’ll discuss the connection between the hypothesis of mental hypertime and the notion\, suggested in recent years by several philosophers\, that our seeming to move through time is closely connected to our seeming to endure (rather than perdure) through time. I shall suggest a new way to understand this claim about endurance that avoids some possible objections. Finally I shall discuss a putative phenomenal contrast that suggests that the sense of moving through time is not just cognitive\, but is also phenomenological.
URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-simon-prosser-university-of-st-andrews/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240606T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240606T143000
DTSTAMP:20260615T072312
CREATED:20240507T050850Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240606T070812Z
UID:10002065-1717678800-1717684200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: CANCELLED
DESCRIPTION:CANCELLED
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-petronella-randell-st-andrews-stirling/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20240607
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20240609
DTSTAMP:20260615T072312
CREATED:20240508T051610Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240607T070824Z
UID:10002069-1717718400-1717891199@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Workshop on Modality: With or Without Possible Worlds?
DESCRIPTION:The University of 58łÔčÏ ArchĂ© Philosophical Research Centre for Logic\, Language\, Metaphysics and Epistemology will be hosting a workshop on Modality\, With or Without Possible Worlds?\n\n \nDESCRIPTION: The purpose of the workshop is to bring together and promote research in the area of metaphysics of modality\, with a specific focus on two broad themes: (i) the challenges associated with exclusively employing possible worlds to clarify our modal discourse about metaphysical necessity and possibility\, among other metaphysical concepts; and (ii) alternative approaches that shed light on such discourse without relying on the concept of a possible world.\n \nDATE AND VENUE: 7 June 2024\, Online on Teams\n \nSPEAKERS: Vera Hoffman-Kolss (University of Bern)\, Barbara Vetter (Freie UniversitĂ€t Berlin)\, Jennifer Wang (Simon Fraser University)\, Mark Jago (University of Nottingham)\, Takashi Tagisawa (California State University)\, and John Divers (Trinity College Dublin).\n\n \n\nREGISTER HERE: https://forms.gle/Cnh4zpbyFXPzhg7v8\n\n\n\n\n \n\n\n\n\nPROVISIONAL SCHEDULE (Note: All times are in British Summer Time):\nEvery time slot includes: the main talk (40 mins)\, and Q&A (20 mins).\n\n\n\n \n\n\n\n9:55 – 10:00 Preliminary Remarks \n10:00 – 11:00 Barbara Vetter (Freie UniversitĂ€t Berlin) \n11:00 – 11:15 Break \n11:15 – 12:15 Mark Jago (University of Nottingham) \n12:15 – 12:30 Break \n12:30 – 13:30 Jennifer Wang (Simon Fraser University) \n13:30 – 14:30 Break \n14:30 – 15:30 John Divers (Trinity College Dublin) \n15:30 – 15:45 Break \n15:45 – 16:45 Vera Hoffman-Kolss (University of Bern) \n16:45 – 17:00 Break \n\n17:00 – 18:00 Takashi Yagisawa (California State University) \n\n \n \nTITLES AND ABSTRACTS: \n \n\nTitle: Modal epistemology without worlds: the case of axiom T (Barbara Vetter)\n \nAbstract: Epistemologists of modality often assume that some knowledge of possibility is easy: knowledge by inference from actuality\, via axiom T of modal logic. What is true in this world must be true at some world\, after all; what could be easier? Inference by axiom T takes centre stage in similarity based modal epistemologies like that of Sonia Roca Royes\, but it is generally assumed to be a form of easy modal knowledge. In this talk\, I argue that the role of axiom T in a realistic modal epistemology has been overstated. The case of axiom T also serves as a case study for a general caveat not to project to much of our (modal) logic into a realistic (modal) epistemology.\n\n \n\nTitle: Knowing What it Is (Mark Jago) \nAbstract: Essentialists understand modal properties in terms of the essences of things. Given this view\, it is natural to think that our knowledge of modality ultimately derives from our knowledge of the essences of things. Is that view plausible? Do we genuinely have knowledge of the essences of things\, in a form substantial enough to ground our modal knowledge? The more we pack into the notion of essence to allow it to underpin modal properties\, the harder it is to claim genuine knowledge. I will argue that realists about essence of a certain kind can have the best of both worlds. They can co-opt a conventionalist explanation of our knowledge of essence\, but against the background of a fully realist notion of essence.\n\n\n \n\nTitle: The Explanatory Grounds of De Re Modal Truths (Jennifer Wang)\n\nAbstract: In Naming and Necessity\, Kripke makes a forceful case for the actualist against the so-called “problem of transworld identification”. If the goal is to be able to use possible worlds semantics\, then I think that his response is entirely correct. But if the goal is to provide an explanation of de re modal truths\, then the actualist should reject transworld identity. In this paper\, I argue that the actualist who wants to use possible worlds to explain facts such as “Oscar could have been a movie star” should adopt a purely qualitative conception of possible worlds. Perhaps more surprisingly\, they should combine this with a counterpart-theoretic treatment of de re modality. I will argue that this combination is consistent with actualist motivations\, and with Kripke’s views in particular.\n\n\n \n\nTitle: Modality\, With or Without Possible Worlds? A Quinean Perspective (John Divers)\nAbstract: We may proceed in the philosophy of modality with\, or without\, deploying the device of quantification over possible worlds. How we think of the advantages and disadvantages brought by the respective approaches will be determined for the most part on whether we are presupposing some form of modal realism. Here\, I will address the matter from a modal anti-realist and – more specifically – Quinean perspective\n\n\n \n\nTitle: Counterpossibles\, Causal Exclusion\, and Impossible Worlds (Vera Hoffman-Kolss)\nAbstract: In this paper\, I argue that counterpossible conditionals\, whose truth conditions are formulated in terms of impossible worlds\, can shed new light on the problem of causal exclusion. According to the interventionist version of this problem\, higher-level (e.g.\, mental) properties described by an interventionist causal model are causally pre-empted by the lower-level properties upon which they supervene\, because it is metaphysically impossible to intervene on the higher-level properties without changing at least some of the lower-level properties (which then do all the causal work). Recent debate has shown\, however\, that there are several reasons to allow for counterpossible interventions as well. But once counterpossible interventions are allowed in certain metaphysical contexts\, there is no good reason to ban them from causal exclusion contexts. I argue that this paves the way for a new approach to the causal exclusion problem. The autonomy of higher-level properties can be vindicated by showing that higher-level properties and lower-level properties enter into different counterpossible dependence relations. These counterpossible dependence relations can in turn be interpreted in terms of impossible worlds.\n \nTitle: Ontology of Some Philosophy (Takashi Yagisawa)\n\nAbstract: When philosophers discuss philosophical views\, theories\, or arguments\, their discussion is often not metaphysically innocent. Given certain substantial but widely accepted assumptions concerning relativization of truth\, the worlds framework\, and understanding ontological issues in terms of domains of discourse (see Three Insights below)\, it can be argued that the extent of ontological involvement of some philosophical discussion is considerable. In particular\, philosophical discussion concerning modal metaphysics frequently makes the discussants incur non-trivial ontological commitments.\n\nThree Insights:\n(1 )It is useful to relativize the notion of truth for many philosophical purposes; a sentence is true or false at a truth-relativizer.\n(2) The framework of worlds\, including both possible worlds and impossible worlds\, gives us truth-relativizers for the purposes of explicating the truth conditions of many important kinds of sentences\, in particular\, counterfactual conditional sentences.\n(3) Ontological matters should be understood as matters pertaining to the domain of discourse associated with quantification.\n\nSupposition-Based Argument: “You assert P. Suppose you are right and P is true. Then Q follows. But Q is false. So\, P is false and you are not right”.\n\nClaim: Three insights + Supposition-Based Argument ⇹ a potentially endless sequence of ever-expanding ontological commitments.
URL:/philevents/event/workshop-on-modality-with-or-without-possible-worlds/
CATEGORIES:Workshops
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:/philevents/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/A4556275-07D9-4476-8FD9-0CA973F36D36-m1ilJm.tmp_.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240610T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240610T110000
DTSTAMP:20260615T072312
CREATED:20231109T140824Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231109T140824Z
UID:10001797-1718010000-1718017200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar:
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/medieval-logic-seminar-51/
CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240611T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240611T140000
DTSTAMP:20260615T072312
CREATED:20240512T052647Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240607T070824Z
UID:10002070-1718107200-1718114400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-65/
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240611T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240611T140000
DTSTAMP:20260615T072312
CREATED:20240608T072710Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240611T081017Z
UID:10002103-1718107200-1718114400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind seminar: Ethan Landes (University of ZĂŒrich)
DESCRIPTION:Titile: Can Someone Be a Semantic Externalist Experimental Philosopher? \nAbstract: Among experimental philosophy of language\, semantic internalism is not merely the dominant metasemantic view – it is universal. Experimental philosophers of language take the target of their inquiry to be wholly mind-dependent and revealed by participant responses to survey questions. At the same time\, some of the biggest critics of experimental philosophy have been semantic externalists. This talk will argue that this split is not principled. Not only should experimental philosophers interested in the semantic properties of words be using empirical methods\, but many existing experimental studies can be reinterpreted to shed light on externally-grounded semantic properties. The talk will also consider the implications for debates in conceptual engineering.
URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-ethan-landes-university-of-zurich/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240613T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240613T143000
DTSTAMP:20260615T072312
CREATED:20240514T052429Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240611T081018Z
UID:10002074-1718283600-1718289000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Amiya Hashkes (58łÔčÏ & Stirling)
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Amiya Hashkes (58łÔčÏ & Stirling)
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-amiya-hashkes-st-andrews-stirling/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240617T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240617T110000
DTSTAMP:20260615T072312
CREATED:20231109T140824Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231109T140824Z
UID:10001798-1718614800-1718622000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar:
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/medieval-logic-seminar-52/
CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240618T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240618T140000
DTSTAMP:20260615T072312
CREATED:20240519T055336Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240611T081019Z
UID:10002079-1718712000-1718719200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-66/
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240618T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240618T140000
DTSTAMP:20260615T072312
CREATED:20240614T082351Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240618T085733Z
UID:10002105-1718712000-1718719200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind seminar: Christoph Hoerl
DESCRIPTION:Memory and the feeling of pastness\n\nRecent accounts of episodic memory have revived some ideas familiar from the ‘empiricist theory of memory’\, which go back at least as far as Hume. New versions of the empiricist theory cite two separate bodies of recent research in psychology in support of thinking of episodic memory along empiricist lines: One is taken to demonstrate the existence of an imagistic ingredient that remembering shares\, e.g.\, with episodic future thinking or sensory imagining; the other that of an affective ingredient (e.g.\, a ‘feeling of pastness’) that distinguishes remembering from these other cognitive activities. I will provide a sketch of the empiricist theory\, taking Russell’s account of memory in The Analysis of Mind as my guide. I will then offer some reasons for thinking that new versions of it found in the current literature on episodic memory are subject to much the same criticisms as their more traditional predecessors.
URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-christoph-hoerl/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240620T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240620T143000
DTSTAMP:20260615T072312
CREATED:20240521T055357Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240620T091010Z
UID:10002083-1718888400-1718893800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Viviane Fairbank (58łÔčÏ & Stirling)
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Viviane Fairbank (58łÔčÏ & Stirling) \nShould Science Journalists Know About Science?\nDespite scientific evidence to the contrary\, many journalists in the 2000s reported on one researcher’s unfounded claims of a link between the MMR vaccine and autism. They treated the issue as an open question that required equal consideration of “both sides”: those who thought there was a causal link between vaccines and autism\, and those who did not. Many commentators blamed journalists for the avoidable\, unfortunate results that followed\, including measles outbreaks among unvaccinated children in the US and UK. \nThe inclination is to interpret the MMR-vaccine case as showing not the impossibility of good journalism on politicized scientific issues\, but rather the dangers of bad journalism: if science journalists had done their job properly\, the idea goes\, their work would have served to illuminate scientific knowledge instead of obfuscating it. This prompts the question: In what sense did journalists fail to grasp the relevant science regarding vaccines and autism\, as their critics have claimed? And\, more generally\, to what epistemic norms ought we hold science journalists today? I call this the Epistemic Challenge for Science Journalism (ECSJ). \nIn this paper\, I aim to answer the ECSJ by bringing together insights from practicing journalists and journalism educators\, scholars of science communication\, and epistemologists. In §1\, I detail the MMR-vaccine case and outline the Epistemic Challenge for Science Journalism. In §2\, I present the dominant answer to the ECSJ in the science communication and journalism education literature\, which I call the Knowledge-Based Solution\, and I argue that it is unconvincing: knowledge of science is neither sufficient nor necessary for good science journalism. In §3\, I propose an alternative\, which I call the Confirmation-Based Solution\, and I show that it is able to make sense of the MMR-vaccine case and others in a satisfying way. In §4\, I turn to recent debates about journalistic objectivity\, and I argue that the Confirmation-Based Solution can respond to important concerns voiced by journalists and their audiences. §5 discusses my proposal in the context of philosophical debates about epistemic norms of assertion. §6 concludes.
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-viviane-fairbank-st-andrews-stirling/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240624T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240624T110000
DTSTAMP:20260615T072312
CREATED:20231109T140825Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231109T140825Z
UID:10001799-1719219600-1719226800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar:
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/medieval-logic-seminar-53/
CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240625T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240625T140000
DTSTAMP:20260615T072312
CREATED:20240526T060848Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240618T085734Z
UID:10002086-1719316800-1719324000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-67/
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240625T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240625T140000
DTSTAMP:20260615T072312
CREATED:20240619T090055Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240625T091702Z
UID:10002106-1719316800-1719324000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind seminar: No seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-no-seminar/
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240627T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240627T143000
DTSTAMP:20260615T072312
CREATED:20240528T061310Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240627T093926Z
UID:10002090-1719493200-1719498600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Matt McGrath (Washington University in St Louis)
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Matt McGrath (Washington University in St Louis) \nShould have Known and Epistemically Appropriate Belief\nSometimes people don’t know things they should have known. For instance\, cardiologists should know about recent major developments that bear on their practice; if they don’t know\, they should have. Can what a person should have known matter to what they’re epistemically appropriate to believe? Call the view that it can “should-have-known impurism.” If the cardiologist believes the usual treatment for a certain type of heart disease is best but should have known that an alternative treatment outperformed it in a recent large study\, it seems the cardiologist isn’t believing as she should. In this paper\, I dig into the reasoning behind or suggested by intuitions like this. Once we locate this reasoning\, we can probe its structure\, assess its quality\, and explore variations of it\, along with its relation to intuitions on the opposing “purist” side. In the end\, I argue that we can capture what the impurist gets right without accepting impurism. This is important because\, as I argue\, impurism faces serious problems.
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-matthew-mcgrath-washington-university-in-st-louis/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240628T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240628T170000
DTSTAMP:20260615T072312
CREATED:20240529T062354Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240628T094839Z
UID:10002094-1719568800-1719594000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:All Arché Research Day
DESCRIPTION:The All ArchĂ© Research Day is a whole-of-ArchĂ© get-together. It’s an opportunity to foster interaction between research streams\, and to celebrate achievements from the year 2023-2024. \nSession 1: 10am-11am (Chair: Jessica Brown) \nTalk 1 Katharina Bernhard: Epistemic Projection and Inductive Risk \nCoffee Break: 11am-11:30am \nSession 2: 11:30am-1pm (Chair: Francesco Berto) \nLightning talks: 11:30am-12noon\n(Jessica Brown\, Greg Restall\, Cecily Whiteley) \nTalk 2: 12noon-1:00pm\nViviane Fairbank: Is Logic Objective? \nLunch Break: 1:00pm-2:00pm (Catered) \nSession 3: 2:00pm-3:00pm (Chair: Aaron Cotnoir) \nTalk 3: Hoaxu Wang: On the Qualification of Being—A Quiddity in the Context of Russellian Monism \nCoffee Break: 3:00pm-3:30pm \nSession 4: 3:30pm-5:00pm (Chair: Jade Fletcher) \nLightning talks: 3:30pm-4:00pm\n(Aaron Cotnoir\, Francesco Berto\, 
) \nTalk 4: 4:00pm-5:00pm\nEmma Holmes: The Philosophy of Diets \nAfter Drinks at Brewdog
URL:/philevents/event/all-arche-research-day/
CATEGORIES:Workshops
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR