BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//Philosophy events - ECPv6.16.5.1//NONSGML v1.0//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
X-ORIGINAL-URL:/philevents
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Philosophy events
REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H
X-Robots-Tag:noindex
X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Europe/London
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0000
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:BST
DTSTART:20190331T010000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0000
TZNAME:GMT
DTSTART:20191027T010000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0000
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:BST
DTSTART:20200329T010000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0000
TZNAME:GMT
DTSTART:20201025T010000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0000
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:BST
DTSTART:20210328T010000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0000
TZNAME:GMT
DTSTART:20211031T010000
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201006T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201006T170000
DTSTAMP:20201006T211231Z
CREATED:20200709T160550Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201006T211231Z
UID:10001008-1601996400-1602003600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Conceptual Engineering Seminar | Paul Égré (Paris) & Cathal O’Madagain (Ben Guérir): “Concept utility”
DESCRIPTION:Abstract. — Practices of concept-revision among scientists suggest that concepts can be improved. In 2006\, the International Astronomical Union revised the concept PLANET so that it excluded Pluto\, and insisting that the result was an improvement. But what could it mean for one concept or conceptual scheme to be better than another? Here we draw on the theory of epistemic utility to address this question. We show how the plausibility and informativeness of beliefs\, two features that contribute to their utility\, have direct correlates in our concepts. These are how inclusive a concept is\, or how many objects in an environment it applies to\, and how homogeneous it is\, or how similar the objects that fall under the concept are. We provide ways of measuring these values\, and argue that in combination they can provide us with a single principle of concept utility. We use this measure to account for concept constitution\, and to rationalize cases of concept-revision. \n\nZoom meeting ID: 857 3025 53 80\nZoom password: ACEW20 (Invite link)
URL:/philevents/event/conceptual-engineering-seminar-tba-4/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58�Թ�\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Conceptual Engineering Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201013T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201013T170000
DTSTAMP:20201013T230607Z
CREATED:20200716T174429Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201013T230607Z
UID:10001019-1602601200-1602608400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Conceptual Engineering Seminar | Helen De Cruz (St Louis): “Ameliorative genealogy and hunter-gatherer philosophies”
DESCRIPTION:Abstract. — According to Mary Midgley (1919–2018)\, philosophy is like plumbing: “Each system supplies vital needs for those who live above it. Each is hard to repair when it does go wrong\, because neither of them was ever consciously planned as a whole”. In her view\, philosophy responds to basic needs that are fundamental to human social life. Our political and social institutions have philosophical concepts at their basis\, and a well-ordered society requires philosophical concepts that are up to the task of helping us devise right ways of living together. Melioristic projects in philosophy attempt to fix or reroute this plumbing\, but because our philosophical concepts are invisible and because we are so familiar with them\, conceptual engineering is difficult. Philosophical genealogies aim to overcome this limit to our imagination by looking at how our current concepts originated. This paper will discuss philosophical concepts developed in hunter-gatherer communities as a source of inspiration for melioristic philosophy and conceptual engineering. We ought not treat contemporary hunter-gatherers as proxies of stages of human evolution. Rather\, examining the philosophical ideas of hunter-gatherers is useful because it gives us a better idea of the range of human ethical\, political\, metaphysical ideas. Members of large-scale societies do not get a clear view of this range\, because living in large groups presents its own constraints and challenges\, which in turn limits the philosophical options. I will argue that features of hunter-gatherer philosophies\, such as egalitarianism and care for one’s natural environment are not inevitable byproducts of hunter-gatherer life\, but rather\, sophisticated philosophical ideas\, and hunter-gatherer societies\, past and present\, are philosophical peers to our present-day large-scale societies. I close by considering the role of academic philosophers in the light of this. \n\nZoom meeting ID: 857 3025 53 80\nZoom password: ACEW20 (Invite link)
URL:/philevents/event/conceptual-engineering-seminar-tba-5/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58�Թ�\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Conceptual Engineering Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201020T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201020T170000
DTSTAMP:20201020T215750Z
CREATED:20200723T191042Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201020T215750Z
UID:10001026-1603206000-1603213200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Conceptual Engineering Seminar | Teresa Marques (Barcelona): “Representing or shaping reality? What class can teach about woman”
DESCRIPTION:Abstract. — Historically\, some feminists and Marxists aimed to introduce theoretically useful concepts to accurately describe\, explain\, and predict existing oppression and inequality. In fact\, Haslanger (2000\, 2006) had argued that we should analyse social kind concepts for discriminated groups (e.g.\, for race or gender) so as to lay down the conditions of oppression of the relevant groups. Haslanger’s analysis was recently criticized by Simion (2018a)\, who argued that a concept should be ameliorated only if so doing preserves epistemic accuracy. Simion further argued that Haslanger’s concept woman is not epistemically accurate (Simion 2018b). In turn\, Podosky 2018 and McKenna 2018 suggested that conceptual revision should be allowed because concepts can “shape reality”\, not just represent it. I argue that this recent debate makes a mistaken assumption. I draw a parallel with the Marxist analysis of class and the aforementioned analysis of woman. The theoretical concept class was not introduced to shape reality – to create new social positions that the concept would come to represent. Rather those positions are occupied (if the Marxist analysis is correct) by the oppressed and the oppressors. Doing away with unfair inequality would bring about less epistemically accurate class concepts. An apt criticism of class analysis would rather have to show that it failed in its aim of explaining and predicting actual conditions of inequality. I claim that this discussion shows us what ameliorative projects that have political aims should look like. \n\nZoom meeting ID: 857 3025 53 80\nZoom password: ACEW20 (Invite link)
URL:/philevents/event/conceptual-engineering-seminar-tba-6/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58�Թ�\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Conceptual Engineering Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201027T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201027T170000
DTSTAMP:20201027T221728Z
CREATED:20200731T181121Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201027T221728Z
UID:10001034-1603810800-1603818000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Conceptual Engineering Seminar | David Plunkett (Dartmouth) & Tristram McPherson (Ohio State): “Conceptual ethics\, metaepistemology\, and the foundations of epistemic normativity”
DESCRIPTION:*** SESSION RESTRICTED TO ARCHÉ MEMBERS *** \nAbstract. — This paper advertises the importance of distinguishing three different foundational projects concerning the epistemic\, which we call normative epistemic inquiry\, metaepistemic inquiry\, and the conceptual ethics of epistemology. We argue that these projects can be distinguished by their contrasting constitutive success conditions. We argue further that because of these contrasts\, explicit attention to the distinction between them is a valuable resource for philosophical work on the epistemic. For example\, we argue that carefully distinguishing these projects allows us to: (a) better understand and evaluate existing views; (b) identify and appreciate new or underexplored theoretical options; (c) avoid merely verbal disputes that can hinder intellectual progress\, and (d) help us to understand the relationship between epistemology and the deepest normative questions concerning what we ought to believe\, and how we ought to live.
URL:/philevents/event/conceptual-engineering-seminar-tba-7/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58�Թ�\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Conceptual Engineering Seminar
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR