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DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20210618
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20210621
DTSTAMP:20210618T135330Z
CREATED:20210508T103806Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210618T135330Z
UID:10001302-1623974400-1624233599@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:How Could Truth be Plural?
DESCRIPTION:It has been nearly thirty years since Crispin Wright’s Truth and Objectivity was published\, and in these thirty years alethic pluralism has established itself as a strong contender in the current debate on truth. Yet\, while various intricate versions of alethic pluralism have been developed over the years\, many philosophers are still hesitant to buy into the very idea that truth is plural.\nOur conference\, “How Could Truth Possibly Be Plural?”\, offers the alethic pluralist the opportunity to face their critics and defend their views. \nSchedule (all times are in UTC+1)\nDay 1 (18th of June):\n14:45 – 15:00 Crispin Wright (NYU/Stirling)  Introduction\n15:00 – 16:15 Mark Jago (Nottingham)  On Ways of Being True\n16:30 – 17:45 Cheryl Misak (Toronto)  Ramsey’s Unified Pragmatist Concept of Truth\n18:00 – 19:15 María José Frápolli (Granada)  Semantic Pluralism and the Complex Meaning of Truth\n19.30 – 20:45 Chase Wrenn (Alabama) — Blindspots and Brightspots in Alethic Pluralism \nDay 2 (19th of June):\n15:00 – 16:15 William Gamester (Leeds) A Place and Purpose for Pluralism\n16:30 – 17:45 Douglas Edwards (Utica) & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (Yonsei) Moderate Pluralism: Doubly Grounded?\n18:00 – 19:30 Douglas Edwards\, Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen\, Crispin Wright  Panel Discussion \nRegistration\nIf you would like to attend the conference\, please register by emailing Tom Kaspers (tk70@st-andrews.ac.uk) or Niccolò Aimone Pisano (nap6@st-andrews.ac.uk). The conference is free and open to all. \nAbstracts\nJago — On Ways of Being True \nThere are many ways for truths to be true. How should we understand that idea? One is that there are different kinds of truth: the ways are different properties of truth. Another understanding is that a truth can be made true in different ways\, by different kinds of entities. The former understanding supports alethic pluralism. But the latter can be understood as a kind of monism: truth is the existential property of having some truthmaker or other. On this view\, the differences reside in how a truth is made true\, but not in its being true. I’ll discuss how these two understandings differ\, and what the potential advantages of each might be. \nMisak — Ramsey’s Unified Pragmatist Concept of Truth \nF.P. Ramsey is sometimes taken to be a proponent of the redundancy theory of truth. Sometimes he is taken to be on the same page as the Vienna Circle or Wittgenstein’s Tractatus\, where the truth predicate only applies to something like simple elementary perceptual propositions. I will argue that both these interpretations are wrong. Ramsey offered a promising account of truth on pragmatist lines\, where truth is the aim of belief\, and each domain of belief or inquiry must answer\, for its own subject matter\, the question What is true? His project was to offer a unified account of how various kinds of beliefs might aim at truth\, including logic\, ethics\, and perhaps even aesthetics. \nFrápolli — Semantic Pluralism and the Complex Meaning of Truth \nTruth ascriptions are sophisticated linguistic tools of endorsement and generalisation over propositions. Their complex meaning can only be unravelled in a pluralistic semantic framework that makes room for a distinction between an aspect of meaning that is stable\, i.e. linguistic meaning\, and an aspect that is contextually modulated\, i.e. the content that they help to assert. The focus on the use of truth ascriptions accommodates the intuition that different terms (different sentences) can act as truth predicates (truth ascriptions). This does not imply\, nevertheless\, that there are different truth conceptsthat apply to different kinds of contents. Ramsey is my main inspiration. Frege\, Kaplan\, Strawson\, C. F. J. Williams and Brandom have also had an essential impact on my proposal\, which combines philosophical aspects\, taken from pragmatics\, and technical aspects\, taken from the linguistic analysis of proforms. \nWrenn — Blindspots and Brightspots in Alethic Pluralism \nAlethic pluralists often stake their position on the claim that truth-attributions involve marking claims with a special normative status. We can understand that status as fitness to believe or fitness to assert. I argue that truth-attributions can’t necessarily involve attributing any such status. The problem comes from true-belief (or true-assertion) blindspots (Sorensen; Bykvist & Hattiangadi) and brightspots. The former are claims such as ‘It’s raining and no one believes it’\, which can be true but not truly believed. The latter are claims such as ‘2 is prime and no one believes it’\, which can be false but not falsely believed. The basic shape of the problem is this: If something is fit to believe\, then\, were you to believe it\, your belief would be alethically fitting (or correct or good or whatever). No state of believing a blindspot is alethically fitting\, even though blindspots can be true. So\, being true does not entail fitness to believe. For similar reasons\, falsehood doesn’t entail unfitness to believe. Consequently\, it can’t be part of the content of TRUE that what is true is fit to believe. After laying out the problem\, I explore some of the likeliest pluralist responses to it. \nGamester — A Place and Purpose for Pluralism \nThis talk takes up a suggestion made independently by Wright (“Comrades Against Quietism”\, 1998) and Lynch (“Expressivism and Plural Truth”\, 2013): that truth pluralism and metaethical expressivism are natural allies. I explore one way in which expressivists stand to benefit by endorsing a substantive\, but non-representational\, theory of truth for ethical judgements: with regards to the notorious Frege-Geach Problem. I argue that such a theory can play a critical role in earning the right to a truth-conditional semantics for ethical discourse\, by explaining that in virtue of which ethical sentences have truth-conditions (namely\, in virtue of expressing judgements that can be true or false). The expressivist can hereby silo her distinctive commitments to the metasemantics of ethical discourse and the nature of ethical judgement\, while endorsing an utterly orthodox\, truth-conditional semantic theory. While this does not\, by itself\, suffice to solve the Frege-Geach Problem – we still need a compositional story about what mental states are expressed by logically complex sentences – it constitutes a major step forwards. Moreover\, I suggest how we can complete the solution by appealing to a kind of logical expressivism – an independently motivated and well-developed theory that is already employed by some truth pluralists (Ferrari\, Moruzzi\, and Pedersen\, “Austere Truth Pluralism”\, 2021). \nEdwards & Pedersen — Moderate Pluralism: Doubly Grounded? \nModerate truth pluralists (such as Lynch 2009\, Edwards 2018) hold that truth itself is distinct from properties such as correspondence and superassertibility that nevertheless play a significant role in explaining the truth of sentences in different domains. A significant challenge for moderate pluralists is to explain the relationship between truth itself and these domain-specific properties. In this talk we explore the idea (due to Pedersen 2020\, MS) that grounding can be used to account for this relation. We do this in two ways. We first show how the truth of particular sentences can be explained through grounding\, before going on to explore whether grounding can also be used to account for the general relation between truth and the domain-specific properties. \n  \n 
URL:/philevents/event/how-could-truth-be-plural/
LOCATION:A virtual Conference – by Zoom
CATEGORIES:Conference
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DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20210624
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20210627
DTSTAMP:20210624T131842Z
CREATED:20210504T101355Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210624T131842Z
UID:10001291-1624492800-1624751999@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Integrated Information Theory: Current State and Perspectives
DESCRIPTION:One of the most intriguing theories of consciousness developed during the past twenty years is the Integrated Information Theory (IIT). Its core idea is that consciousness is identical with integrated information\, that is\, with the amount of information a system can generate as a whole\, over and above the information produced by its component parts taken independently from each other.\nIIT represents an articulate\, interdisciplinary attempt at characterising what consciousness is and how it works in a scientifically robust way\, by making use of mathematical tools to precisely describe phenomenal consciousness both quantitatively and qualitatively\, which is what makes it such a momentous theory of consciousness. However\, empirically testing this theory is quite troublesome\, as this would require a presently infeasible amount of computations. Furthermore\, after the first phase in which the theory has gradually reached its current shape\, a number of works have been published which point at a range of aspects of the theory in need of elaboration or reconsideration.\nThis conference is thus meant to provide a space in which some of the experts who have been contributed to IIT in various ways over the past few years will present and confront their views on the current state of IIT\, on the ways it could be developed in future\, and\, more generally\, on its prospects as a theory of consciousness. This would be beneficial for the development of IIT itself\, as it would represent an important occasion to take stock and discuss the most promising directions that this important theory of consciousness may (need to) take in the future. Therefore\, one of the main purposes of this conference is\, crucially\, to facilitate the first step towards a more mature stage of the theory\, one at which\, perhaps\, it will become the leading contemporary theory of consciousness. \nProgramme (all times are in UTC+1) \nDay 1 (Thursday 24th June)\n14:45 – 15:00 Introduction\n15:00 – 16:15 Larissa Albantakis (Wisconsin\, Madison) – Integrated Information Theory – An Introduction\n16:30 – 17:45 Haoying Liu (Massachusetts\, Amherst) – On the Postulates of the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness\n18:00 – 19:15 Melanie Boly (Wisconsin\, Madison) – Integrated Information Theory – Empirical Predictions \nDay 2 (Friday 25th June)\n13:30 – 14:45 Timothy Bayne (Monash) – IIT and the Unity of Consciousness\n15:00 – 16:15 Adam Barrett (Sussex) – The Strength of Weak Integrated Information Theory\n16:30 – 17:45 Pedro Mediano (Cambridge) – Beyond Integrated Information: Information Decomposition and its Implications for Consciousness Science\n17:45 – 18:00 Concluding Remarks \nRegistration\nIf you would like to attend the conference\, please register by emailing Niccolò Aimone Pisano (nap6@st-andrews.ac.uk) or Tom Kaspers (tk70@st-andrews.ac.uk).The conference is free and open to all. \nAbstracts\nLarissa Albantakis (Wisconsin\, Madison): “Integrated Information Theory – An Introduction”\nIntegrated information theory (IIT)\, developed by Giulio Tononi and colleagues\, aims to provide a theory of consciousness with explanatory\, predictive\, and inferential power starting from phenomenology itself. IIT contrasts with current approaches that start from the NCC with the hope of identifying generalized principles about the nature of consciousness. Instead\, IIT first identifies the essential properties of every experience from consciousness itself. From these “axioms” of phenomenology\, IIT then infers a set of requirements (“postulates”) for a physical system to be a substrate of consciousness. IIT predicts that the quality or content of an experience is structurally identical to the cause-effect structure of its physical substrate\, and that the quantity or level of consciousness corresponds to the amount of intrinsic cause-effect power the substrate has onto itself. IIT’s theoretical formalism makes it possible to evaluate\, in principle\, whether a physical system complies with the IIT postulates and thus forms a physical substrate of consciousness. It\, moreover\, quantifies the level of consciousness of such a system\, and provides a full account of its phenomenological structure in causal terms. \n\nHaoying Liu (Massachusetts\, Amherst): “On the Postulates of the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness”\nThe Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness (IIT) begins with five “axioms” about the phenomenological features of consciousness. It then proceeds with five corresponding “postulates\,” which are supposed to specify a system’s physical features that realize these phenomenological features. Assuming that the axioms of IIT are not false\, I examine how the postulates of IIT may be derived from the axioms. Two major issues will emerge in this examination. The first concerns whether the concept of causation (in particular\, cause-effect power) in the formulation of the postulates is ambiguous. The second concerns whether the postulates sufficiently capture certain robust aspects of consciousness mentioned by the axioms\, such as “intrinsic perspective” and “phenomenal distinctions.” The examination will cast doubt on IIT’s potential to offer a substantive theory that sufficiently captures consciousness in terms of causation. \n\nMelanie Boly (Wisconsin\, Madison): “Integrated Information Theory – Empirical Predictions”\nTBA \n\nTimothy Bayne (Monash): “IIT and the Unity of Consciousness”\nAn appeal to the unity of consciousness is at the heart of the axiomatic case for IIT\, but what exactly is the unity of consciousness and to what extent does it support IT? This talk considers various conceptions of the unity of consciousness\, and compares and contrasts the appeal that is made to the unity of consciousness in IIT with the appeal that is made to it in other theories of consciousness. \n\nAdam Barrett (Sussex): “The Strength of Weak Integrated Information Theory”\nIIT has divided the consciousness science community. While some scientists believe it provides a feasible approach to address the `hard problem’\, others dismiss it on the grounds of scarce empirical support and in-principle untestability for its primary claims. In this talk I describe how this might be ameliorated by the division of IIT into two branches\, `strong’ and `weak’. Strong IIT will continue to assert that consciousness is integrated information\, and search for a fundamental mathematical formula for this based on first principles. Meanwhile\, weak IIT will focus on developing and testing pragmatic hypotheses on correlations between aspects of consciousness and broader measures of information dynamics\, and through this strategy obtain a deeper understanding of consciousness supported by progressive empirical validations. I will go over mathematical and physical arguments for why the existing formulation of strong IIT fails\, and mention some possible ways forward. I will summarise experimental evidence for weak IIT\, while also discussing theoretical limitations of approaches based on one-dimensional measures of integrated information. Finally\, I will argue for a multi-dimensional approach to measuring integrated information in weak IIT\, and briefly touch upon the `integrated information decomposition’ taxonomy of information dynamics. \n\nPedro Mediano (Cambridge): “Beyond Integrated Information: Information Decomposition and its Implications for Consciousness Science”\nA crucial part of the research programme in weak integrated information theory is the computational and empirical validation of practical measures of integrated information. To this end\, in this talk we will first examine the behaviour of several proposed measures of integrated information\, showing that they behave inconsistently even in simple linear systems. With the aim of understanding and alleviating some of the problems with these measures\, we will introduce the framework of `integrated information decomposition\,’ or ΦID\, which allows us to decompose the `modes’ of information dynamics taking place within a system. Some of these modes will be identified with measures of integrated information\, or other dynamical phenomena like causal emergence. We will then examine some of the philosophical implications of ΦID\, and argue that the modes of information dynamics revealed by ΦID provide a promising avenue to explore the multi-dimensional structure of consciousness. We will conclude by outlining a few neuroscientific applications of ΦID\, highlighting how a `weak’ approach to IIT can provide further insight into brain function and point towards compatibilities between IIT and other theories of consciousness.
URL:/philevents/event/integrated-information-theory-current-state-and-perspectives/
LOCATION:A virtual Conference – by Zoom
CATEGORIES:Conference
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