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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T130000
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DTSTAMP:20260615T130323
CREATED:20240402T012446Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240502T045502Z
UID:10002003-1714654800-1714660200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Carlotta Pavese (Cornell University)
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Carlotta Pavese (Cornell University) \nAre there essentially intentional actions? \nA long tradition in action theory holds that there are such things as essentially intentional actions—actions that are intentional whenever performed (Anscombe\, Davidson\, Bennett\, Turri\, etc). In my talk\, I argue that the existence of essentially intentional action is a philosophical myth and that this has interesting repercussions in action theory and in epistemology. In the first part of my talk\, I defend the claim that the doctrine of essentially intentional actions is incompatible with a desirable practical knowledge condition on intentional actions\, which I argue we have independent reasons to embrace. In the second part of my talk I argue that the doctrine of essentially intentional actions is incompatible with a plausible solution to a puzzle—the puzzle of novice learning—-that arises for certain kinds of theories of action and I contend that is an additional reason to reject the doctrine. Finally\, I explore some interesting conclusions that follow from rejecting the doctrine of essentially intentional actions.
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-tba-29/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
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