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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210506T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210506T143000
DTSTAMP:20210506T102042Z
CREATED:20200819T113131Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210506T102042Z
UID:10001138-1620306000-1620311400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Lara Jost “Knowledge: Emotions\, Perception and Rational Agents”
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: In contemporary analytic epistemology\, emotions are usually not considered to be a good justification for an agent’s belief\, in the same way perception\, memory\, reasoning or testimony are\, due to emotions facing issues when it comes to being reliable and sensitive to defeaters. In this talk\, I argue that this problem can be overcome if one reframes what is expected of emotions under rational guidance. Building on Jones (2003)\, I will propose that we need to consider emotions as participating to knowledge acquisition under a conception of epistemic agents as reason trackers rather than reason responders. This will enable me to build a model where the reliability and sensitivity of emotions can be explained through delayed calibration rather than immediate control. In order to strengthen this proposal\, I will highlight how perception is following the same pattern\, while benefiting from a better epistemic reputation than emotions. Finally\, I will discuss how the calibration of emotions is a dual process\, where calibration is influenced by both internal and social monitoring\, which explains why our emotions can offer good justification for belief.
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-tba-18/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58�Թ�\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210513T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210513T173000
DTSTAMP:20210513T112006Z
CREATED:20200819T113136Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210513T112006Z
UID:10001143-1620921600-1620927000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar (joint with CEPPA and FPST): Emmalon Davis (UMich) “Challenging the Pursuit of Novelty”
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Novelty—understood as the value of saying something new—appears to be a good-making feature of a philosophical contribution. Beyond this\, however\, novelty functions as a marker of philosophical success: contributions that say something new are considered successful\, while contributions that do not say something new are considered unsuccessful. When novelty serves as a marker and metric of success\, the pursuit of novelty becomes an aspirational ideal. This paper challenges the presumption and expectation that a successful philosophical contribution will be a novel one.\n\nTo do so\, I distinguish two constituent components—novelty as ingenuity/originality and novelty as discovery/priority—which\, taken together\, comprise the aspirational ideal of novelty. I outline a series of traps or pitfalls associated with the practical pursuit of each component part and show that efforts to avoid traps associated with one render philosophers vulnerable to traps associated with the other. I argue that an aspirational ideal of novelty should be rejected\, as the pursuit of each component part is in tension with the other. Throughout my analysis\, I demonstrate that the greatest risks accompanying the pursuit of novelty are unevenly distributed and that an aspirational ideal of novelty disadvantages certain practitioners disproportionately. I conclude that an aspirational ideal of novelty is less desirable and less feasible than it appears.
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-tba-19/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58�Թ�\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210520T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210520T173000
DTSTAMP:20210520T121903Z
CREATED:20200819T113138Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210520T121903Z
UID:10001148-1621526400-1621531800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar (joint with CEPPA and FPST): Rima Basu (CMC) “Normative Expectations”
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: In supplementing the familiar ways that our interpersonal relationships are morally fraught\, recent work in epistemology on doxastic wronging has highlighted how these relationships can be epistemically fraught as well. However\, in focusing predominantly on beliefs— mental states that arguably constitute a small fraction of our mental lives—these theories have their own theoretical blindspots. In this paper\, I expand the scope of analysis to expectations. Typically\, we notice the failures of expectations when we’re the targets of them: when we let our loved ones down. Key indicators of the presence of normative expectations are feelings of disappointment and betrayal. Contexts in which these feelings manifest most vividly involve parents and their hopes and dreams for our lives. Focusing on these contexts\, I argue that normative expectations play three distinctive roles: a pre- dictive role\, a prescriptive role\, and a proleptic role. Each role\, I conjecture\, comes with its own avenue for moral\, epistemic\, and conceptual failure. Ultimately\, in precisifying the heterogeneous class of attitudes that constitute normative expectations\, I reveal just how expansive the ‘doxastic’ in doxastic wronging ought be.
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-tba-20/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58�Թ�\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210527T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210527T173000
DTSTAMP:20210527T125029Z
CREATED:20200819T113140Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210527T125029Z
UID:10001153-1622131200-1622136600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar (joint with CEPPA and FPST): Renee Bolinger (Princeton) “Are We Entitled to Be Believed?”
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Discussions in a variety of contexts (including at least epistemic injustice\, moral encroachment\, epistemic obligations of friendship) sometimes assume that speakers have a right or moral entitlement to be believed when they assert or testify that p: that they are wronged if their audience fails to believe them. It is controversial whether rights of this kind are intelligible\, or precisely what their basis is. This talk aims to get clearer on what a “right to be believed” is a right to by working backward: sifting through the various ways of characterizing the justifications we might give for such an entitlement\, and the wrongs suffered when it is violated. I suggest that the best candidate is a claim to appropriate epistemic policies\, which I unpack and sketch at the end of the talk.
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-tba-21/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58�Թ�\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
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