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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210603T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210603T143000
DTSTAMP:20210603T125912Z
CREATED:20200819T113143Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210603T125912Z
UID:10001158-1622725200-1622730600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Daniel Whiting (Southampton) “Higher-Order Evidence\, First-Order Beliefs”
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: When a person has evidence about their capacity to assess the evidence for or against a proposition\, for example\, when they have evidence that their assessment is subject to bias\, they have higher-order evidence. A popular view in epistemology is that higher-order evidence can make a difference to whether it is rational for a person to believe a proposition. In particular\, many think that there are cases in which it would be rational to believe a proposition in the absence of higher-order evidence but not rational to believe that same proposition in the presence of higher-order evidence. In this paper\, I will ask\, how? How might higher-order evidence have this effect? I will outline three answers to this question and show that they fail. In closing\, I will query the motivation for thinking that higher-order evidence makes a rational difference.
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-tba-22/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58�Թ�\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210610T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210610T143000
DTSTAMP:20210610T131901Z
CREATED:20200819T113145Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210610T131901Z
UID:10001163-1623330000-1623335400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Catarina Dutilh Novaes “Argumentation and a three-tiered model of epistemic exchange”
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Argumentation is often contrasted with testimony in that in cases of testimony\, an epistemic agent (presumably) primarily evaluates the trustworthiness of the source of information (the informant)\, whereas in argumentation there is (presumably) primarily engagement with the content communicated. I have argued however (Dutilh Novaes 2020) that trust and trustworthiness in fact play an important role in argumentation too. From this analysis emerged a three-tiered model of epistemic exchange\, inspired by the framework of social exchange theory (an influential framework in sociology and social psychology). According to this model\, there are three stages for an instance of epistemic exchange to take place: 1- a relation of attention is established between the parties; 2- a relation of sufficient trust is established between the parties; 3- the parties can finally engage in fruitful epistemic exchange. This model generalizes beyond argumentation\, and sheds new light on a number of phenomena that have attracted the interest of social epistemologists such as epistemic bubbles and epistemic injustice\, among others. In this talk\, I present the model in detail and discuss some of its applications.
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-tba-23/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58�Թ�\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210617T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210617T143000
DTSTAMP:20210617T135308Z
CREATED:20200819T113147Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210617T135308Z
UID:10001168-1623934800-1623940200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Corine Besson (Sussex) “Carroll’s Regress\, Guidance and Explicit Representation”
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: What is the nature of one’s justification to use a logical principle such as Modus Ponens in reasoning? It is widely agreed amongst epistemologists of logic that such justification cannot be internalist. One key reason offered for this view is that internalist accounts of justification are susceptible to Carroll-style regresses. In this talk\, I examine this claim and argue that internalist accounts of justification are not open to such regresses. I further argue that the sorts of externalist accounts of the justification of logical principles typically put forward as alternatives are inadequate.
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-tba-24/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58�Թ�\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210624T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210624T143000
DTSTAMP:20210624T131843Z
CREATED:20200819T113149Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210624T131843Z
UID:10001173-1624539600-1624545000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Frederik Andersen “Engel’s Dilemma and the Horrors of Logical Disagreement”
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Hinge propositions\, or simply “hinges”\, are primitive certainties that we (must) presuppose in our normal inquiries. Recently there has been a lot of interest in hinge epistemology\, which is a kind of epistemology that sets the notion of hinge at the center stage. This paper puts forward a dilemma leveled against hinge epistemologists. The dilemma is based on work by Pascal Engel (2016) and it states that\, given the assumption that hinge propositions are normative at all\, they are either grammatical or epistemic norms. If the former is the case\, then hinges would appear to be irrelevant to epistemology as it is ordinarily conceived\, while if the latter holds\, hinges would have to compete with other types of epistemic norms\, resulting in an incomprehensible epistemology altogether. After presenting Engel’s dilemma\, it is utilized to tease out certain bleak insights about logical disagreement.
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-tba-25/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58�Թ�\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
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