BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//Philosophy events - ECPv6.16.4.1//NONSGML v1.0//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
X-WR-CALNAME:Philosophy events
X-ORIGINAL-URL:/philevents
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Philosophy events
REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H
X-Robots-Tag:noindex
X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Europe/London
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0000
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:BST
DTSTART:20200329T010000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0000
TZNAME:GMT
DTSTART:20201025T010000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0000
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:BST
DTSTART:20210328T010000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0000
TZNAME:GMT
DTSTART:20211031T010000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0000
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:BST
DTSTART:20220327T010000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0000
TZNAME:GMT
DTSTART:20221030T010000
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210923T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210923T143000
DTSTAMP:20210923T230812Z
CREATED:20210629T152332Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210923T230812Z
UID:10001316-1632402000-1632407400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Paulina Sliwa (Cambridge) “Asking the right moral questions”
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: What is it to engage in moral inquiry? The received wisdom is that it is to answer moral questions – that is\, questions about what we ought to do. Someone has moral expertise to the extent to which she is reliable at arriving at true answers to those questions. Philosophical disagreements have focused on what it takes to arrive at right answers: is it a matter of being able to weigh reasons\, something more akin to a perceptual capacity\, or the ability to give explanations? These debates leave a crucial part of moral inquiry unexplored: namely how we come up with moral questions in the first place. This paper examines the asking-questions part of moral inquiry and what it tells us about moral expertise.
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-12/
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210930T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210930T143000
DTSTAMP:20210930T233809Z
CREATED:20210702T152337Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210930T233809Z
UID:10001323-1633006800-1633012200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Roy Sorensen (58�Թ�) “A Priori Lies: Kant’s Gift to Lawyers”
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: An a priori lie is a lie that conflicts with an a priori truth. Rather sportingly\, the liar leaves himself open to refutation by armchair methods such as calculation. My thesis is that Immanuel Kant precludes the existence of a priori lies. For asserting a proposition requires raising a rational expectation of its truth. If the hearer believes the negation of an a priori proposition\, Kant blames the deceived\, not the deceiver. We are sometimes permitted to believe beyond the evidence but never against the evidence. The impossibility of a priori lies vindicates the advocate’s assumption that one cannot lie with deliberately invalid deductions or by engaging in insincere legal semantics.
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-13/
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR