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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211007T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211007T173000
DTSTAMP:20211007T151204Z
CREATED:20210709T155337Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211007T151204Z
UID:10001330-1633622400-1633627800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar (joint with CEPPA): Thi Nguyen (Utah) “Value Capture”
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Value capture occurs when an agent enters a social environment which presents external expressions of value — which are often simplified\, standardized\, and quantified — and those external versions come to dominate our reasoning and motivations. Examples include becoming motivated by Twitter Likes and Retweets\, citation rates\, ranked lists of best schools\, and Grade Point Averages. We are vulnerable to value capture because of the competitive advantage that such pre-packaged value expressions have in our reasoning and our communications. But when we internalize such metrics\, we damage our own autonomy. In value capture\, we outsource the process of deliberating on our values. And that outsourcing cuts off one of the key benefits of personal deliberation. When we tailor our values to ourselves\, we can fine-tune them to fit our own particular psychology and place in the world. But in value capture\, we buy our values off the rack.
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-14/
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211014T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211014T143000
DTSTAMP:20211014T153810Z
CREATED:20210716T165402Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211014T153810Z
UID:10001337-1634216400-1634221800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Nick Kuespert (58�Թ�) “Aims of Moral Inquiry”
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: What should the interaction between non-experts and experts look like when it comes to moral inquiry? In this talk\, I discuss this interaction from both perspectives. In the first part\, I argue that whether non-experts should treat experts as authorities or advisors depends on the aim of moral inquiry which in turn varies with context. I propose a hybrid model: by default\, the aim of moral inquiry is moral understanding and non-experts should therefore treat moral experts as advisors. If\, however\, moral understanding is unavailable or only attainable at high risk\, moral knowledge becomes the aim of moral inquiry and non-experts should treat moral experts as authorities. In the second part\, I argue that we should be careful not to conceive of moral experts as completely analogous to non-moral experts. In particular\, we can expect that many moral experts will be those negatively affected by injustices. This creates special procedural obligations for non-experts in their pursuit of moral expertise.
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-15/
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211021T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211021T143000
DTSTAMP:20211021T155337Z
CREATED:20210723T171113Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211021T155337Z
UID:10001344-1634821200-1634826600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Lara Jost (58�Թ�) “Epistemic Exclusion: Why We Shouldn’t Treat Members of Oppressed Groups like We Treat Conspiracy Theorists”
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: In this work-in-progress\, I build from Iris Marion Young’s notions of inclusion and exclusion and Kristie Dotson’s framework of epistemic oppression\, to show how some traditional views about what counts as a good source of justification can participate to internal epistemic exclusion\, which contributes to second order epistemic oppression. Whilst theories of justification often seem detached and independent from social structures\, I aim to cast doubt over the apparent fairness of the process of engagement with one another\, as some epistemic agents are subjected to internal exclusion\, even though they are reasonable and engage with the rest of the group. This leads me to argue that members of oppressed groups who use affective experience as a source of justification are unduly excluded from epistemic exchanges. In contrast\, I explain why conspiracy theorists who argue on the basis of their affective experience should remain duly excluded.
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-16/
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211028T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211028T143000
DTSTAMP:20211028T153810Z
CREATED:20210730T175857Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211028T153810Z
UID:10001351-1635426000-1635431400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Frederik Andersen (58�Թ�) “Logical Akrasia”
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: The aim of this paper is two-fold. First\, it introduces the concept logical akrasia (by analogy to epistemic akrasia). Second\, it discusses how logical akrasia relates to the standards of epistemic rationality\, and in particular\, how logical akrasia poses a challenge to the tenability of the controversial fixed point thesis.
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-17/
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
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