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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211104T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211104T143000
DTSTAMP:20211104T160812Z
CREATED:20210806T184152Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211104T160812Z
UID:10001358-1636030800-1636036200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Corine Besson (Sussex) “Carroll’s Regress\, Guidance and Explicit Representation”
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: What is the nature of one’s justification to use a logical principle such as Modus Ponens in reasoning? It is widely agreed amongst epistemologists of logic that such justification cannot be internalist. One key reason offered for this view is that internalist accounts of justification are susceptible to Carroll-style regresses. In this talk\, I examine this claim and argue that internalist accounts of justification are not open to such regresses. I further argue that the sorts of externalist accounts of the justification of logical principles typically put forward as alternatives are inadequate.
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-18/
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211111T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211111T143000
DTSTAMP:20211111T162307Z
CREATED:20210813T192434Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211111T162307Z
UID:10001365-1636635600-1636641000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Alessandra Tanesini (Cardiff) “The alleged epistemic significance of silence\, silencing\, and the conversational norm of no silent rejections (NSR)”
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: In this talk I examine\, and rebut\, Goldberg’s (2020) arguments in favour of a conversational norm that would defeasibly entitle linguistic agents to presume that silence indicates assent (NSR). Using evidence from conversational analysis I show that Goldberg is wrong to claim that our linguistic communities de facto conform to this norm in conversation. Instead\, I argue that norms similar to NSR are temporarily enacted by means of exercitive speech acts. If this is right\, and contra Goldberg\, silencing is the function served by these norms rather than a product of NSR’s misapplication. Finally\, I argue that because of the bounded nature of human rationality\, we would not wish a system of human communication aiming at the epistemic goals of persuasion and the sharing of information to have NSR as one of its norms.
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-19/
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211111T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211111T173000
DTSTAMP:20211111T162307Z
CREATED:20211108T162311Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211111T162307Z
UID:10001436-1636646400-1636651800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar (joint with CEPPA): Jennifer Lackey (Northwestern) “Epistemic Reparations and the Right to be Known”
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: In this paper\, I provide an account of the epistemic significance of the phenomenon of “being known” and the relationship it has to reparations that are distinctively epistemic. Drawing on a framework provided by the United Nations of the “right to know\,” I argue that victims of gross violations and injustices not only have the right to know what happened\, but also the right to be known—to be a giver of knowledge to others about their own experiences. I show how such victims can suffer epistemic wrongs by being rendered invisible\, vilified or demonized\, or systematically distorted\, and that these ways of not being known demand epistemic reparations. While there are traditional reparations that are epistemic in nature\, such as memorialization and education\, I argue that there is a prior and arguably more important epistemic reparation—knowing victims of gross violations and injustices in the sense of bearing witness. I conclude by sketching an epistemological picture to underwrite this notion of epistemic reparations\, one that significantly expands the traditional picture by including epistemic duties that are imperfect in nature and concern actions in addition to beliefs.
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-joint-with-ceppa-jennifer-lackey-northwestern-epistemic-reparations-and-the-right-to-be-known/
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211118T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211118T173000
DTSTAMP:20211118T163815Z
CREATED:20210820T200928Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211118T163815Z
UID:10001372-1637251200-1637256600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar (joint with CEPPA and FPST): Linda Martín Alcoff (CUNY) “Extractivist epistemologies”
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: This paper (which is very much a work in progress) will develop the concept of extractivist epistemology as a way to think through the effect of colonialism on knowing practices. Extractivist epistemologies work analogously to extractivist capitalism: seeking an epistemic resource of some sort—such as a piece of pharmacological knowledge held by an indigenous community or rural healer concerning the medicinal potential of a given plant\, or an artifact from an indigenous funeral site. The extractivist approach to knowledge treats this epistemic resource as a piece of knowledge that can be separated from the social context and identities of its origin without epistemic loss. In so doing\, extractivist practices change the items that are abstracted. I will show how this is this is an epistemic problem and not simply an ethical problem.
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-20/
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211125T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211125T143000
DTSTAMP:20211125T172308Z
CREATED:20210827T202442Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211125T172308Z
UID:10001380-1637845200-1637850600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Timothy Williamson (Oxford) “Knowledge by sight and knowledge by proof”
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Knowledge by sight is a standard paradigm of a posteriori knowledge. Knowledge by mathematical proof is a standard paradigm of a priori knowledge. However\, I will argue that the two types of knowledge have so much in common that the a priori – a posteriori distinction cannot go very deep.
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-timothy-williamson-oxford/
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
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