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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240404T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240404T143000
DTSTAMP:20260616T093621
CREATED:20240306T235357Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240320T000844Z
UID:10001961-1712235600-1712241000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-24/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240404T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240404T143000
DTSTAMP:20260616T093621
CREATED:20240321T001103Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240404T013841Z
UID:10001970-1712235600-1712241000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Paul Conlan (58³Ō¹Ļ)
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Paul Conlan (58³Ō¹Ļ) \nEntitlement of Cognitive Project and The Adoption Problem\nKeywords: Epistemology of Logic\, Entitlement Epistemology\, Adoption Problem \nWright (2004) argues that we are warranted in the belief that modus ponens (MPP) is valid via anĀ entitlement of cognitive project. Wrightā€™s entitlement epistemology extends further\, however: WrightĀ (2014)\, suggests that the warrant for ā€˜cornerstoneā€™ beliefs like ā€˜there is an external worldā€™ is generated by epistemically consequentialist Reichenbachian dominance reasoning. One strand of objections to the 2014 position is that the warrant provided isĀ pragmaticĀ rather thanĀ epistemicĀ (see e.g. Pritchard (2007)\, Jenkins\, (2007)). This paper aims to suggest that the objection that the anti-sceptical warrants are merely pragmatic easily generalises to warrants generated by entitlement of cognitive project\, and Wright cannot avail himself of the strategy used to disarm the objection in the case of the anti-sceptical entitlement to fend off the objection that the entitlement to the validity of MPP provides merely pragmatic warrant. Instead\, I suggest that the entitlement to the validity of MPP cannot generate a pragmatic warrantĀ at all. I will argue that given a plausible principle regarding pragmatic warrants and Kripkeā€™s ā€˜Adoption Problemā€™ (See Padro (2015)\, Finn (2019))\, the warrant for the validity of MPP provided by entitlement of cognitive project must be something other than a pragmatic warrant.
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-paul-conlan-st-andrews/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240411T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240411T143000
DTSTAMP:20260616T093621
CREATED:20240313T001022Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240320T000845Z
UID:10001965-1712840400-1712845800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-25/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240411T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240411T143000
DTSTAMP:20260616T093621
CREATED:20240321T001104Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240411T015454Z
UID:10001972-1712840400-1712845800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: CANCELLED
DESCRIPTION:Cancelled due to conflicting event ā€“ Workshop: Proofs\, Rules\, and Meanings
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-cancelled/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240418T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240418T143000
DTSTAMP:20260616T093621
CREATED:20240319T000904Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240320T000845Z
UID:10001967-1713445200-1713450600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-26/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240418T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240418T143000
DTSTAMP:20260616T093621
CREATED:20240321T001104Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240418T023833Z
UID:10001974-1713445200-1713450600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Falbo on Inquiry
DESCRIPTION:Discussion session on ā€œInquiring Minds Want to Improveā€ by Arianna Falbo \nAbstract: \nMuch of the recent work on epistemology of inquiry defends two related theses. First\, inquiry into a question rationally prohibits believing an answer to that question. Second\, knowledge is the aim of inquiry. I develop a series of cases which indicate that inquiry is not as narrow as these views suggest. These cases can be accommodated if we take a broader approach and understand inquiry as aiming at epistemic improvement\, described more generally. This approach captures a wider range of inquiring phenomena because it accounts for forms of epistemic improvement that fall short of\, or go beyond\, coming to know the answer to a question.
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-tba-28/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240425T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240425T143000
DTSTAMP:20260616T093621
CREATED:20240326T003925Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240425T035444Z
UID:10001977-1714050000-1714055400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Catarina Dutilh Novaes (VU Amsterdam & 58³Ō¹Ļ)
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Catarina Dutilh Novaes (VU Amsterdam & 58³Ō¹Ļ) \nA Foucauldian critique of the epistemic injustice research programĀ \nCatarinaĀ Dutilh Novaes (joint work with Merel Talbi and Solmu Anttila)\n\nSince the publication of Frickerā€™s groundbreakingĀ Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of KnowingĀ (2007)\, vibrant debates on the complex relations between knowledge\, ethics and power have ensued\, arguably giving rise to a specific research program (in Lakatosā€™ sense). In contrast with apolitical social epistemology\, the epistemic injustice research program problematizes the roles of power and social identities in epistemic processes. Two of its core assumptions are: there is a reasonably neat separation between epistemic phenomena and ethical-political phenomena (even if they often intersect); while frequent\, occurrences of epistemic injustice are deviations from the norm that can be redressedā€”epistemic injustice is a bug\, not a feature.\n\nIn this talk\, I offer a critique of the epistemic injustice research program thus conceived\, drawing on broadly Foucauldian ideas on the relations between power and knowledge. I focus on the second assumption above\, specifically by revisiting Curryā€™s critique of Frickerā€™s and Medinaā€™s respective analyses ofĀ To Kill a Mocking Bird\, and by presenting a similar critique of Lackeyā€™s recent work on criminal testimonial injustice. In both cases\, the analyses of testimonial injustice as credibility deficit (Fricker and Medina) or as credibility excess (Lackey on confessions) miss the role and functions of these practices in perpetuating oppressive power structures (in these specific cases\, white supremacy). Thus seen\, epistemic injustice is a feature\, not a bug\, requiring much more than epistemic strategies to be redressed.
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-catarina-dutilh-novaes-vu-amsterdam-st-andrews/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
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