58吃瓜

Title: Good Moves: A Risk-Theoretic Account of Telic Know-How Abstract: I defend a new account of telic know-how, what I call the Good Moves (GM) account. To know how to complete a telic task T is to possess a stable, trainable disposition to select and sequence good moves across T’s state space, where a move…

Delineating Epistemic Injustice The notion of epistemic injustice wasn鈥檛 originally intended to be a catch-all term for harms generated by or within our epistemic practices (such as our practice of testimony). Fricker鈥檚 project was one of聽delineation; she wanted to 鈥榙elineate a distinctive class of wrongs, namely those in which someone is ingenuously downgraded and/or disadvantaged…

Minding Our Epistemic Business Recently, there has been a lot of theorizing about distinctively epistemic blame. This raises a question: why are the purely epistemic failings of others our business, such that we have standing to blame them? Cameron Boult provides an answer: given how thoroughly epistemically interdependent we are, our epistemic failures let others…