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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20200601T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20200601T170000
DTSTAMP:20200601T231349Z
CREATED:20200528T093546Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20200601T231349Z
UID:10000952-1591023600-1591030800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics & Logic Seminar Dr. Ole Hjortland: Logical Pluralism Without Collapse
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: I will present a new counterexample to the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles in the form of a world allowing for incompatible time-lines (or histories). The toy-universe I will be working with will be interpreted according to the Branching Space-Time Theory\, presented for the first time in Belnap (1992). In this sense\, I aim to show that Belnap’s Theory\, when interpreted as a strong metaphysical theory of indeterminism\, admits the construction of scenarios contravening PII. The counterexample I will be presenting will be tested against the three most famous lines of defence of the Principle\, as presented in Hawley (2009): the identity defence\, the discerning defence\, and the summing defence. It will be shown that\, unlike other alleged counterexamples to PII\, it proves successful against all these lines of defence.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-logic-seminar-8/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20200608T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20200608T170000
DTSTAMP:20200608T231416Z
CREATED:20200528T093550Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20200608T231416Z
UID:10000958-1591628400-1591635600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics & Logic Seminar: Aybüke Özgün\, Francesco Berto\, and Aaron Cotnoir: Title: Topic-Sensitivity\, Mereology\, Topology
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: The insight behind TSIM theory is that we should take at face value the view of belief\, knowledge\, (cognitive) information\, but also of other notions less explored in formal logic\, like imagination and mental simulation\, as (propositional) representational mental states bearing intentionality\, that is\, being about states of affairs\, issues\, situations\, or circumstances which make for their contents. I will generically call these things topics\, and provide a simple formal mereology for them. The semantics for our TSIMs will be given in a kind of conditional logic framework\, with an added mereology of topics.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-logic-seminar-9/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20200615T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20200615T170000
DTSTAMP:20200615T234353Z
CREATED:20200528T093552Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20200615T234353Z
UID:10000964-1592233200-1592240400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics & Logic Seminar Frederick Andersen Title: An Argument Against Justification Holism in the Epistemology of Logic
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: E-sentences (entailment-sentences) are metalinguistic sentences like [A –> B\, A /= B]\, [/= ¬(A & ¬A)]\, and [(A & ¬A) /= B]. This type of sentences is found at the heart of the epistemology of logic as their truth-values tell us what follows from what. Justification holism says that beliefs regarding E-sentences can only be justified in the context of a logical theory\, e.g. classical\, intuitionistic\, paraconsistent etc. Thus\, beliefs concerning E-sentences cannot be atomistically justified as isolated claims about logical consequence\, independently of theory choice. At present there is a developing interest in and endorsement of justification holism due to the revival of a broadly abductivist approach to the epistemology of logic. This paper presents an argument against holism by proving the existence of a foundational E-sentence which is justified independently of theory choice\, i.e. a justificational fixpoint of deductive entailment.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-logic-seminar-10/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20200622T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20200622T170000
DTSTAMP:20200622T232138Z
CREATED:20200528T093553Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20200622T232138Z
UID:10000971-1592838000-1592845200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics & Logic Seminar Daniel Nolan Title: Morals of the Story: Impossible Fiction
DESCRIPTION:Abstract \nWe can tell tales not just of what does not happen\, but of what cannot happen. I think this phenomenon can tell us two kinds of philosophically interesting things. It tells us interesting things about fiction and how to understand it. It also tells us interesting things beyond fiction: about how representation works\, about how concepts and conceptual truth works\, and about the epistemology of modal truths. This paper will be a tour of all of these topics. Finally\, I will discuss some ways of resisting these lessons\, and say why the resistance looks undermotivated.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-logic-seminar-11/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20200629T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20200629T170000
DTSTAMP:20200629T021453Z
CREATED:20200530T004310Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20200629T021453Z
UID:10000980-1593442800-1593450000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics & Logic Seminar Jace Snodgrass Title: The Modal-Separability Argument
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Take an account of property individuation to be hyperintensional just in case that account individuates properties more finely than necessary equivalence. Proponents of hyperintensional accounts of property individuation are generally led to embrace these accounts because of certain phenomena surrounding concepts like meaning\, thought\, and knowledge. For example\, we can think about a triangle being triangular without thinking about a triangle being trilateral. But critics of these accounts continue to maintain that such motivations are only the result of representational differences\, as opposed to differences in a way that the world is\, or a way that the world could be. In effect\, these critics tell us\, hyperintensional differences between properties are not real differences. The aim of this paper is to present and then closely examine an argument—call it\, ‘the Modal-Separability Argument’—that seems to underlie the rejection of treating hyperintensional differences between properties as real differences.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-logic-seminar-12/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics Reading Group
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