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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20191206T140000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20191206T160000
DTSTAMP:20200129T153323Z
CREATED:20200129T153323Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20200129T153323Z
UID:10000789-1575640800-1575648000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar – Jonathan Ichikawa (British Columbia) Deception and Valid Consent
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: When all goes well\, one’s agreement to φ constitutes valid consent to φ. If I agree to your doing X to me\, for instance\, and all goes well\, then I waive any right I had against your doing X to me\, and other things being equal\, you are morally permitted to do X to me. This paper concerns what it takes for all to be going\, in the relevant sense\, well. In particular\, under what circumstances does ignorance on my part\, or deception on yours\, prevent my agreement from constituting valid consent? Commonsense liberal ethics says it does so only when I am ignorant about central elements of the situation: if I am deceived about who it is I am agreeing to have sex with\, for example\, because of a partner’s disguise\, I do not give valid consent. But if I am seduced by someone who exaggerates their influence in my industry\, it is widely thought\, whatever wrong done to me is not a violation of my consent. Tom Dougherty has argued against this commonsense stance\, suggesting that any time one is deceived about a “dealbreaker”\, one’s consent is invalidated.\nI will argue three things. First\, Dougherty’s view cannot be right; it is subject to clear counterexamples. Second\, attempts to rehabilitate the dealbreaker framework by invoking subtler distinctions in the same spirit are unlikely to succeed; a parallel to the “defeaters” literature in post-Gettier epistemology is instructive. Third\, this motivates an altogether different way of thinking about the motivating questions: instead of focusing on whether deception can prevent one’s agreement to φ from constituting valid consent to φ\, we should focus instead on questions of just what contents one consenting to\, given the conventional ways in which consent is communicated.\n \nWhen all goes well\, one’s agreement to φ constitutes valid consent to φ. If I agree to your doing X to me\, for instance\, and all goes well\, then I waive any right I had against your doing X to me\, and other things being equal\, you are morally permitted to do X to me. This paper concerns what it takes for all to be going\, in the relevant sense\, well. In particular\, under what circumstances does ignorance on my part\, or deception on yours\, prevent my agreement from constituting valid consent? Commonsense liberal ethics says it does so only when I am ignorant about central elements of the situation: if I am deceived about who it is I am agreeing to have sex with\, for example\, because of a partner’s disguise\, I do not give valid consent. But if I am seduced by someone who exaggerates their influence in my industry\, it is widely thought\, whatever wrong done to me is not a violation of my consent. Tom Dougherty has argued against this commonsense stance\, suggesting that any time one is deceived about a “dealbreaker”\, one’s consent is invalidated. \nI will argue three things. First\, Dougherty’s view cannot be right; it is subject to clear counterexamples. Second\, attempts to rehabilitate the dealbreaker framework by invoking subtler distinctions in the same spirit are unlikely to succeed; a parallel to the “defeaters” literature in post-Gettier epistemology is instructive. Third\, this motivates an altogether different way of thinking about the motivating questions: instead of focusing on whether deception can prevent one’s agreement to φ from constituting valid consent to φ\, we should focus instead on questions of just what contents one consenting to\, given the conventional ways in which consent is communicated.
URL:/philevents/event/super-special-seminar-jonathan-ichikawa-british-columbia-deception-and-valid-consent/
CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20191210T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20191210T120000
DTSTAMP:20200129T153324Z
CREATED:20200129T153324Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20200129T153324Z
UID:10000791-1575972000-1575979200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar Walter Dean (Warwick) The liar and the sorites: towards a uniform arithmetical treatment
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: The unification of the paradoxes of truth and vagueness has been a topic of recurrent philosophical interest (e.g. McGee 1989/1990\, Tappenden 1993\, Field 2003/2008\, Priest 1994/2010). I will present a sequence of observations which illustrate how the liar and sorites paradoxes are formally related\, culminating in the observation that both give rise to similar sorts of mathematical incompleteness phenomena. On this basis\, I will highlight the possibility of using formal undecidability in modeling semantic indeterminacy.
URL:/philevents/event/super-special-seminar-walter-dean-warwick-the-liar-and-the-sorites-towards-a-uniform-arithmetical-treatment/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58�Թ�\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Conceptual Engineering Seminar,Super Special Seminar series
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20191212T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20191212T120000
DTSTAMP:20200211T153414Z
CREATED:20200129T153328Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20200211T153414Z
UID:10000794-1576144800-1576152000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar Walter Dean (Warwick) On consistency and existence in mathematics
DESCRIPTION:Abstract:  Following the publication of his Foundations of Geometry in 1899\, David Hilbert engaged in a well-known debate with Frege which concerned (amongst other things) the question of whether the consistency of a set of axioms entails the existence of a model in which they are satisfied.   I will consider this dimension of the so-called Frege-Hilbert controversy in light of the subsequent work in logic and philosophy which it inspired.  I will argue for the following claims: i) the controversy both anticipated Gödel’s completeness theorem and shaped its reception (in which Bernays played a central role); ii) Frege was right to maintain that consistency checking is as difficult as it can be; ii) Hilbert was also right to maintain that given consistency\,  demonstrating the existence of a model is as easy as it can be.
URL:/philevents/event/super-special-seminar-walter-dean-warwick-on-consistency-and-existence-in-mathematics/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58�Թ�\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20191219T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20191219T120000
DTSTAMP:20200211T153404Z
CREATED:20200129T153333Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20200211T153404Z
UID:10000800-1576749600-1576756800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/super-special-seminar/
CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series
END:VEVENT
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