BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//Philosophy events - ECPv6.16.5//NONSGML v1.0//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-WR-CALNAME:Philosophy events X-ORIGINAL-URL:/philevents X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Philosophy events REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H X-Robots-Tag:noindex X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Europe/London BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20200329T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20201025T010000 END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20210328T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20211031T010000 END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20220327T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20221030T010000 END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211011T093000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211011T110000 DTSTAMP:20211011T153811Z CREATED:20210713T164207Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211011T153811Z UID:10001331-1633944600-1633950000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: Walter Segrave\, Insolubles DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/medieval-logic-seminar-13/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211012T120000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211012T140000 DTSTAMP:20211012T153852Z CREATED:20210714T164459Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211012T153852Z UID:10001333-1634040000-1634047200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Language & Mind Seminar: Daniel Garibay Garcia (58³Ô¹Ï) DESCRIPTION:Authority and Group Assertion\n\nWe commonly attribute assertions to groups like companies and government institutions\, and we want to hold them accountable for their assertions. Intuitively\, we don’t attribute those assertions to the individuals performing them\, but to the groups. The question is: what kind of speech act is group assertion and how does it relate to individual assertion? Is it reducible to de second? In this work\, I defend an account based on having the authority to assert on behalf of the group. I take support from Lackey’s (2018) account of group assertion. I argue that her account has some important problems and I try to give a more succinct account of group assertion. URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-s1-6/ CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211012T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211012T170000 DTSTAMP:20211012T153852Z CREATED:20210714T164459Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211012T153852Z UID:10001334-1634050800-1634058000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Conceptual Engineering Seminar – Luciano Floridi (University of Oxford) – On Design and the Logic of Information DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/conceptual-engineering-seminar-15/ CATEGORIES:Conceptual Engineering Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211014T100000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211014T120000 DTSTAMP:20211014T153810Z CREATED:20210716T165401Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211014T153810Z UID:10001336-1634205600-1634212800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/super-special-seminar-11/ CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211014T130000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211014T143000 DTSTAMP:20211014T153810Z CREATED:20210716T165402Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211014T153810Z UID:10001337-1634216400-1634221800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Nick Kuespert (58³Ô¹Ï) “Aims of Moral Inquiry†DESCRIPTION:Abstract: What should the interaction between non-experts and experts look like when it comes to moral inquiry? In this talk\, I discuss this interaction from both perspectives. In the first part\, I argue that whether non-experts should treat experts as authorities or advisors depends on the aim of moral inquiry which in turn varies with context. I propose a hybrid model: by default\, the aim of moral inquiry is moral understanding and non-experts should therefore treat moral experts as advisors. If\, however\, moral understanding is unavailable or only attainable at high risk\, moral knowledge becomes the aim of moral inquiry and non-experts should treat moral experts as authorities. In the second part\, I argue that we should be careful not to conceive of moral experts as completely analogous to non-moral experts. In particular\, we can expect that many moral experts will be those negatively affected by injustices. This creates special procedural obligations for non-experts in their pursuit of moral expertise. URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-15/ CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR