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DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20210610
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20210612
DTSTAMP:20210610T131900Z
CREATED:20210504T101319Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210610T131900Z
UID:10001283-1623283200-1623455999@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Workshop on Identity and Individuation of Particulars and Universals
DESCRIPTION:The University of 58łÔąĎ’ ArchĂ© Philosophical Research Centre for Logic\, Language\, Metaphysics\, and Epistemology will host a one-day online workshop on Identity and Individuation\, which will take place on June 10th 2021\, 12:30PM-7PM (British Summer Time). \nThe aim of this workshop is to bring together and promote research in the metaphysics of identity and individuation\, and to draw connections with ongoing work in metaphysics\, including but not limited to: the logical form and function of criteria of identity\, identity and indiscernibility\, identity and essence\, identity and modality\, the individuation of particulars and properties\, intrinsic and extrinsic properties\, and qualitative and non-qualitative properties\, as well as assessments of the relative merits of the different criteria of identity for both particulars and properties on offer today. \n  \nProgramme\n(N.B. Details to access the workshop can be found at the bottom of this webpage) \n12:30-12:55 Registration and Coffee \n12:55-13:00 Introduction \n13:00-14:00 Tim Button (University College London) \n14:00-14:15 Break \n14:15-15:15 Sophie Allen (Keele University) \n15:15-15:30 Break \n15:30-16:30 Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (University of Oxford) \n16:30-16:45 Break \n16:45-17:45 Vera Hoffman-Kolss (University of Bern) \n17:45-18:00 Break \n18:00-19:00 Sam Cowling (Denison University) \n  \nTim Button (University College London) \nTitle: Getting precise on indiscernibility \nAbstract: “Are there indiscernible but distinct objects?” That question is imprecise\, in at least two regards: \nFirst: there are many notions of indiscernibility. For example: we say (roughly) that two objects are two-symmetricaliff you can swap the objects without affecting the overall structure. (More precisely: a and b are two-symmetrical iff there is an automorphism mapping a to b and b to a.) We say that two objects are Leibniz-indiscernible iff they stand in exactly the same relations to all entities. These are distinct notions. When asking questions about indiscernibility\, we need to know which notion we have in mind. \nSecond: every notion of indiscernibility makes reference to a background language\, with regard to which discernment occurs. When asking questions about indiscernibility\, we need to choose a particular language. Which language we choose might depend on our purposes. For example\, if we are interested in our ability to refer (determinately) to one entity rather than another\, we should presumably choose a language we can acquire and manifest. By contrast\, if we are interested in whether there are “metaphysically” indiscernible entities\, we will have to assume there is a metaphysically privileged language. \nTo see why this matters\, I will run through the question “Are there indiscernible but distinct mathematical objects?” It transpires there is a “cheap” to a version of the identity of indiscernibles (with the most demanding notion of indiscernibility); and it is not obviously too cheap. \n  \nSophie Allen (Keele University) \nTitle: Sortalism\, Token Identity\, and the Conception of a Particular \nAbstract: The conflict between sortalism and token identity between the mental and the physical is not unexpected: the former requires that the individuation of events or objects be based somehow on their type\, their essence or the properties which they have\, while the latter maintains that particulars can be identified across disparate domains regardless of type. In this paper\, I consider the prospects for resolving this dispute\, or for rejecting sortalism and characterising particulars in a way which is compatible with token identity. \n  \nGonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (University of Oxford) \nTitle: An Argument for the Identity of Indiscernibles \nAbstract: I shall argue that there is no trivial version of the Identity of Indiscernibles. I shall also identify the weakest version of the Identity of Indiscernibles (a fortiori the weakest non-trivial version of it) and give an argument for it based on considerations of grounding. \n  \nVera Hoffman-Kolss (University of Bern) \nTitle: Interventionism and the Individuation of Properties \nAbstract: Under what conditions is a property P identical with a property Q? Interventionist theories of causation and causal models provide a prima facie plausible answer to this question: P and Q are identical iff they (or the variables representing them) assume exactly the same position in all possible causal models. This criterion is problematic\, however\, if properties are individuated hyperintensionally\, that is\, if there are properties P and Q that are distinct\, but instantiated by the same individuals in all possible worlds. In this paper\, I argue that causal modeling frameworks can overcome this difficulty if the dependence relations occurring in them are characterized in terms of counterpossible conditionals. \n  \nSam Cowling (Denison University) \nTitle: Haecceitism by the Numbers \nAbstract: Haecceitism holds that things could be just as they are in all qualitative respects—e.g.\, with respect to properties like shape and mass—but differ non-qualitatively—e.g.\, with respect to which individuals exist or which qualitative roles they occupy. Although debate over the truth of haecceitism is commonplace\, investigation into the nature or variety of haecceitistic differences we ought to accept is far more limited. This essay explores the challenges that haecceitists face when specifying which haecceitistic differences are genuine. After considering competing proposals that deliver gruesome or natural species of haecceitism\, we turn to some empirical studies of haecceitistic intuitions. We conclude by considering what differ species of haecceitism might mean for the effectiveness of conceivability arguments for haecceitism. \nDetails to access the workshop:  \nWhere: Zoom \nMeeting ID: 895 194 2082 \nMeeting Password: PHD2020 (Invite link) \nIf you have any questions\, please contact one of the organizers: Matteo Nizzardo (email- mn85@st-andrews.ac.uk) or Jace Snodgrass (email- js413@st-andrews.ac.uk).
URL:/philevents/event/1st-workshop-on-identity-and-individuation/
LOCATION:A virtual workshop by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔąĎ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Workshops
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DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20210617
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20210619
DTSTAMP:20210617T135307Z
CREATED:20210504T101339Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210617T135307Z
UID:10001287-1623888000-1624060799@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Workshop on Hyperintensional Metaphysics
DESCRIPTION:The University of 58łÔąĎ ArchĂ© Philosophical Research Centre for Logic\, Language\, Metaphysics and Epistemology will be hosting a Workshop on Hyperintensional Metaphysics\, which will take place on the 17th of June 2021. \nThe aim of this Workshop is to bring together and promote research in the area of Hyperintensional Metaphysics\, and to draw connections with ongoing work in Metaphysics\, including (but not limited to): causation\, essence\, grounding\, explanation\, the individuation of propositions and properties\, intrinsic and extrinsic properties\, conditionality\, impossible worlds\, and truthmaking. Further\, other areas up for discussion also include: questions regarding the metaphysical status of hyperintensional phenomena\, objections against hyperintensional analyses\, or kinds of analyses\, as well as assessments of the relative merits of the different accounts of hyperintensional metaphysics on offer today. \nConference Venue: Online on Zoom (N.B. There is a 100 participant capacity.) \nProgramme (All times are British Summer Time) \n12:30-12:55 Registration and Coffee \n12:55-13:00 Introduction \n13:00-14:00 Timothy Williamson (University of Oxford) \n14:00-14:15 Break \n14:15-15:15 Maya Eddon (University of Massachusetts\, Amherst) \n15:15-15:30 Break \n15:30-16:30 Sara Bernstein (University of Notre Dame) \n16:30-16:45 Break \n16:45-17:45 Daniel Nolan (University of Notre Dame) \n17:45-18:00 Break \n18:00-19:00 Kit Fine (New York University) \n  \nTimothy Williamson (University of Oxford) \nTitle: Is Hyperintensionalism Good Science? \nAbstract: Theories in metaphysics can be compared abductively\, in a way similar to the abductive comparison of theories in natural science. By that standard\, how do hyperintensionalist theories when compared to their natural rivals\, intensionalist theories? (Here intensionalism about states of affairs\, properties\, relations\, etc. holds that they are identical if necessarily equivalent\, while hyperintensionalism is the denial of intensionalism.) \nSimplicity is one salient abductive virtue. In most cases\, hyperintensionalist theories are manifestly more complicated than their intensionalist rivals\, so the issue is whether the former can compensate on other dimensions for this initial disadvantage. Hyperintensionalism is sometimes held to have an advantage over intensionalism in being a less constraining framework than intensionalism\, but from an abductive perspective that is a mistake: extra degrees of freedom weaken a theory (i.e. make it less informative) and so in themselves are an abductive vice. Furthermore\, the intensionalist approach has been far more systematically and fully developed than hyperintensionalist accounts\, has proved its worth in applications outside philosophy (e.g. in computer science\, theoretical economics\, and linguistics)\, and is closely related to frameworks in very general use in science (e.g. probability spaces). Another disadvantage of hyperintensionalism is that its unrestricted versions are inconsistent (Russell-Myhill paradoxes)\, while its restricted versions involve further losses of simplicity and elegance; there is no analogous threat to intensionalism. \nIf hyperintensionalist theories are to survive abductive comparison with their intensionalist rivals\, they will have to do so by fitting the data better (for which the extra complications and loss of informativeness would be the price to be paid). However\, the data to which they appeal are shaky. The relevant judgments seem to project features of discourse onto the extra-linguistic world\, e.g. relevance\, aboutness\, contextual shifts\, perspicuousness of explanations\, and can be explained away by intensionalists without ad hoc auxiliary assumptions. By abductive standards\, intensionalism is way ahead of hyperintensionalism. \n  \nMaya Eddon (University of Massachusetts\, Amherst) \nTitle: On Not Having Mass \nAbstract: What does it mean for an object to lack some quantitative feature\, like mass?  Does such an object instantiate the property having no mass\, or does it instantiate the property having 0 units mass\, or is there even any distinction between the two?  I will show that no matter what we say we must deal with some counterintuitive results.  I lay out several views and their consequences\, and argue in favor of one of these views. \n  \nSara Bernstein (University of Notre Dame) \nTitle: Countersocial Counterfactuals \nAbstract: We often reason about what our lives would have been like if we had belonged to different social groups\, as in “If I had been born into a Victorian English family\, I wouldn’t have gotten married\,” or “If I hadn’t been a woman\, I would have had an easier time in that meeting.” This talk aims to make sense of such countersocial counterfactuals\, conditionals whose antecedents run contrary to social facts. I distinguish between several sorts of countersocials\, and suggest that some countersocials are non-vacuous counterpossibles. After arguing for the explanatory power of such countersocials\, I suggest that countersocial counterfactuals play an important role in social explanations. I discuss the benefits of adopting a hyperintensional framework (i.e.\, a framework for distinguishing between necessarily equivalent claims) for the evaluation of countersocials. I conclude by suggesting that a plausible similarity metric for countersocial counterfactuals must take into account the nature of unitary and intersectional social groups. \n  \nDaniel Nolan (University of Notre Dame) \nTitle: The Hyperintensional Mind \nAbstract: The case for hyperintensionally individuated mental contents is now hard to resist. That is\, it is clear that agents do not automatically believe all the necessary equivalents of the things they believe; and they do not always desire necessary equivalents to the same degree. Debate continues about the ontology of the contents of belief and desire. Issues include whether to characterise contents as propositions or properties; whether to think of the propositions or properties as structured or unstructured; and if contents are not individuated by necessary equivalence\, how fine-grained should we take them to be. \nWe would like an account of what it is about an agent that determines she has one set of mental contents rather than another. One influential picture of how content is determined\, associated with the kinds of functionalism defended by David Lewis\, Frank Jackson\, Robert Stalnaker and others\, outlines an account of the contents of an agent’s attitudes in terms of how the agent\, others like her\, and her internal states are disposed to behave across a range of possible circumstances. This kind of story can be developed to handle a rich range of impossible contents as well\, provided we equip ourselves with hyperintensional metaphysical resources. In particular\, if we endorse non-trivial counterpossible conditionals and non-trivial dispositions to respond in impossible circumstances\, we can characterise the “modal” profiles of agents\, states\, and populations in the way needed to deliver a foundational story about agents with fine grained attitudes. The resulting understanding of mental content is a useful guide to the metaphysics of those contents themselves. It suggests a picture of contents as sets of worlds rather than as structured contents\, and offers some guidance on the question of the fine-grainedness of belief and desire. \n  \nKit Fine (New York University) \nTitle: Why go Hyperintensional? \nAbstract: I will give some purely logical reasons why it might be helpful to adopt a hyperintensional approach to logics – such as those for the counterfactual and deontic operators – that are commonly taken to be intensionial. \n  \nOrganizers: \nJace Snodgrass \nMatteo Nizzardo
URL:/philevents/event/workshop-on-hyperintentional-metaphysics/
LOCATION:A virtual workshop by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔąĎ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Workshops
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