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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210513T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210513T173000
DTSTAMP:20210512T103602Z
CREATED:20210504T101422Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210512T103602Z
UID:10001299-1620921600-1620927000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk – Emmalon Davis (Michigan)
DESCRIPTION:Title: ‘Challenging the Pursuit of Novelty’ \nAbstract: Novelty—understood as the value of saying something new—appears to be a good-making feature of a philosophical contribution. Beyond this\, however\, novelty functions as a marker of philosophical success: contributions that say something new are considered successful\, while contributions that do not say something new are considered unsuccessful. When novelty serves as a marker and metric of success\, the pursuit of novelty becomes an aspirational ideal. This paper challenges the presumption and expectation that a successful philosophical contribution will be a novel one. \nTo do so\, I distinguish two constituent components—novelty as ingenuity/originality and novelty as discovery/priority—which\, taken together\, comprise the aspirational ideal of novelty. I outline a series of traps or pitfalls associated with the practical pursuit of each component part and show that efforts to avoid traps associated with one render philosophers vulnerable to traps associated with the other. I argue that an aspirational ideal of novelty should be rejected\, as the pursuit of each component part is in tension with the other. Throughout my analysis\, I demonstrate that the greatest risks accompanying the pursuit of novelty are unevenly distributed and that an aspirational ideal of novelty disadvantages certain practitioners disproportionately. I conclude that an aspirational ideal of novelty is less desirable and less feasible than it appears. \n*** \nThis event is co-hosted with the Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory Seminar. \n 
URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-emmalon-davis-the-new-school/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Emilia Wilson":MAILTO:ew58@st-andrews.ac.uk
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210520T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210520T173000
DTSTAMP:20210520T110421Z
CREATED:20210504T101422Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210520T110421Z
UID:10001300-1621526400-1621531800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk – Rima Basu (Claremont McKenna College)
DESCRIPTION:Title: ‘Normative Expectations’ \nAbstract: In supplementing the familiar ways that our interpersonal relationships are morally fraught\, recent work in epistemology on doxastic wronging has highlighted how these relationships can be epistemically fraught as well. However\, in focusing predominantly on beliefs— mental states that arguably constitute a small fraction of our mental lives—these theories have their own theoretical blindspots. In this paper\, I expand the scope of analysis to expectations. Typically\, we notice the failures of expectations when we’re the targets of them: when we let our loved ones down. Key indicators of the presence of normative expectations are feelings of disappointment and betrayal. Contexts in which these feelings manifest most vividly involve parents and their hopes and dreams for our lives. Focusing on these contexts\, I argue that normative expectations play three distinctive roles: a predictive role\, a prescriptive role\, and a proleptic role. Each role\, I conjecture\, comes with its own avenue for moral\, epistemic\, and conceptual failure. Ultimately\, in precisifying the heterogeneous class of attitudes that constitute normative expectations\, I reveal just how expansive the ‘doxastic’ in doxastic wronging ought be. \n  \n*** \nThis event is co-hosted with the Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory Seminar.
URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-rima-basu-claremont-mckenna-college/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Emilia Wilson":MAILTO:ew58@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210526T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210526T173000
DTSTAMP:20210526T111929Z
CREATED:20200819T112737Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210526T111929Z
UID:10001063-1622044800-1622050200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk – Jonathan Quong (University of Southern California)
DESCRIPTION:Title: The Permissibility of Lesser Evil \nAbstract: \nFlood:   Flood water is headed toward a cave where five innocent people are trapped and will be killed if the water reaches them. The water can be diverted into a mineshaft\, but innocent Betty is trapped in the mineshaft and will be killed if the water is redirected. Albert is a bystander who has seen and understood the whole situation\, and he stands next to a switch that can divert the flood. He can easily flip the switch. \nWhen considering cases like this\, some people believe that Albert is morally required to save the five at the cost of Betty’s life (the requirement thesis). Others believe that Albert is permitted but not required to save the five (the permissive thesis). I argue in favor of the permissive thesis and against the requirement thesis. I conclude by considering some further implications for the ethics of self-defense and war.
URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-jonathan-quong/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
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