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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220505T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220505T173000
DTSTAMP:20260618T131954
CREATED:20220223T193847Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220504T234218Z
UID:10001517-1651766400-1651771800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) – Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Duke University)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 \nTitle: How to Build Morality into AI \nAbstract: AI is spreading fast. We humans need to figure out the best way to prevent AI from making the worst decisions\, which are harmful\, unfair\, or otherwise morally wrong. One way is to design AI to predict what humans would judge to be immoral if they were informed\, rational\, and impartial. Then the AI can use that information when making its choices. This talk will illustrate this method in a test case of who gets the kidney when two patients need a transplant but only one kidney is available. This same approach can be extended to other areas of morality\, including end-of-life decisions in medicine\, hiring and promotion in business\, pretrial release in criminal law\, and autonomous vehicles and weapons. The result will be AI that aligns with our deepest values.
URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-walter-sinnott-armstrong-duke-university/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220512T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220512T173000
DTSTAMP:20260618T131954
CREATED:20220302T194206Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220512T123809Z
UID:10001521-1652371200-1652376600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online only) – Jeff McMahan (Oxford University)
DESCRIPTION:Title: “Compensation for Wrongful Life” \nAbstract: In a recent case in the UK\, a 20-year-old woman with spina bifida brought an action against her mother’s physician for failing to advise her to take folic acid supplements for several months before becoming pregnant. The court ruled in the woman’s favor\, accepting her claim that\, had the physician not acted negligently\, the mother would have had a healthy child. Yet this healthy child would have been a different child. So the physician’s omission was not worse\, or on balance bad\, for the plaintiff\, who has a life that is well worth living. If anything\, it benefited her. So on what basis can she claim a right to compensation\, or damages? I consider whether the court might have justified its decision by appealing to Parfit’s “No-Difference View\,” which asserts that it makes no moral difference whether a bad effect is worse for anyone. I will consider as well whether there is a requirement to cause a better-off individual to exist rather than a different\, less well-off individual\, or whether it might be permissible to cause the less well-off individual to exist. Also\, do an agent’s intentions matter to whether the agent is liable to pay damages in a case of wrongful life? Finally\, is a claim of wrongful life better grounded if the explanation of why the individual ought not to have been caused to exist concerns suffering in the individual’s life rather than a comparative lack of benefits?
URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-jeff-mcmahan-oxford-university/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Joel Joseph":MAILTO:jj73@st-andrews.ac.uk
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220525T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220525T160000
DTSTAMP:20260618T131954
CREATED:20220321T203816Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220525T130906Z
UID:10001523-1653489000-1653494400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) – Matthew Adler (Duke University)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 and Teams \nTitle: “Person-Affecting Consequentialism: Equity-Regarding\, Desert-Neutral\, Repugnant” \nAbstract: \nThe philosophical literature on consequentialism regularly distinguishes between “person-affecting” and “impersonal” moral justifications or accounts.   The “person-affecting”/”impersonal” distinction can be interpreted in various ways.  I understand it as follows.  A person-affecting justificatory framework sees individuals’ well-being gains and losses—well-being effects on persons—as the fundamental moral considerations that underlie the moral goodness of outcomes. \nMy research has investigated the implications of the person-affecting framework\, using the concept of “claims-across-outcomes”—a concept that seeks to make the framework more rigorous and to draw clear implications from it. This talk will present and synthesize the results of this research program. \nIn a nutshell: the claims-across-outcomes framework argues for a moral-goodness ranking that satisfies an equity axiom (the Pigou-Dalton axiom)\, as opposed to utilitarianism; is neutral to individual differences in desert; and (extended to the variable-population context) implies the Repugnant Conclusion.  In short\, person-affecting consequentialism is equity-regarding\, desert-neutral\, and repugnant.  Surprisingly\, perhaps\, the simple idea that moral goodness is grounded on well-being gains and losses has these upshots.
URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-matthew-adler-duke-university/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
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