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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220601T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220601T160000
DTSTAMP:20260618T000859
CREATED:20220322T203811Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220601T135308Z
UID:10001524-1654093800-1654099200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Enrico Galvagni – CEPPA Work-In-Progress Talk (in person)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 \nTitle: Hume’s Account of Virtue and Its Place in the History of Ethics \nAbstract: Hume’s account of virtue is notoriously puzzling. On the one hand\, he claims that the virtues are qualities useful or agreeable to oneself or to others. On the other\, he says that they are qualities which give a pleasing sentiment of approbation to a spectator. In this paper\, I argue that these two claims are part of one unified definition of virtue and that Hume’s apparently idiosyncratic account is best explained historically. To do so\, I show that Hume inherited from Natural Law theorists (such as Pufendorf and Locke) the problem of squaring the existence of morality with the belief that physical entities have\, in themselves\, no moral relevance. The solution offered by his predecessors\, however\, was not available to Hume who refused to ground morality in the authoritative command of God. I claim that Hume’s account of virtue has to be explained as an attempt to introduce a naturalistic and secular solution to this central problem in the history of ethics.  
URL:/philevents/event/enrico-galvagni-ceppa-work-in-progress-talk-2/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Luca Stroppa":MAILTO:ls330@st-andrews.ac.uk
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220609T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220609T173000
DTSTAMP:20260618T000859
CREATED:20220402T212403Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220609T142910Z
UID:10001526-1654790400-1654795800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) – Brian Hedden (ANU)
DESCRIPTION:Location: School 6 \nTitle: Counterfactual Decision Theory \nAbstract: I defend counterfactual decision theory\, which says that you should evaluate an act in terms of which outcomes would likely obtain\, were you to perform it. Counterfactual decision theory has traditionally been subsumed under causal decision theory as a particular formulation of the latter. This is a mistake. Counterfactual decision theory is importantly different from\, and superior to\, causal decision theory. Causation and counterfactuals come apart in three kinds of cases. In cases of overdetermination\, an act can cause a good outcome without the latter counterfactually depending on the former. In cases of constitution\, an act can constitute a good outcome rather than causing it. In cases of determinism\, either the laws or the past counterfactually depend on your act\, even though your act cannot cause the laws or the past to be different. In each of these cases\, it is counterfactual decision theory which gives the right verdict\, and for the right reasons. \nCo-Hosted with ECT
URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-brian-hedden-anu/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Jessica Brown":MAILTO:jab30@st-andrews.ac.uk
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