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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230406T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230406T173000
DTSTAMP:20260615T211012
CREATED:20230106T172315Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230406T133827Z
UID:10001678-1680796800-1680802200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online only) – Catherine Elgin (Harvard)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Teams (online only) \nTitle: Epistemic Dynamics \nAbstract: Epistemic agents are finite and fallible.  Our range is limited and some of what we accept is\, no doubt\, flawed.  To achieve our epistemic and practical objectives\, we devise methods and practices that foster correction\, refinement\, and expansion of our current epistemic commitments. Traditional epistemology maintains that epistemic acceptability requires non-fortuitously justified true belief\, where non-fortuitousness insures that the justification and the truth maker align. If so\, reflective equilibrium is at best indicative of acceptability.  I argue otherwise.   Reflective equilibrium is constitutive of epistemic acceptability.  Because a network of cognitive commitments in reflective equilibrium is as reasonable as any available alternative in the epistemic circumstances\, it is worthy of acceptance.  That does not make it perfect or permanently acceptable.  Such a network is susceptible of and probably in need of improvement.  But it is the best we can currently do and provides a suitable platform for improvement.  I argue that such a network should be designed to foster\, not merely to allow for\, further gains.  It should support epistemic leveraging.  That requires that it enable critical reflection about its own ends and means\, enabling epistemic agents to recognize opportunities for and obstacles to improvement. \nCo-hosted with ECT.
URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-online-only-catherine-elgin-harvard/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Viviane Fairbank":MAILTO:vf45@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230413T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230413T173000
DTSTAMP:20260615T211012
CREATED:20230113T172321Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230413T142710Z
UID:10001681-1681401600-1681407000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) – Daniel Muñoz (UNC Chapel Hill)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 \nTitle: Values as Vectors \nAbstract: Often\, two things seem tied in value\, though slightly improving one would not break the tie. How can we model such ‘insensitivity to sweetening’? A leading answer is that overall values\, rather than being like precise numbers\, must be imprecise\, giving rise to a special nontransitive value relation\, which Chang calls parity. But parity is notoriously hard to pin down\, and imprecise values are neither necessary nor sufficient for modeling sweetening. I propose instead to model overall values as many-dimensional vectors. The result is a fresh and flexible framework for the stranger side of ethics—as well as an elegant definition of parity as a tie between things of nonfungible value.
URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-daniel-munoz-unc-chapel-hill/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230420T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230420T173000
DTSTAMP:20260615T211012
CREATED:20230120T175322Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230420T143824Z
UID:10001682-1682006400-1682011800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) – Bart Streumer (University of Groningen)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 \nTitle: “Superspreading the Word”.\n\nAbstract: Quasi-realists are expressivists who say much of what realists say. To avoid making their view indistinguishable from realism\, however\, they usually stop short of saying everything realists say. Many realists therefore think that something important is missing from quasi-realism. I will argue that quasi-realists can undermine this thought by defending a version of quasi-realism that I will call super-quasi-realism. This version seems indistinguishable from realism\, but I will argue that this is a mistaken impression that arises because we cannot believe super-quasi-realism.
URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-bart-streumer-university-of-groningen/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230427T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230427T173000
DTSTAMP:20260615T211012
CREATED:20230127T180823Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230427T152405Z
UID:10001683-1682611200-1682616600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) – Jordan MacKenzie (Virginia Tech)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 \nTitle: Humorlessness and Moral Recognition \nAbstract: We’re often quick to point fingers at people who fail to find humor in themselves. And our accusations have a moral tinge: we decry people for being sanctimonious buzzkills\, and command them to  ‘get over themselves’. But are these moralized reactions justified? And what\, if anything\, justifies them? In this paper I argue that humourlessness often is a moral failing. This is because humorlessness often involves a disrespectful failure or refusal to engage with other peoples’ perspectives. I’ll then explore what implication this account has for accusations of humorlessness in oppressive social contexts\, and I’ll argue that one of the harms of oppression is that it makes having a sense of humor towards oneself morally risky.
URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-jordan-mackenzie-virginia-tech/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk
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