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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240307T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240307T173000
DTSTAMP:20260614T222511
CREATED:20231208T172702Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240307T124012Z
UID:10001814-1709827200-1709832600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online) – Renee Jorgensen (Michigan)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Encroachment and epistemic negligence \nAbstract: In this talk\, I argue that the moral duty of non-negligence is a fruitful way to understand and motivate the claim that moral reasons can ‘encroach’ on epistemic norms. More forcefully: we should readily affirm that on the epistemic norms governing agents like us—that is\, who have limited cognitive resources\, conduct inquiries with widely varying practical and moral stakes\, and who rely on belief to simplify and structure their practical deliberation—the strength of evidential warrant necessary to justify belief is responsive to the gravity of the costs of being mistaken. I suggest that a ‘purism’ about doxastic justification that denies this faces a dilemma: either a belief’s being justified suffices to license using it to structure inference and inquiry\, or it isn’t. If it is\, then being insensitive to non-truth-conducive factors leaves the standard for justified belief unresponsive to relevant risks. If it isn’t\, then it is unclear what theoretical value the notion justified belief has\, and we still need something to fill the role of licensing the relevant epistemic moves (which will be responsive to the risks.) \nLocation: Teams (online only)\, we will bee streaming it from Edgecliffe G03
URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-online-renee-jorgensen-michigan/
LOCATION:Microsoft Teams
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Jessica Brown":MAILTO:jab30@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240312T173000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240312T190000
DTSTAMP:20260614T222511
CREATED:20231213T175523Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240312T125530Z
UID:10001816-1710264600-1710270000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:1st Sarah Broadie Memorial Lecture – Ursula Coope
DESCRIPTION:Title: Contingency and the Present \nLocation: School V
URL:/philevents/event/1st-sarah-broadie-memorial-lecture-ursula-coope/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240314T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240314T173000
DTSTAMP:20260614T222511
CREATED:20231215T180532Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T131144Z
UID:10001817-1710432000-1710437400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online) – Sergio Tenenbaum (Toronto)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Practical Reason and the Satisfaction of Desire \nLocation: Teams (online only) \nAbstract: I have a desire for dulce de leche ice-cream (or that I myself eat ice-cream) but there’s no ice-cream nearby. A heavenly angel takes pity on me and decides she will help me out. She conjures the ice-cream and quickly shoves it through my mouth at a temperature that burns my taste buds just as I had finished eating a whole watermelon. She then tells me: “Smile away my dear mortal; your desire has been satisfied!”. This vignette illustrates a well-known issue in understanding the nature of desire: the problem of under-specification. This problem has been recently debated mostly in the context of philosophy of language as a problem for a standard theory of propositional attitudes. My interest here is not to settle the dispute in the philosophy of language\, but to understand better how the satisfaction of desire is determined in the context of practical reason. That is\, in the above vignette\, I certainly failed to procure what I wanted. But if not in the mismatch between the proposition (or the common noun\, or the infinitival) that I use to express my desire and the facts on the ground\, in virtue of what has my desire failed to find satisfaction? After all\, the world seems to have conformed to the content of my will. \nIn this paper\, I first investigate the different ways in which desire finds no satisfaction. I then argue that a certain understanding of how desire relates to the good explains\, better than any other alternative\, how what is represented in my desire can fail to find satisfaction in the world despite its content being made true. In fact\, I will argue that this phenomenon provides an important argument for the guise of the good; since “satisfaction” seems to be the major potential alternative as the formal object of desire and intentional action\, the fact that satisfaction is inseparable from at least the apparent good\, shows that these are not rival aims of agency but one and the same formal object of our practical attitudes. I will end with a potential difficulty for this argument; namely\, that some cases of failure of satisfaction seem to require a “guise of the pleasant” above and beyond the “guise of the good”. I briefly sketch how on a Kantian view of human agency the guise of the pleasant is incorporated into the guise of the good and even more briefly try to explain how a similar account might be available to those less sympathetic to the Kantian conception of agency.
URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-online-sergio-tenenbaum-toronto/
LOCATION:Microsoft Teams
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Johannes Nickl":MAILTO:jmn20@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240321T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240321T173000
DTSTAMP:20260614T222511
CREATED:20231222T185426Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240321T130857Z
UID:10001818-1711036800-1711042200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) – Elad Uzan (Oxford)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Compromises and Lesser-Evil Compromises in Ending Wars. \nAbstract: Contemporary conflicts often lack a clear end-state\, posing challenges to the traditional notion of victory in just wars. This ambiguity calls for a revaluation of war’s objectives\, suggesting that wars should end without a clear victory. In this paper\, I will explore various moral and non-moral considerations that structure the duty to reach war-ending compromises. I will assess whether a defender has a duty to seek a compromise peace before fully achieving its objectives and address the tension between achieving a just peace and a lasting peace. The conclusion of a war often necessitates accepting moral hazards: the just side may need to make sacrifices and relinquish certain entitlements and the unjust side may secure wrongful gains. I will also examine the potential moral risks of prematurely terminating just wars. Lastly\, I will discuss the duty to enter negotiations and the moral complexities of negotiating the conclusion of wars. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-elad-uzan-oxford/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240328T154500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240328T170000
DTSTAMP:20260614T222511
CREATED:20240104T195459Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240328T134039Z
UID:10001823-1711640700-1711645200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) – Quân Nguyen (Edinburgh)
DESCRIPTION:This talk is part of our series on Climate Ethics \nTitle: Is despair about climate breakdown rational? \nAbstract: Both within the wider climate and environmentalist movement as well as in academic circles\, it has become a common assumption that\, in order to maintain and sustain actions against the climate crisis\, we need to avoid despair. Despair about the climate crisis\, so philosophers and environmentalists alike\, is the opposite of hope\, and should be avoided on grounds of both rational aptness and pragmatic considerations. Despair about climate breakdown is only rationally apt if it is impossible for our actions to make a difference – as our actions do make a difference\, despair is not a fitting response to climate change (McKinnon 2014). Further\, we have pragmatic or strategic reasons to avoid despair as it leads to apathy and inaction about climate change by hindering our agency and our capacity for moral imagination (Malm 2021\, Huber 2023\, Thaler 2022). In this paper\, I argue that this consensus has moved too fast\, and that despair even in its fundamental form is a rationally apt response to the climate crisis. Despair is a fitting response to the structural features of the climate crisis in terms of fragmentation of agency and moral corruption (Gardiner 2006)\, making despair an accurate representation of a situation lacking agency. Despair is thereby an important source of moral knowledge about the structure of the climate crisis\, which in itself is not automatically outweighed by pragmatic reasons of counterproductivity (Hutton 2022\, Srinivasan 2017)\, and a demand to avoid despair can lead to affective injustice for young people\, climate activists\, climate scientists and anyone concerned with the climate crisis. The paper closes with considerations whether despair hinders moral imagination\, arguing that in several paradigmatic cases\, despair can spurn radical militant action just as much as hope can \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 \n 
URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-quan-nguyen-edinburgh/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
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