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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240404T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240404T173000
DTSTAMP:20260614T210636
CREATED:20240105T195329Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240404T140955Z
UID:10001824-1712246400-1712251800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) – John Broome (Oxford)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 \nTitle: The Continuum Argument Is Invalid \nAbstract: Derek Parfit argues by means of something he calls a ‘continuum argument’ that a particular appealing premise in population axiology implies a conclusion that he and many others consider repugnant. He treats this as a paradox\, and takes up the challenge of resolving it. He looks for a way to avoid the repugnant conclusion. The solution he offers depends on the existence of imprecision within the relation of betterness among populations. Other philosophers have taken up the same challenge\, following Parfit’s lead\, and offered similar solutions. I shall show that actually the repugnant conclusion is not implied by Parfit’s appealing principle. The continuum argument is invalid. There is therefore no paradox and no real challenge. Moreover\, the explanation of why this is so has nothing to do with imprecision\, incompleteness\, incommensurateness\, indeterminacy or vagueness in betterness. It is consistent with a sharp\, complete betterness ordering.
URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-john-broome-oxford/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Luca Stroppa":MAILTO:ls330@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240411T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240411T173000
DTSTAMP:20260614T210636
CREATED:20240112T202750Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240411T141656Z
UID:10001840-1712851200-1712856600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) – Michael Gill (Edinburgh)
DESCRIPTION:Title: The Formality of the Humean Authoritative Ought \nAbstract: There are different things we ought to do. There is what we ought to do insofar as we are seeking to advance our long-term interests. There is what we ought to do insofar as we are trying to do our job well. There is what we ought to do insofar as we are trying to be good friends. Different oughts can conflict with each other. There may be times when we think such conflict is irresolvable. But at least sometimes we think the conflict is resolvable. At least sometimes we think that one thing we ought to do overrides all others. You might think\, for instance\, that helping a friend in a particular situation is what you really ought to do\, even if it means neglecting your job and forgoing your own interests. Call the ought that overrides all others the authoritative ought. \nWhat makes it true that we authoritatively ought to perform an action? What I will call Humean views hold that what makes it true that we authoritatively ought to perform an action is that we would\, were we to reflect properly\, have a positive response toward performing the action. In this paper I elucidate a distinction within Humean views of the authoritative ought\, and argue for one side over the other. The distinction is between substantivism and formalism\, and the side I argue for is the formalist. \nHumean substantivists (such as Julia Driver and Dale Dorsey) believe that proper reflection will lead all of us to the same substantive practical principles—to principles with content\, to principles that prescribe particular types of action. According to substantivists\, because proper reflection would lead all of us to certain substantive principles\, we can identify the actions that fall under those principles as those we authoritatively ought to perform.  \nHumean formalists (such as W.D. Falk and Sharon Street) deny that we are warranted in thinking that proper reflection will lead everyone to the same substantive principles. According to formalists\, we can identify the form of authoritative oughts: what we authoritatively ought to do is what we would respond positively to when we reflect properly. But that is all we can do. We cannot identify the authoritative ought with any substantive content. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 \n 
URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-michael-gill-edinburgh/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240425T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240425T173000
DTSTAMP:20260614T210636
CREATED:20240126T220115Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240425T153822Z
UID:10001843-1714060800-1714066200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) – Helen Frowe (Stockholm)
DESCRIPTION:Title: The Permissibility of Collective Defence Agreements \nAbstract: Collective defence agreements (CDAs)\, of the sort that exist between\, for example\, NATO members\, EU members\, and African Union members\, are a prime example of a prominent deterrence mechanism. They promise a degree of assistance that will make it almost impossible for an adversary to win an aggressive war against any member. On the face of it\, then\, such agreements seem obviously morally permissible and\, indeed\, morally desirable. However\, I suspect that the moral picture is in fact much more mixed. For example\, acting on a CDA is unlikely to minimise harm compared available alternatives. If\, as I believe\, states are usually subject to a duty to minimise harm when aiding\, then acting on CDAs is likely to be permissible only if doing so is exempt from this duty. This talk explores some of the moral issues raised by CDAs and deterrent mechanisms more broadly. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-helen-frowe-stockholm/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Joel Joseph":MAILTO:jj73@st-andrews.ac.uk
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