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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T173000
DTSTAMP:20260614T190026
CREATED:20240402T140839Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240502T161437Z
UID:10002007-1714665600-1714671000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) – Bridget Bradley (58łÔąĎ)
DESCRIPTION:This talk is part of our series on Climate Ethics. \nTitle: Ethical births\, ethical deaths: Climate anxiety in Britain through the life course \nAbstract: This paper is based on anthropological research conducted with climate activists on the topic of climate anxiety in Britain. Drawing on themes of kinship and its relationship to mental health and activism\, the paper considers the ethical questions surrounding birth and death as significant moments in the life course. Through ethnographic and autoethnographic reflections\, this work reveals how climate anxiety re-frames expectations surrounding what counts as appropriate ways to enter and leave the world\, situated within the context of the cultural politics of contemporary Britain in a time of ecological crisis.\n \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 \n 
URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-bridget-bradley-st-andrews/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T173000
DTSTAMP:20260614T190026
CREATED:20240416T142456Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240509T164232Z
UID:10002033-1715270400-1715275800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CANCELLED CEPPA Talk (in person) –  Victor Tadros (University of Warwick)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Consent\, Intent\, and Communication \nWhat is consent? I will assume that it is a normative power – a power to alter rights and duties directly. If this is right\, how is consent exercised? I will argue that consent is exercised through the execution of intentions to alter practical reasoning. Successful communication is not needed for valid consent. Even an attempt to communicate is not needed (though it is the central way of consenting). What is needed is an intention that the consentee understands that their practical reasoning is altered – their understanding that they are permitted to do what the consenter consents to. More precisely\, I defend: \nPermissive Intentions: X consents to Y aing where they execute their intention permit Y to a by intending that Y understands that X has permitted Y to a. \nThis View contrasts with familiar alternative views in four ways. \nFirst\, consent is concerned with altering the consentee’s practical reasoning\, and not just with altering the normative status of the consentee’s conduct. So\, a person cannot give consent where they believe that altering the consentee’s practical reasoning is impossible\, even where they wish the normative status of the target’s conduct to be altered. This contrasts with pure mentalist views that consent can be given just by having a mental state or performing a mental action without attempting to alter the consentee’s practical reasoning. Second\, consent can be given without external behaviour that is sufficient to give the consentee grounds to conclude that the consenter has permissive intentions. Consenters can try but fail to give others evidence of their intentions. This contrasts with one kind of externalist view that external evidence or signs of permissive intentions are necessary for consent. Third\, consent is given only if the consenter intends to permit the consentee’s conduct. This contrasts with another kind of externalist view that external evidence or signs of permissive intentions are sufficient for consent. Fourth\, consenters necessarily intend to permit consentees’ conduct. It is insufficient for consent that a person intends the recipient of their communication to believe that they intend to permit them to act. A person can pretend to consent by communicating that they intend to permit an act without actually intending to permit it. And sometimes this might result in the consenter forfeiting a right against the consentee acting. But consent is absent. This contrasts with the view that intending to communicate that one has permissive intentions is sufficient for consent whether or not the consenter has these intentions. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-neil-sinhababu-national-university-of-singapore/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240516T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240516T173000
DTSTAMP:20260614T190026
CREATED:20240506T163900Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240516T205342Z
UID:10002062-1715875200-1715880600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) – Neil Sinhababu (National University of Singapore)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Pleasure Fundamentalism \nAbstract: Pleasure fundamentalism is the view that moral value is the same thing as pleasure and this explains all other moral facts. This talk presents two arguments for pleasure fundamentalism and discusses the form of naturalism they arise from. According to the Reliability Argument\, all processes generating moral belief are unreliable\, except for phenomenal introspection which tells us that pleasure is good. According to the Universality Argument\, pleasure is universal moral value\, because of its qualitative identity with the pleasure in the minds of all possible perceivers of moral value. Both arguments are available within an Einsteinian naturalism combining empiricism with a spacetime ontology\, and avoiding behaviorism in favor of a more Humean psychology. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-neil-sinhababu-national-university-of-singapore-2/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240529T170000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240529T183000
DTSTAMP:20260614T190026
CREATED:20240517T205331Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240528T122321Z
UID:10002077-1717002000-1717007400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Public Lecture: Stephen Gardiner (University of Washington)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Beyond Institutional Denial: A Global Constitutional Convention for Future Generations \nAbstract: Humanity is in deep institutional denial. Current institutions are failing future generations\, in part because there is a governance gap when it comes to promoting intergenerational concern. This gap facilitates a tyranny of the contemporary that puts the young and other future generations at risk. Climate change is a prime example. To confront intergenerational tyranny\, humanity needs more than merely a Summit for the Future. It needs a global constitutional convention focused on future generations.
URL:/philevents/event/public-lecture-stephen-gardiner-university-of-washington/
LOCATION:School II (St. Salvator’s)
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240530T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240530T173000
DTSTAMP:20260614T190026
CREATED:20240517T205332Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240528T122321Z
UID:10002078-1717084800-1717090200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Public Lecture: Tahseen Jafry (Glasgow Caledonian University)
DESCRIPTION:Title: About Climate Justice: What Does it Mean and What Lies Ahead? \nAbstract: In July 2023\, Europe reached scorching milestones with relentless heatwaves and Scotland had its hottest June ever. Several regions grappled with unprecedented rainfall\, triggering ecological and socioeconomic upheaval. However\, impacts aren’t equally distributed\, those who contribute minimally to carbon emissions\, find themselves on the frontline of these erratic weather extremes.  \nDespite being on our doorstep\, the reality of climate disparities and injustices remains largely hidden. Scotland must prepare to connect with and apply a climate justice framework. This talk will explore how to embrace the changes we are witnessing in our climate and delve into a positive dialogue on what we needs to be made to combat climate inequality\, ensuring well-being and economic prosperity for all.  \n  \n The second lecture will be followed by a wine reception (location to be announced) – all are very welcome to attend!
URL:/philevents/event/public-lecture-tahseen-jafry-glasgow-caledonian-university/
LOCATION:School II (St. Salvator’s)
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
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