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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241003T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241003T173000
DTSTAMP:20260614T144844
CREATED:20240912T213846Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241003T220859Z
UID:10002151-1727971200-1727976600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Barry Maguire (Edinburgh)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Two Moralities of Recognition \nAbstract: According to moralities of recognition\, fundamental moral norms are norms for living together. Moral norms explain how living in unity is possible despite being separate individuals\, they explain how we can relate to each other as persons that are more than mere sources of benefits and burdens\, obstacles and opportunities. Those who relate to each other according to these norms stand in relations of mutual recognition. By contrast\, some moral theories are atomistic — they deny that fundamental moral norms are communal norms. The paper explains the appeal of morality of recognition and elaborates a distinction between two kinds of moralities of recognition. Some envision a community founded on respect; according to these theories\, mutual recognition is mutual respect. Others offer a fundamentally different vision of the moral community\, namely\, one founded on concern; according to these theories\, mutual recognition is mutual concern. We examine T. M. Scanlon’s contractualism as a fully developed\, influential\, and relatively recent version of respect morality and argue that Scanlon’s morality of respect has certain distinctive structural features. We then articulate the contours of an alternative\, morality of concern\, which offers a different idea of moral community and has a distinctively different structure. Our goal is not to present an argument for morality of concern\, but to explain what makes it attractive and to make clear that choosing between the two kinds of moralities of recognition involves choosing between two substantively different visions of how to live together. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-online-barry-maguire-edinburgh/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241010T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241010T173000
DTSTAMP:20260614T144844
CREATED:20240912T213849Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241010T122306Z
UID:10002154-1728576000-1728581400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Adrian Walsh (University of New England)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Internal Validity\, External Validity and the Evaluation of Thought Experiments in Applied Ethics and Political Philosophy \nAbstract: Thought experiments clearly play a central role in much contemporary ethical theorising. In the recent literature on thought experiments\, some commentators (e.g. Wilson 2016; Dowding 2019) have criticised the lack of attention paid by moral philosophers to two ideas which are key notions in science. These are internal and external validity. Wilson argues that if thought experiments are indeed a kind of experiment\, then philosophers should begin any plausible search for rigour in the scientific literature on experimental research design. When designing a thought experiment\, Wilson suggests we consider the extent to which ethical judgements that are correct or endorsed in the world of the experiment generalise to the world beyond the experiment. This is an important question to consider. However\, I suggest that Wilson’s approach (i) overstates the connection between real-world scientific experiments and thought experiments (ii) focuses too readily on the formal structure of thought experiments at the expense of the argumentative context. With respect to the former claim\, I suggest that this points towards a more general thesis that it is a mistake to treat the reasoning involved in the use of thought experiments as a subset of scientific reasoning. I shall also consider\, towards the end of the talk\, a more moderate (and plausible) view of the positive role that the concepts of internal and external validity might play in evaluating and assessing the legitimacy of thought experiments. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-online-adrian-walsh-university-of-new-england/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241017T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241017T173000
DTSTAMP:20260614T144844
CREATED:20240917T213857Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241016T122310Z
UID:10002165-1729180800-1729186200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online) – Valerie Tiberius (Minnesota)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Happy Immoralists and Satisfied Loners: A Pragmatic Perspective on Disagreement about Well-being \nAbstract: Can a morally bad person live well? Can a person without friends achieve well-being? There is long-standing disagreement about the correct answers to these questions. I offer a diagnosis of the debate between those who answer “no” (objectivists about well-being) and those who answer “yes” (subjectivists about well-being). I suggest that the reason people are divided about this question is that the opposing answers represent two different perspectives on well-being that answer to two different sets of practical interests. Given this diagnosis\, the cure is to acknowledge the importance of both perspectives. I discuss different ways of doing this. \nLocation: online & livestreamed from Edgecliffe G03
URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-online-valerie-tiberius-minnesota/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241028T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241028T170000
DTSTAMP:20260614T144844
CREATED:20241010T122307Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241028T123958Z
UID:10002203-1730131200-1730134800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:In person Talk by Tom Angier (University of Cape Town)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Goodness as Natural Perfection. \nAbstract: In this paper I outline Aristotle’s conception of human functioning\, which I take to be a viable and illuminating ground for determining human goods. I then look at alternative schemata for the notion of ‘function’ – ones derived from evolutionary theory – and argue that they are not preferable to their Aristotelian rival. I finish the paper by looking at ‘neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism’\, in particular that of Philippa Foot\, and argue that it is not Aristotelian enough.\n\nBio: Tom Angier is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cape Town. He works on neo-Aristotelian ethical and political theory. He is currently completing a monograph entitled “Human Nature\, Human Goods: A Theory of Natural Perfectionism”. It is due to be published by Cambridge University Press in 2025.
URL:/philevents/event/in-person-talk-by-tom-angier-university-of-cape-town/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241031T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241031T173000
DTSTAMP:20260614T144844
CREATED:20241001T220828Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241031T123943Z
UID:10002189-1730390400-1730395800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Katharina Bernhard (58�Թ�) and Graeme MacGilchrist (58�Թ�)
DESCRIPTION:Please join us on 31 October (4-5.30pm) for the launch of the Philosophy of Climate Science (PhiCliSci) working group\, which will bring together philosophers and climate scientists to discuss central themes relating to the climate crisis. In the first session\, climate scientist Graeme MacGilchrist and philosopher Katharina Bernhard will give presentations on the topic of ‘Uncertainty’ in climate science\, after which the floor is open for discussion. \nTitle: Uncertainty \nLocation: The Stewart Room in Younger Hall
URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-online-katharina-bernhard-st-andrews-and-graeme-macgilchrist-st-andrews/
LOCATION:The Stewart Room in Younger Hall\, Younger Hall\, 58�Թ�\, KY16 9AJ\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
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