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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220414T160000
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DTSTAMP:20260619T104459
CREATED:20220225T193844Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220414T222517Z
UID:10001518-1649952000-1649957400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk – David Christensen (Brown University)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Epistemic Akrasia: No Apology Required \nAbstract: It is natural to think that rationality imposes some relationship between what a person believes\, and what she believes about what she’s rational to believe. Epistemic akrasia—for example\, believing P while believing that P is not rational to believe in your situation—is often seen as intrinsically irrational. This paper argues otherwise. In certain cases\, akrasia is intuitively rational. Understanding why akratic beliefs in those case are indeed rational provides a deeper explanation how typical akratic beliefs are irrational—an explanation that does not flow from akrasia per se. This understanding also allows us to diagnose where general anti-akratic arguments go wrong. We can then see why even principles designed to allow only moderate akrasia fail\, and also why recognizing the possibility of rational akratic beliefs does not call for finding some other epistemic defect in agents who believe akratically. Believing akratically\, in itself\, is nothing to apologize for.\nCo-Hosted with ECT.
URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-david-christensen-brown-university/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Nick Kuespert":MAILTO:nk94@st-andrews.ac.uk
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