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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201005T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201005T170000
DTSTAMP:20201005T230248Z
CREATED:20200708T155410Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201005T230248Z
UID:10000998-1601910000-1601917200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar Claudio Calosi Title: How to Build Things from Atoms
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Mereological atomism is the thesis that everything is ultimately composed of atomic parts. Typically\, this thesis is characterized by an axiom stating\, more simply\, that everything has atomic parts. The present paper argues that the success of the standard characterization crucially depends both on how the notion of composition is related to the notion of sum and on how the notion of sum is initially defined. In particular\, we put forward a novel definition of mereological sum such that: (i) provided no strong decomposition principle is assumed\, it is not equivalent to extant definitions in the literature; (ii) can be used to claim that the standard characterization of atomism fails in that for something to have atomic parts is not sufficient for it to be be the sum of its atoms\, and (iii) delivers a purely mereological distinction between structured and unstructured wholes [Joint Work with Alessandro Giordani\, Catholic University of Milan].
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-tba-4/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201012T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201012T170000
DTSTAMP:20201012T224529Z
CREATED:20200714T162825Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201012T224529Z
UID:10001017-1602514800-1602522000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar Roy Sorenson
DESCRIPTION:Title: Mini-Meno: How to Get More Out of Your Transmission \nAbstract: My positive thesis is that competent deduction can add justification not already present in the premise – contrary to a tradition inaugurated by Plato’s dialogue Meno. My negative thesis is there is a novel counter-example to Counter-closure. According to this conservative principle\, if you now know a conclusion by virtue of deducing it from a premise\, then you knew that premise all along the inferential process. The counter-example features a lazy but logical student Mini. Doctor Evel tells her D: All deductive arguments reason from general to particular.  When she is unpersuaded\, Doctor Evel cites the definition of deduction in the Oxford English Dictionary. In light of this authority\, Mini does not know that D is false. But then she rallies: Not D\, therefore. Not D. Whether her premise counts as general or particular\, her own deduction constitutes a direct counterexample to D.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-tba-5/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201019T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201019T170000
DTSTAMP:20201019T220046Z
CREATED:20200721T175956Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201019T220046Z
UID:10001024-1603119600-1603126800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar tba Mark Jago Title: Metaphysical Structure
DESCRIPTION:Metaphysical structure is the way things hang together\, in and of themselves\, and aside from their causes and effects and propensities to behave. Examples include: truth depending on reality\, the mind depending on the brain\, sets depending on their members\, disjunctions depending on their disjuncts\, wholes depending on their parts\, types being realised by their tokens\, determinables being determined by their determinates. These might all be understood as cases of grounding – or rather\, they might if we understood what grounding is. In this talk\, I investigate parallels between metaphysical construction and familiar logical operators. First\, there’s a link between composition (of parts into a whole) and conjunction. Second\, I argue\, there’s a link between some familiar metaphysical relations and disjunction. On the picture that emerges\, metaphysical structure may be understood as logical structure\, whilst remaining a genuine mind\, concept\, and language-independent feature of reality.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-tba-6/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201026T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201026T170000
DTSTAMP:20201026T223513Z
CREATED:20200731T181119Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201026T223513Z
UID:10001032-1603724400-1603731600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar Sara Bernstein Title: Ontological Pluralism about Non-Being
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: This talk develops ontological pluralism about non-being\, the view that there are multiple ways\, kinds\, or modes of non-being. I suggest that the view is both more plausible and defensible than it first seems\, and that it has many useful applications across a wide variety of metaphysical and explanatory problems. After drawing out the relationship between pluralism about being and pluralism about non-being\, I discuss logical notation strategies for the pluralist about non-being. I examine historical precedent for the view. Finally\, I suggest that pluralism about non-being has explanatory power across a variety of domains\, and that the view can account for differences between nonexistent past and future times\, between omissions and absences\, and between different kinds of fictional objects.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-tba-7/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
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