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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201102T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201102T170000
DTSTAMP:20201102T233930Z
CREATED:20200804T184546Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201102T233930Z
UID:10001038-1604329200-1604336400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar Christopher Masterman
DESCRIPTION:Title: How Serious is Serious Actualism?\n\n\nAbstract: Serious Actualism is a view which many find compelling: it is impossible for an object to exemplify a property and not exist. In this talk\, I aim to do two things. First\, I argue that there are compelling reasons for thinking that there is a property of nonexistence and that it is possibly exemplified. Thus\, Serious Actualism\, as standardly construed\, is false. Second\, I defend a neglected approach to Serious Actualism. I distinguish between a strong and a weak formulation of the view by drawing on the distinction between truth in\, and truth at\, a possible world. I argue that we should endorse only the weak formulation of Serious Actualism. This allows us to accommodate for much of what rings true about Serious Actualism without running into problems posed by properties like the property nonexistence.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-tba-8/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58�Թ�\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201109T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201109T170000
DTSTAMP:20201109T162629Z
CREATED:20200813T190938Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201109T162629Z
UID:10001045-1604934000-1604941200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar Barbara Vetter
DESCRIPTION:Title: Essence\, Potentiality\, and Modality \nAbstract: According to essentialism\, metaphysical modality is founded in the essences of things\, where the essence of a thing is roughly akin to its real definition. According to potentialism (also known as dispositionalism)\, metaphysical modality is founded in the potentialities of things\, where a potentiality is roughly the generalized notion of a disposition. Essentialism and potentialism have much in common\, but little has been said about their relation to each other. The aim of my talk is to better understand the relations between essence and potentiality\, on the one hand\, and between essentialism and potentialism\, on the other. It is argued\, first\, that essence and potentiality are not duals but interestingly linked by a weaker relation dubbed ‘semi-duality’; second\, that given this weaker relation\, essentialism and potentialism are not natural allies but rather natural competitors; and third\, that the semi-duality of essence and potentiality allows the potentialist to respond to an important explanatory challenge by using essentialist resources without thereby committing to essentialism.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-tba-9/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58�Թ�\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201116T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201116T170000
DTSTAMP:20201116T162808Z
CREATED:20200818T202306Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201116T162808Z
UID:10001052-1605538800-1605546000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar Franz Berto
DESCRIPTION:Title: Indicative Conditionals: Probabilities and Relevance \nAbstract: Adams’ Thesis claims that the acceptability of a simple indicative conditional equals the corresponding conditional probability. The Thesis is widely endorsed\, but arguably false and refuted by empirical research. To fix it\, we submit\, we need a relevance constraint: we accept a simple conditional ‘If ϕ\, then ψ’ to the extent that (i) the conditional probability p(ψ|ϕ) is high\, provided that (ii) ϕ is relevant for ψ. How (i) should work is well-understood. It is (ii) that holds the key to improve our understanding of conditionals. We propose a formal framework giving acceptability and logical closure conditions for simple indicatives: its probabilistic component (i) uses Popper functions; its relevance component (ii) is given via an algebraic structure of topics. We then present the resulting logic. We argue that its (in)validities are both theoretically desirable and in line with empirical results on how people reason with conditionals.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-tba-10/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58�Թ�\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201123T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201123T170000
DTSTAMP:20201123T161448Z
CREATED:20200819T112945Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201123T161448Z
UID:10001078-1606143600-1606150800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar Travis Manuel
DESCRIPTION:Title: “Good News for the Subregion Theory of Parthood”\n\nAbstract: The Subregion Theory of Parthood is probably the most intuitive theory of parthood. It says that whatever is exactly located at a subregion of your exact location is part of you\, and nothing else is. Mutatis mutandisfor all material objects. I defend this view from its two worst enemies: colocation and interpenetration. It is inconsistent with colocation\, but I argue that colocation is (at least physically) impossible. Some have alleged that it is inconsistent with interpenetration\, but I complicate matters by showing that it is inconsistent with some but not all cases of interpenetration. Fortunately\, those cases are all also (at least physically) impossible. This is good news for the Subregion Theory of Parthood\, which looks more compelling for having defeated its worst enemies.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-tba-11/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58�Թ�\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201130T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201130T170000
DTSTAMP:20201130T164714Z
CREATED:20200819T112948Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201130T164714Z
UID:10001084-1606748400-1606755600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar Sean Walsh (University of California\, Los Angeles)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Modeling contingently existing propositions (and other intensions). \nAbstract: The traditional Montagovian framework for the analysis of intensional language uses constant domain models. However\, in other areas of philosophy which employ modal logic\, it is much more common to use variable domain models which permit various forms of contingent existence. Part of the difficulty in integrating the Montagovian framework with the variable domain setting is due to its higher-order nature. One facet of this is just the trivial issue that a function from actually existing individuals to actually existing individuals is not a function from possibly existing individuals to possibly existing individuals. Hence\, there is no obvious outer domain for the contingently existing higher-order entities to reside in\, in contrast to the case of standard first-order quantified modal logic. In this work we outline a semantics on which the outer higher-order domain is pieced together from the varying inner domains. We then test this framework out on the traditional Stalnakerian view about contingently existing propositions. This is joint work with Greg Lauro (UC Irvine\, LPS).
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-tba-12/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58�Թ�\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
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