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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201207T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201207T170000
DTSTAMP:20201207T172121Z
CREATED:20200819T112951Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201207T172121Z
UID:10001091-1607353200-1607360400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar Fraser Macbride
DESCRIPTION:Title: CONVERSE PREDICATES AND THE INTERPRETATION OF SECOND ORDER QUANTIFICATION  \n ABSTRACT: In this paper I argue that we cannot interpret second-order quantification as quantification over properties and relations. My argument forges a hitherto unexplored connection between debates typically conducted independently\, one metaphysical\, about whether there are converse relations\, the other logical\, about the interpretation of second-order quantifiers. I begin from the semantics of converse predicates. Either we suppose that pairs of mutually converse predicates co-refer or they do not. If we suppose they do co-refer\, I argue that we lack an understanding of the relevant class of higher-order predicates which are required for second-order quantification over a domain of relations to make sense. If we suppose they don’t co-refer but pick out distinct converse relations then I argue that even if we do understand the relevant class of higher-order predicates enough to make sense of quantification over relations\, we do so only at great theoretical cost. Either way\, I conclude that second-order quantification should not be interpreted as quantification over properties and relations.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-tba-13/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58�Թ�\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201214T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201214T170000
DTSTAMP:20201214T174743Z
CREATED:20200819T112954Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201214T174743Z
UID:10001097-1607958000-1607965200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar Maya Eddon Title: The Humean Objection to unHumean Laws
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: The denial of necessary connections between distinct existences is generally taken to be at the heart of Humanism\, and any philosophical account that requires necessary connections is rejected on the grounds that it violates Hume’s dictum.  In this paper\, I focus on Armstrong’s account of lawhood.  Lewis objects to Armstrong’s account on Humean grounds – the account requires necessary connections of the sort the Humean renounces. But the Humean rejection of Armstrong’s account is not so straightforward.  I discuss several different ways one can understand the Humean denial of necessary connections\, and argue that there is no plausible understanding that will yield the result that Armstrong’s account – and other alleged “unHumean” accounts – employs necessary connections.  So perhaps the denial of necessary connections is not as close to the heart of the Humeanism as we sometimes think.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-tba-14/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58�Թ�\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
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