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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210503T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210503T170000
DTSTAMP:20200819T113130Z
CREATED:20200819T113130Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20200819T113130Z
UID:10001135-1620054000-1620061200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar tba
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-tba-19/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58�Թ�\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210510T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210510T170000
DTSTAMP:20210510T104929Z
CREATED:20200819T113135Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210510T104929Z
UID:10001140-1620658800-1620666000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar Helen Beebee (University of Manchester)
DESCRIPTION:Title: The Genesis of Lewis’s Counterfactual Analysis of Causation\n\n\nAbstract: Lewis presented a prototype counterfactual analysis of causation back in 1958 — aged just 16 or 17 — in the very first undergraduate philosophy essay he ever wrote. I place this paper in its historical context\, relating it to the state of the debate at that time both about counterfactuals and\, in philosophy and law\, about causation. I also trace his view as it developed in two further versions of the paper written during the following two years\, and say something about the further development of his view between then and the publication of his seminal ‘Causation’ in 1973.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-tba-20/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58�Թ�\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210517T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210517T170000
DTSTAMP:20210517T114923Z
CREATED:20200819T113137Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210517T114923Z
UID:10001145-1621263600-1621270800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar Fatema Amijee (University of British Columbia)
DESCRIPTION:TITLE: Fundamentality Without Favouritism \nABSTRACT: According to a widely endorsed conception of fundamentality\, the fundamental is characterized in terms of a certain privileged relation or set of relations. On this conception\, something is fundamental just in case it is unexplained relative to a unique privileged relation or a privileged set of relations. Let us say that such a conception of fundamentality shows favouritism\, for it privileges some relations over others in in its characterization. First\, I will argue that fundamentality characterized in terms of a single privileged relation or set of relations cannot do all the work we need fundamentality to do. In particular I will show that we also need an ecumenical conception of fundamentality\, according to which fundamentality is relativized to some metaphysical dependence relation or other.  On this conception\, there is no one privileged relation or set of relations that determines what qualifies as fundamental. Instead\, something qualifies as fundamental relative to any given metaphysical dependence relation just in case it is unexplained relative to that relation. Second\, I will argue that the conception of fundamentality characterized in terms of a privileged relation or set of relations itself relies on the ecumenical conception of fundamentality for its coherence\, and that the ecumenical conception is thus conceptually basic
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-tba-21/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58�Թ�\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210524T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210524T170000
DTSTAMP:20210524T123418Z
CREATED:20200819T113139Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210524T123418Z
UID:10001150-1621868400-1621875600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar Andrea Oliani (University of St. Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:TITLE: Against Conservative Ontology\n\nABSTRACT: In his recent book Objects: Nothing Out of the Ordinary (2015)\, Dan Z. Korman argues in favour of conservatism in metaphysics\, that is\, very roughly\, that what we ordinarily take there to be is true. Especially\, we are right about how many objects there are and what these objects are supposed to be. Korman takes conservatism to be opposed both to permissivism\, according to which there is much more than we ordinarily take there to be\, and eliminativism\, according to which\, there is nothing of (or much less than) we ordinarily take there to be. Korman’s master conservative defence relies on what he calls the “arguments from counterexamples” plus an epistemic “theory of apprehension”. In this talk\, I’ll show that his defensive line is ineffective and that permissivism – at least the version of it I favour – can be vindicated.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-tba-22/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58�Թ�\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210531T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210531T170000
DTSTAMP:20210531T125000Z
CREATED:20200819T113142Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210531T125000Z
UID:10001155-1622473200-1622480400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar Kathrin Koslicki (Université de Neuchâtel)
DESCRIPTION:TITLE: Artifacts and the Limits of Human Creative Intentions \nABSTRACT: According to Amie Thomasson’s author-intention-based account of artifacts\, an artifact of kind K is essentially a product of a largely successful intention to create something of kind K (see\, e.g.\, Thomasson (2003)\, “Realism and Human Kinds”\, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research\, Vol. 67\, No. 3\, pp. 592-602). A maker has the relevant intention if and only if she has a substantive concept of the nature of Ks which largely matches that of prior makers of Ks (if any) and she intends to realize that concept by imposing K-relevant features. In cases of prototype production\, however\, where there are no prior exemplars of the artifactual kind in question\, Thomasson argues that what it is to be a K and what the K-relevant features are is determined\, as a matter of invention or stipulation\, purely by the content of the maker’s intentions and the goals she sets out to achieve through her creative act. As a result\, an agent who is constructing a prototype is related in a special way to the artifact and the artifactual kind she creates which protects her from certain kinds of error concerning the outcome of her creative act (see\, e.g.\, Thomasson\, Amie (2007)\, “Artifacts and Human Concepts”\, in Creations of the Mind: Theories of Artifacts and Their Representation\, edited by Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence\, Oxford University Press\, New York\, NY\, pp. 60-61). In this paper\, I discuss the adequacy of Thomasson’s treatment of prototype production. I argue that the process of prototype production in fact allows for various sources of errors and failures on the part of agents attempting to carry out their creative intentions that are not recognized by Thomasson’s author-intention-based account. The possibility of this kind of divergence between the intentions of authors and the outcome of their creative efforts thus calls for an alternative conception of prototype-production and of the nature of artifacts more generally.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-tba-23/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58�Թ�\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
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