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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210607T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210607T170000
DTSTAMP:20210607T131900Z
CREATED:20200819T113144Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210607T131900Z
UID:10001160-1623078000-1623085200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar Thomas Randriamahazaka (University of St. Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Truthmaker semantics for containment and nonsense\n\nAbstract: Conceptivism is the doctrine according to which a proposition cannot entail another proposition if the latter contains a concept which is not already contained in the former: entailment does not introduce any additional conceptual content. This doctrine motivates so-called containment logics\, namely logics where a formula B cannot be deduced from a formula A if B contains a propositional variable which is not already contained in A. Interestingly\, most containment logics can be described as the result of filtering another logic by this syntactic condition. For instance\, A follows from B in Parry’s logic PAI if and only if A classically follows from B and all the propositional variables of B occur in A. Routley uses this fact to discredit containment logics as syntactic artefacts lacking any semantic depth. In this talk\, I investigate the semantic properties of containment logics to rebut Routley’s critique. I look at two recent strategies to semantically characterise containment logics without syntactic filters: Berto (2019)’s two-component semantics\, where entailment contains a condition of topical inclusion\, and logics of nonsense (e.g.\, Ferguson (2015))\, which include a truth-value representing meaninglessness. Both are somewhat unsatisfactory and call for a more general approach. I argue that the framework of truthmaker semantics (e.g.\, Fine (2017)) can be used to that end. I develop sound and complete truthmaker semantics for logics of nonsense and adapt them to model containment logics. The truthmaker understanding of containment logics provides a purely semantic foundation for them\, thus refuting Routley’s claim that they are syntactic artefacts.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-tba-24/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210614T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210614T170000
DTSTAMP:20210614T133418Z
CREATED:20200819T113146Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210614T133418Z
UID:10001165-1623682800-1623690000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar Hitoshi Omori (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
DESCRIPTION:Title: On American and Australian plans for negation \nAbstract: Francesco Berto\, later joined by Greg Restall\, defends a modal account of negation\, or the Australian plan for negation. The aim of this talk is to carefully examine and compare Australian and American plans for negation. To this end\, I will consider four cases\, and draw some implications for both plans. The four cases include (i) FDE-family\, also with Shrieking and Shrugging idea deployed by Jc Beall\, (ii) intuitionistic logic\, (iii) treatment of Aristotle’s thesis\, and (iv) the system CLoN made use of by Diderik Batens.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-tba-25/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210621T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210621T170000
DTSTAMP:20210621T135437Z
CREATED:20200819T113149Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210621T135437Z
UID:10001170-1624287600-1624294800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar Matteo Nizzardo and Jace Snodgrass (University of 58³Ô¹Ï)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Something Must Go \nAbstract: In this talk\, we identify a tension between the intensional criterion of property identity and Leibniz’s Law. In particular\, we argue that these two widely accepted criteria\, when taken together and examined in light of certain assumptions\, offer a circular analysis of the identity of properties and objects.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-tba-26/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210628T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210628T170000
DTSTAMP:20210628T152306Z
CREATED:20200819T113151Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210628T152306Z
UID:10001175-1624892400-1624899600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar Joaquim Giannotti (University of Birmingham)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Fundamentality and Humean Laws of Ground \nAbstract: What grounds facts of ground? Some metaphysicians invoke fundamental grounding laws to answer this question. These are general principles that link grounded facts to their grounds. The main business of this talk is to advance the debate about the metaphysics of grounding laws by exploring the prospects of a plausible yet underexplored Humean account. In the positive part\, I articulate such a novel view and argue for its merits. This view shuns essences and takes laws to be unmysterious elite regularities. Therefore\, it is a promising alternative for theorists of ground who demur the acceptance of essentialism about grounding laws but nonetheless think that these are needed in our theorizing. In the negative part\, I argue that widely accepted principles of ground and Humeanism jeopardize the fundamentality of the grounding laws. I discuss two immediately available and prima facie appealing strategies to evade this threat. I show that both have undesirable theoretical costs. However\, I conclude with an optimistic take: by rejecting an orthodox principle that links partial and full grounds\, we can recover the fundamentality of Humean grounding laws.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-tba-27/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
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