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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210913T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210913T170000
DTSTAMP:20210913T222309Z
CREATED:20210628T152320Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210913T222309Z
UID:10001308-1631545200-1631552400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics Seminar Aaron Cotnoir (University of 58³Ô¹Ï)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Partial identity and mereotopology \nAbstract: How should we think about the ways in which identity and parthood interact? One important line of thought comes from the joint influence of the two Davids: Armstrong and Lewis. The underlying idea is that mereological overlap is a kind of identity – namely\, partial identity. The aim of this paper is to ask whether there may be principled reasons to doubt that two partially identical objects must share some part. We wish to explore a notion of partial identity that does not require the existence of some separate part of both. We then provide a formal theory of such a relation drawn from mereotopology. We then consider an application in the philosophy of mathematics.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-seminar/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210920T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210920T170000
DTSTAMP:20210920T230814Z
CREATED:20210831T210810Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210920T230814Z
UID:10001402-1632150000-1632157200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics Seminar Matthew Green (University of 58³Ô¹Ï)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Relevance in the Logic of Imagination \nAbstract: Reality-oriented mental simulation is a kind of imagination. The working assumption is that\, when trying to determine whether a match would light if struck\, one initially imagines striking the match and\, together with relevant beliefs imported into the imaginative scenario\, mentally simulates what would happen. But what beliefs count as relevant in this context? And how is relevance to be modelled in the logic of imagination? \nDifferent answers to these questions yield different approaches in the logic of imagination\, including possible worlds approaches (Lewis 1978\, Heintz 1979\, Niiniluoto 1985\, Costa–Leite 2010)\, impossible worlds approaches (Berto 2014\, Priest 2016a\, Priest 2016b\, Berto 2016\, Berto 2017\, Berto and Jago 2019)\, and subject matter approaches (Berto 2018a\, Berto 2018b). In the first part of the talk\, I’ll argue that these approaches do not adequately model relevance. In the second\, I’ll propose a new approach and argue that\, whilst an improvement\, it is not without issue. I’ll introduce a significant problem for the approach and show how I’ve tried to solve it.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-seminar-11/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210927T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210927T170000
DTSTAMP:20210927T233811Z
CREATED:20210629T152333Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210927T233811Z
UID:10001318-1632754800-1632762000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics Seminar Travis Manuel (University of 58³Ô¹Ï)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Composition as Identity defeats an Ethical Objection to Four-Dimensionalism\n\nAbstract:\nJohnston\, Olson\, and Taylor have argued against four-dimensionalism on the grounds that it commits us to the existence of personites\, which are proper temporal parts of four-dimensional persons. They argue that the existence of personites makes many of our moral beliefs and practices untenable\, so we must either give up those beliefs and practices or reject four-dimensionalism. I show that composition as identity can solve this problem: composition as identity can make four-dimensionalism and personites consistent with our moral beliefs and practices. Four-dimensionalism is saved and we have a novel reason to endorse composition as identity.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-seminar-2/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
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